stephen holmes RT report

RT’s original uncensored report which exposes Stephen Holmes’ identity.

I’m more used to breaking stories concerning the Mossad than I am the CIA.  But in this case, Russia Today (now known as RT) dropped a scoop right in my lap.

The main thrust of this story deals with the exposure of an accused CIA operative, Ryan Fogle, who was arrested in Moscow several days ago.  Fogle’s “cover” was a job as third political secretary of the U.S. embassy.  His “crime” was an attempt to recruit a Russian agent to work for the CIA.

The entire incident, replete with fake wigs and an alleged letter of invitation to the Russian to spy on behalf of Uncle Sam, reeked of a put-up job.  Either Fogle was the dumbest spy ever to work for this country; or the Russians are the worst con artists in the history of counter-espionage practice.

Though I have no idea what really happened, reading the RT story, it appears the FSB was extremely unhappy with unspecified CIA activities in Russia and had warned the station chief that it was walking a fine line.  I’m guessing that nothing as extravagant as what the Russians claim actually happened.  But that the Russians set-up Fogle, and his arrest and expulsion were a warning to the U.S. to get back into line.

But here’s the real scoop: in the RT story, it exposed the identity of the CIA’s Moscow station chief.  His name is Stephen Holmes.  You’ll find the original story displayed here.  This is a link to the censored version.

So the real question is what happened to this story and why.  Presumably, the FSB wanted to expose the CIA station chief.  Doing so would blow his cover and render him less effective as a spook.  If that’s the case, it might have been further revenge for Holmes’ refusal to rein in his operatives when the FSB requested that he do so.

But why censor the report after you’ve exposed him?  A tug of war within the Kremlin?  Political operatives cooling off the FSB?  A complaint from the U.S. embassy?  A threat the U.S. would expose the identity of the SVR (Russia’s overseas intelligence service) station chief in DC?  At any rate, you can’t put the genie back in the bottle. America will have to respond with a tit for tat.  And where does that leave us?

Just when the U.S. and Russia were making attempts to patch up a frayed relationship, it appears that either Putin or the spy apparatus want to return us to the days of the very Cold War.  It’s a time that ex-KGBniks like Putin remember well.  Perhaps they feel nostalgic for it.  Perhaps they don’t care whether Syria goes up in flames and want to topple a joint effort to negotiate an end to the crisis there.

At any rate, I expect that Mr. Holmes may be returning home himself a bit sooner than expected.

A number of media outlets have reported this story, though I don’t believe any have reported Holmes’ name.  I do so here because RT has already done so.  It will only be a matter of hours before someone else will do so in the western media.

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oecd table israel

Comparative rates of poverty/income distribution Israel (in red) vs OECD average (blue)

Today the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, which monitors economic well-being among 39 countries of the developed world, released its 2013 findings.

It found that Israel’s poverty rate of 20.9% was the highest of all member states. Israel’s nearest “competitor” was Mexico at 20.4%.  Anyone who has visited Mexico understands how severe the problem is there. in Israel, it’s worse. Even Spain and Greece suffering from severe recession have far lower rates.  The average poverty rate for all OECD countries is 11.1%. The OECD also found that Israel had the fifth largest income disparity.

“You don’t see him from a meter away.” (Yudit Ilany)

Some other salient statistics: the child poverty rate average for all OECD nations is 13.3%. For Israel, it is 28.8%. Israel had the 4th largest rise in child poverty between 2007-2011.

I marvel at the comments of some here when they read these statistics, who claim that Israel’s economic numbers are depressed by Haredi men and Israeli Palestinian women who deliberately absent themselves from the country’s economic system. The problem with this approach is that the OECD statistical tables correctly blame a nation and not individual citizens if they are left out of the system. It is up to the nation to ensure economic benefits are available to all.

In other words, contrary to what the some would have us believe, people by and large don’t embrace poverty as their destiny. Nor may nations sentence entire segments of their population to such a fate without it being reflected in the OECD tables.  Many other nations have found ways to spread economic benefits more equitably.  In fact, Israel used to have such a system.

