Reuven Pedatzur has written an eye-opening primer in Haaretz on how the IDF operates within the confines of Israeli democracy. He focuses on the question of why and how the IDF faces few of the checks and balances exercised by most democracies on military power. It will both distress and educate you and goes a long way to explaining how Israel has gotten itself into the messes it has now in Lebanon and in Gaza just before that:
While in all other democracies, a certain dependency of policy-makers on generals is apparent, together with attempts to reduce it, in Israel, the case is not only one of dependency but the fact that our policy-makers are held captive by the generals.
The security policy-making process is in fact the domain of the Israel Defense Forces and the defense establishment. In the absence of non-IDF national security planning bodies, the major part of the planning – not only operational and tactical planning but also strategic and political planning – is done within the army.
The result is that military considerations have often become more dominant than political ones. Thus, Israel’s foreign policies have come to be based on an essentially belligerent perception that favors military considerations over diplomatic ones. Violence is seen not only as a legitimate instrument in international affairs, but almost as the only means that can bring positive results.
As a result, the chief of staff in Israel is afforded power that exceeds that of his counterparts in other Western armies. He is the one to decide on the policy recommendations that will be presented to the prime minister and his ministers. This, of course, gives him great political power.
In general, the Knesset and the government do not intervene in the operations of the defense establishment, which enjoys almost full autonomy when it comes to policy-making – beginning with major issues such as the size and content of the defense budget, and including even the formulation of war plans that are presented to the government for approval only after the planning is done.
Therefore, it is no surprise that to this day, two weeks after the outbreak of the second Lebanon war, the Knesset has not held even one session on the conflict, its objectives, and the IDF operations.
It all started in the time of David Ben-Gurion, who throughout his terms as prime minister and defense minister opposed the establishment of a civilian control system over the defense establishment. Civilian control was replaced by his own charismatic control, which relied both on his status as prime minister and defense minister, and on his being the supreme authority on defense in the country.
Ben-Gurion also long opposed the establishment of a ministerial committee for security affairs. He consented only in 1953, but continued even after to keep the ministers out of the security policy-making process. One example is the Sinai War, the preparations for which were kept a secret from the members of the committee.
It is true that not all of Ben-Gurion’s successors enjoyed his authority on security, but the pattern remained the same. The civilian element did not even try to assume any control or supervisory role over the army, which enjoyed a free range in its operation and planning. In actual fact, the defense establishment shaped Israeli policy, and did not always bring it before the government to be approved.
“Things are taking place [in the defense establishment],” said former prime minister Moshe Sharet with much frustration, “that do not come to my attention. I hear announcements on Israel Radio and later read about them in the paper, without knowing their true background”.
Sharet was referring to the retribution actions the IDF carried out in the 1950s, some of which were not even brought before the prime minister beforehand.
One of the Knesset members’ major duties should have been the overseeing of of the defense establishment, and instead they were escaping it like the plague. The Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee is at best a rubber stamp for army decisions. Even the most effective controlling device, budget allotment, was not used by Knesset members.
“Obviously we must trust the General Staff when it tells us there is a need for extra rockets or tanks, even if there is someone in the committee that thinks different”, explained former Knesset member Israel Kargman, who served for many years as chairman of the Knesset Finance Committee. “Who are we to make that decision? We know nothing about this.”
When one analyzes Israeli policy since the country’s establishment, only four cases come up in which the prime minister came up with something that the army did not suggest or approve of. Three of these cases involve ex-generals as prime ministers; and in the fourth instance, the prime minister was backed by two generals in his government.
In 1977, Menahem Begin decided on a peace agreement with Egypt that came with a price – the withdrawal from Sinai, which sparked opposition from IDF commanders. But Begin enjoyed support from then defense minister Ezer Weizman and the foreign minister at the time, Moshe Dayan, both former generals. Yitzhak Rabin, a former chief of staff, decided to go along with the Oslo Accords in 1993, despite opposition from the army. Ehud Barak, also a former chief of staff, took the IDF out of Lebanon, despite very loud and public protests by army commanders. And Ariel Sharon, another general, decided on the Gaza disengagement plan and its execution despite strong objection from former chief of staff Moshe Ya’alon and his senior officers.