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Eli valley cartoon on stephen hawkingThe Forward’s Eli Valley has penned a deliciously sly, knowing send-up of the hasbara bonanza that followed on Stephen Hawking’s cancellation of his talk at the Shimon Peres conference.  Those of you who followed it could read any number of the hasbarafia who noted that Hawking’s speech processor contained an Intel chip developed in Israel.  Haaretz’s Chemi Shalev even used the disgusting, condescending term “poster boy” to describe Hawking’s supposed relation to the BDS movement.

Valley titles his cartoon, The Hypocrisy of Stephen Hawking. But don’t be fooled because he’s speaking in the voice of the pro-Israel crowd who were in high dudgeon over the affair.  He begins his list of Israel’s achievements with the Intel processor, but by the end he’s claiming Hawking’s teeth contain phosphorus:

Teeth: Teeth contain phosphorus.  Israel is a global leader in white phosphorus technology.

By then, the joke’s on the hasbara crowd, who began thinking Valley would ratify their prejudices, and ended feeling confused and even betrayed.  That’s the hidden power of the best satire.  The target may read it believing it reinforces his worst prejudices.  But by the end, he develops a sinking, queasy feeling in his stomach that something’s not quite right.  As Dylan once sang:

Something’s happenin’ here but you don’t know what it is,
Do you, Mr. Jones?

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idf white phosphorus

IDF rains white phosphorus indiscriminately on civilian targets

Yesh Din and other Israeli human rights NGOs sued the IDF over its use of white phosphorus during Operation Cast Lead and in similar conflicts.  It is deemed by many as a chemical weapon, especially when used as the IDF does.  It is not allowed to be used in or near civilian populations, which is precisely how Israel uses it.  It also dropped the napalm-like substance directly on civilians targets causing grievous injuries.  Scores of Gazans died or were maimed by the toxic, highly flammable material during the 2009 war.  The only time it’s legal to use it in combat is to provide smokescreen cover for combat operations. While the IDF maintains that was what it did, the evidence in the form of civilian casualties refutes that.

Recently, facing a difficult hearing before what would likely have been a skeptical Supreme Court, the IDF announced it would stop using white phosphorus in populated areas.  So far so good.  But as in every matter concerning Israel’s army, the devil is in the details:

The IDF has decided “to avoid the use in built-up areas of artillery shells containing white phosphorus, with two narrow exceptions,” the state said in an announcement to the court.

Yuval Roitman, who represented the state in the petition, added: This “has been decided in the IDF as a matter of policy … even though this is not a commitment in a legal sense.” The state’s decision emphasizes that while this is current IDF policy it could change in the future.

The State wants to appear to have renounced use of white phosphorus while not really doing so.  Note those “two narrow exceptions.”  I’m trying to ascertain what they are.  They have been conveniently omitted from any court filings or documents.  But I’m guessing they may be wide enough to drive a Mack truck through.  Also note the State affirms that the policy is only temporary and may be changed at the discretion of the army itself.  Further, the army makes a big deal out of the fact that while this is a change of policy, it isn’t a legally binding agreement forced upon it.  This is the equivalent of the defendant who cops a plea without an admission of guilt.

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The latest Israeli budget under consideration in the Knesset reveals that Israel opened a new mission in an unnamed Gulf State in the past year.  Though the identity of the state is supposed to be a secret (the linked Haaretz article doesn’t explicitly name it) given the delicate nature of Israeli relations with Arab countries in the region, my source informs me that it is the United Arab Emirates.  It is one of several Gulf states feeling threatened by the so-called Iranian threat.

Israel is eager to reinforce the sense of isolation and encirclement against Iran and what better way to do this than to make common cause with one of the competing powers in the region.  My source informs me that the purpose of the new mission is to coordinate and plan strategies for containing Iran.  Though I don’t know this for a fact, the main purpose of this new government outpost would appear to be intelligence and military liaison.  I don’t think Israel is making friends in UAE in order to engage in cultural exchange programs.  This is strictly business–the business of taking Iran down a peg or two or three.

Recently, the NY Times reported (this is the Jerusalem Post’s story) the U.S. was preparing a $10-billion arms package to send advanced weaponry to Israel, the Saudis and UAE in order to battle that Iranian threat.  The notoriously unreliable Times of Israel also reports a so-called “moderate crescent” alliance taking shape among the Saudis, Israel, UAE, Turkey and Jordan.  It too would have the goal of offering mutual defense against Iran.  If this report is credible (given the Times of Israel’s record, that’s by no means guaranteed), then the secret mission could be part of this project, since it would enable Israel and the UAE to coordinate their efforts much more intensively.  Personally, it could be a total crock.  But even if it is, it does indicate the “thinking” of some Israeli strategists who have delusional visions of creating a Middle Eastern version of NATO to deter Iran.

This news comes on the heels of yesterday’s hijacking and hacking of an advanced Israeli drone likely by Iran or forces closely associated like Hezbollah.  All of this is part of the nasty covert war going on among all these various states.  I’ve warned many times here before that it isn’t far from covert or overt war.  All it takes is one catastrophic failure, one stupid decision.  This is a tinderbox waiting to erupt in flames.

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shoval drone

Israeli Shoval drone hijacked

A highly-placed Israeli source elaborates on a partially truthful Ynetnews report that Israel destroyed an advanced Shoval (“Heron”) drone that was on a mission over the sea between Tel Aviv and Netanya. Israel did indeed destroy the drone, one of the most advanced in its fleet. Here is what its manufacturer had to say about it after its October 2012 launch:

The drone, called Heron 1 (Shoval), will help improve Israel’s Naval and Air Force’s recognition of unknown or hostile ships and aircraft even if they are 300 km away, with a radar that can reach Turkey, Cyprus or Egypt.

“The system can inquire and intercept any object within just a few minutes,” an IAI official told the newspaper on Sunday, after the Shoval drone had concluded a demonstration in which the new cameras captured every detail of a ship sailing the Mediterranean.

“The Shoval has satellite communication abilities, which means any footage it takes will be broadcasted [sic] online to distant location like Paris [!],” the official said.

But there was no “malfunction.” Rather an unknown hostile force exploited a breach in the navigation system and took control of the vehicle.

Once the drone became unresponsive, the IAF realized either it could be crashed into a sensitive Israeli target or else hijacked to Lebanon or Syria. At that point, the IAF launched flares over Israeli territory in a search to find it. They must’ve succeeded, which enabled them to destroy it.

I do not know who took control of the aerial vehicle. It was either Iranian forces or Hezbollah (or both). That makes it likely the drone was patrolling over Lebanon or Syria. The Ynetnews report said it was on a “routine” mission, which could mean anything or nothing.

Further support for my source may be found in the decision to ground the entire Shoval fleet. The hijackers discovered a weakness in the drone’s software controls and they can’t be flown again until it’s fixed.

Last year, the Iranians claimed to have done precisely the same thing to a U.S. Predator drone over Iranian territory. Though we claimed there had been a navigational malfunction, our protestations sounded hollow. The current incident points to a hitherto unknown or unappreciated ability by the Iranians to penetrate Israeli aerial guidance systems.

Just before the Shoval upgrade was announced above, Hezbollah had launched a drone which penetrated 30 miles into Israeli territory near the Dimona nuclear plant. A few weeks ago, Israel shot down another drone that may’ve been launched from Lebanon.

I should note that Hezbollah, with the likely help of the Iranians, compromised the IDF communications systems to devastating effect during the 2006 Lebanon war.

In 1997, Hezbollah intercepted the transmission (Hebrew) of Israeli aerial surveillance images which allowed the militant group to ambush IDF navy commandos, causing the death of 12. At the time, the army told the public the ambush had not been planned, but the result of a lucky break for Hezbollah. Then Hassan Nasrallah released the stolen images, which put egg on the face of lying Israeli generals. They were even forced to acknowledge that some intelligence data of this sort wasn’t even encrypted, thus allowing it to be intercepted.

Israel likes to tout its military invincibility and superiority over its enemies. Incidents like this remind us there are large chinks in the IDF’s armor.

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Tear Down This Wall, Mr. Netanyahu

by Richard Silverstein on May 10, 2013 · 24 comments

in Mideast Peace

Bibi Netanyahu is visiting China where he’s negotiated trade deals, lobbied unsuccessfully for a tougher Chinese diplomatic stance against Iran, and likely cooked up some secret arms deals with the Chinese military. But one of the oddest of his public appearances was at the Great Wall, where he extolled its supposed virtues and promised to adopt them for Israel:

You know, this Wall served as an inspiration for me. We built the barriers to protect Israel from the south. Ultimately, we’ll have Israel covered with them everywhere.

He was later quoted amplifying on this thought:

“Just as the Chinese defended themselves by barricading themselves behind the Great Wall, so to will we [Israel] fortify ourselves along the southern border, the Golan Heights and all fronts.”

Leaving aside the debate about the utility of Israel’s Separation Wall, let’s look at walls in human history. There is a human impulse to isolate oneself from enemies. If you don’t have to see things that are unpleasant, it makes life so much more comfortable. Hadrian did it. The French did it with the Maginot Line. The Israeli tries tried it with the Bar-Lev Line. And the East Germans tried it in Berlin.

Deb Reich penned a study of various historic walls and found that none, including the Great Wall, ultimately succeeded in their goal of keeping undesirables out of the homeland:

Emperor Meng T’ien (Qin Dynasty) began the Great Wall of China in 221 BCE, with 300,000 workers, to keep out the Huns. Additions were made over the next 1,700 years. All told, it’s around 6,400 km long, up to 50 feet high, 15 to 30 feet wide at the base, and dotted with guard towers. Nowadays, of course, it’s a tourist attraction: Westerners admire it, but for the Chinese it signifies mainly their eventual defeat by the Manchurians.

Roman Emperor Hadrian’s Wall (2nd century CE) was meant to keep the northern neighbors out of Britain, but its location split the tribal lands of the Brigantes, the most powerful Celts…at the time. This little detail insured continuing trouble. A later emperor then built another wall farther north, but the cheeky Celts just rebelled again. These days, Hadrian’s Wall and Antonine’s Wall draw hikers and day-trippers; the Roman empire is long gone.

The Berlin Wall, its remnants now preserved for tourism, was erected in the middle of the night on August 13, 1961, and subsequently beefed up (to keep the East Germans in, and everyone else out). It was higher tech than the Roman stuff – 150 km of barbed wire and concrete, 3.5 meters high. JFK visited divided Berlin in June 1963 and, famously, gave good solidarity (“I am a Berliner”). Imagine what he’d say today if he came to Qalqilya.

Sharon’s Wall, planned at 500 km in length and meantime expanded to nearly 800 km and counting, is much, MUCH higher tech than the Berlin Wall ever was… But of course Sharon’s wall, too, is destined to evolve into a tourist attraction eventually. (Just ask Hadrian or any of those other guys.) Ah, for a working time machine! We could skip this cheerless, macabre interim phase and segue straight to the future theme park…

Netanyahu’s father was a professor of Jewish history. The son seems not to have absorbed any of the lessons of history his father may’ve imparted. Or else his father taught him the wrong lessons. Alternately, Bibi might’ve paid more attention to Robert Frost’s wise and knowing poem:

Before I built a wall I’d ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.
Something there is that doesn’t love a wall,
That wants it down.

At any rate, Bibi has lost sight of the fact that walls don’t work. Ultimately, the people or forces you’re trying to keep out have greater will than you and they overwhelm your defenses.

Unless, of course, you come to terms with them before this happens. No chance of that happening. So we’re left with the alternative, which is an Israeli wall that will eventually become a historical curiosity, because it failed in its goal of keeping Israel free of “terrorists” and marauders, those pesky Palestinians.

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Trevor Borman produced a second installment of his TV documentary on Prisoner X aka Ben Zygier.  Borman was the first journalist to expose the real identity of Prisoner X three months ago.  Now, he has produced yet another astonishing segment in this scandalous story.  The Australian journalist also builds on the narrative developed by Ronen Bergman and three other Der Spiegel reporters who told us most of what we knew about Zygier and his alleged crimes that landed him in prison.

ben zygier three idf mias

Zygier exposed top secret operation to repatriate remains of three IDF MIAs from 1982 Lebanon War: Zachary Baumel, Tzvi Feldman, Yehuda Katz

Bergman had reported that the failed Mossad agent had exposed the identity of two top-secret Lebanese informants.  This in itself was perhaps the greatest internal failure the Israeli intelligence agency had ever suffered.  But Borman goes even farther and explains that one of the Lebanese agents, Ziad al Homsi, was part of a complex Mossad operation whose goal was to retrieve the remains of three IDF tank crew members who’d been captured during the worst defeat that Israel suffered during the 1982 Lebanon War: the Battle of Sultan Jaqoub.  There a tank unit was ambushed by the Syrian army with the loss of 20 Israeli dead, 30 injured, two captured and three disappeared.  The fate of the latter was the subject of this operation.

Israel believed that the three had been taken prisoner and later killed.  At first, it believed they might’ve died in Syria.  But later, information they learned pointed to their death in Lebanon and burial in the Bekaa Valley, a current Hezbollah stronghold.  Despite the danger of Israeli operations in the region, its intelligence operatives managed to learn the precise location of the graves.

To bring these bodies back to Israel, the Mossad devised an intricate plan that had many facets.  One of them involved the recruitment of Ziad al Homsi, the major of the village near the location of the bodies.  Through an elaborate ruse that involved a Chinese man claiming to be an official of the city of Beijing, al Homsi was brought to China, where he met a Syrian, who began the process of debriefing him about the 1982 battle in which the soldiers were captured.

Eventually, the Israelis explained their mission, told him they knew where the bodies were buried, and tasked him with excavating the remains and safeguarding them until a second group of Lebanese would retrieve them and return them to Israel’s hands.  Israel knew that the Lebanese would want to know the location of the corpses as well since in the past Israel has bargained for such repatriations in exchange for the return of live prisoners and the bodies of Arab fighters killed in battle.  The Mossad sought to avoid allowing the Lebanese to discover its secret, lest Israel have to give up Lebanese or Palestinian prisoners in return for the three bodies.

Into this complex covert operation steps Ben Zygier, who is facing personal and professional demons of his own.  After the failure of his three-year effort to infiltrate Iran’s European arms and nuclear materials trade, he returned to a desk job at headquarters and the prospect that he’d be drummed out of the service.  He desperately searched for a path that might lead him to redemption in the eyes of his bosses.

Through social media and internet forums frequented by Islamists, he contacted someone who turned out to be a Hezbollah agent.  Zygier believed if he could turn the man and have him become an Israeli agent, his superiors would recognize his value and retain him.  Unfortunately for the Australian-Israeli, the Lebanese turned out to be considerably more skilled than Zygier.  When a proof of his bona fides was demanded, Zygier gave up the identity of al-Homsi.  Whatever the Lebanese gave up to Zygier turned out to be worthless.

In the TV documentary, Borman interviews al-Homsi, who conveniently claims he was a Lebanese double agent all along and that he was reporting Mossad’s every move to his handlers.   Personally, I think there’s something terribly self-serving in all of this.  As a former Lebanese war hero, al-Homsi desperately needs to redeem his reputation.  Claiming he was always working for his country would do so.

But there is one major problem with this explanation: a Lebanese agent would not have received a 15 year prison sentence for betraying his country as al-Homsi did.  He would’ve been paraded through the streets of his village or Beirut as proof of yet another intelligence coup for his country and evidence of yet another Israeli intelligence failure.

I believe that al-Homsi was a real Mossad asset and cooperated in the plan to retrieve the IDF MIAs.  Zygier’s betrayal of al-Homsi led to his exposure by Lebanese intelligence.  In the TV documentary, al-Homsi says that the Mossad knew where they were buried.  Presumably, the Israelis would’ve told him this information too.

This is where there may be some truth in al-Homsi’s claim to be a double agent.  If the Lebanese arrested him and then turned him, he could’ve told them where the bodies were buried.  Such intelligence would be worth its weight in gold in the Middle Eastern netherworld of hostages, detainees, and corpses of the war dead on each side.  That would be something al-Homsi could use as a bargaining chip to reduce his sentence.

This may explain why his 15 year sentence was reduced to three years.  It would also mean that Lebanon now knows where the Israelis are buried and has possession of the remains.  If this is so, then we may, in future find yet another exchange of Israeli remains for Arab prisoners detained in Israeli jails.  It is highly unlikely this will happen anytime soon since Israel’s relations with Hezbollah, Syria and Iran are at their lowest ebb in many years.  The Netanyahu government will have no interest in undertaking such a negotiation in the current climate.  It will take a much higher degree of calm for such an agreement to be negotiated.

Keep in mind that when the Netanyahu government negotiated for the release of Gilad Shalit, they exchanged 1,000 Palestinians prisoners for him.  In return for the three IDF soldiers, Israel would be expected to offer a similarly rich rate of exchange.  Whenever Israel negotiates such exchanges they are very controversial in nationalist circles because Israel invariably releases prisoners viewed as terrorists and murderers.  That would be another reason this intelligence failure would be so sensitive.  In effect, Ben Zygier placed Israel’s nationalist government in a huge bind.

I want to reserve a final word for one participant in Borman’s production.  He is former Mossad officer, Rami Igra.  Igra presumably would’ve been intimately involved with the Lebanon operation as he was in charge of intelligence efforts to find and retrieve MIAs.  Igra’s interviews are shameful.  At one point, he, an Israeli citizen, has the chutzpah to tell Borman that it is his patriotic duty as an Australian to drop the story.  At another point, he calls Zygier a “psychiatric” case who was destined the screw up.  In a subsequent interview for Israel’s Channel 2, Igra calls the ABC TV segment a “science fiction fantasy.”

Though Igra is the CEO of a chain of Israeli retirement homes, we all know how this game is played.  The exceedingly secretive Mossad, doesn’t publicly engage with the media, even when they face scandal of immense proportions.  Instead, they send former operatives to do their dirty work for them.  That’s Igra’s role.  He’s trying to clean up the mess made by those in the Mossad responsible not just for hiring Zygier in the first place (a bad enough failure), but by those who decided to spirit Zygier into a bunker where he could be presumed to either rot into oblivion or put an end to himself.

After ten months in a windowless hell hole, cut off from virtually all human contact (except for a few select figures who mostly knew nothing about him), with little prospect of anything except more of the same (he faced a 22-year prison sentence or a ten-year sentence if he accepted a plea bargain), Zygier killed himself.

To all of this negligence and incompetence, add the fact that Yossi Melman and Igra both boast that in its entire history the Mossad has had only “a few” cases like Zygier’s.  That is supposed to make us feel reassured.  That the Israeli intelligence agency has everything under control.  That no one need worry about a thing.  It’s precisely this sort of anaesthesia that it relies on in its relationship with the Israeli public.  Thankfully, it didn’t work with Trevor Borman or ABC-TV.

Finally, any journalist who uses Rami Igra as a source after listening to the garbage he peddled here should either have his head examined or else use his words to hoist him on his own petard.  I believe Borman has done precisely that.

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