In all other cases, decisions regarding national security were based on proposals the IDF placed on the prime minister’s desk.
The current events followed the exact same pattern. The abduction of the soldiers in the north gave rise to a need “to do something.” The prime minister and his government had only army assessments, intelligence the army presented to them, and the ready war plans before them. In fact, they had no other alternative but to approve what the IDF suggested for there is no other body or mechanism that can come up with suggestions for a policy in Lebanon.
This is precisely what happened 24 years ago. In a government session on June 5, 1982, in which the ministers voted on launching an offensive in Lebanon, they faced only two options: Approve the IDF and defense minister’s proposal to go to war, or don’t approve it. Since the government found it hard to disperse with no action set in motion, especially when faced with a security issue that had to be addressed, it chose to approve the alternative suggested by the defense establishment.
I find it fitting to close with words written in the 1960s by Yigal Allon, one of Israel’s few politicians who tried to both influence the shaping of the national security policy and to deal with defense issues with other than military means: “The need to defend the country against aggression, the military confrontations on the borders… the military achievements, the mass drills… all of these create an atmosphere that necessarily harbors acute social and moral dangers. The danger of the spreading of chauvinist and vulgar militarism is a real danger in Israel… The culture of arms bears with it the danger of losing social, moral and cultural values, to the point of the blurring of the nation’s image as an enlightened society… This applies to all civilians and the youth, and also military personnel, who may be intoxicated by the very charm of involvement with arms.”
Wednesday’s child.
Whether the Rome summit/conference/get-together on Wednesday accomplished anything very useful remains to be seen. A less charitable view might see it merely as an expensive sounding board, just one more obligatory ritual to be acted out prior to jetting off into the sunset. What emerged at the end could hardly be said to have fired the imagination, let alone the enthusiasm, of the world.
But what if Condoleezza and co. had announced the following instead? At least the contrast in method would have been some recompense for the predictability what actually took place.
Extracted from Place4Peace.com discussion portal:
Can it really be beyond the compass of the human mind to at least regulate this constant cycle of carnage in the Middle East? Maybe it is – but here’s a suggestion for closure where the expenditure involved would seem to comprise mainly that of a few brain cells, a commodity we all have in plentiful supply.
This is a dry, almost antiseptic solution, perhaps a bit ‘clinical’ in its approach to the conflict. It’s a formula-driven method which, somewhat perversely, derives an unexpected synergy from the very problem it seeks to address. Worked out by a German I met many years ago in Nurnburg. Very Germanic therefore, very direct – and, in its own fashion, arguably much more effective than many peace proposals floated in the past – and which have now long since sunk without trace.
Simulation.
Monitor events in the region, sample and evaluate any incidents involving violence and/or intolerance, even the quite minor ones. Place on record that which occurs and make a determination/estimation as to whether this side or that is deemed responsible. For instance, something happens; it was violent; it seemed deliberate; people were hurt; property was damaged – so on and so forth. This was judged at the time to be Israeli in origin – or it was Palestinian inspired. Can include a default option too – ‘perpetrated by person or persons unknown’ – if circumstances so dictate. Collate all this information and await the next sequence of bombs, bullets, whatever, that happens along. Do likewise with these and continue monitoring.
At some stage – a time limit, a points cut-off – the sampling process terminates and one of the entries thus catalogued is then randomly selected. Penalise the offending party here by conferring full ownership and title of some nominal area of land on its opposite number. One square kilometre should more than suffice, the transfer of which is formally recognised by the rest of the world – also acting as guarantor – even if only in the moral and legal sense. One of the much maligned UN resolutions perhaps?
The sampling process then re-engages and, assuming the violence continues unabated, a further parcel of land is thereby delineated and assigned to whoever. The area this covers would then be some 2 sq.km. Subsequent infractions might trigger another penalty; 4 sq.km. After that, it’s 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256 sq.km. …….XXXX sq.km. A natural progression; soon ramps up to some very serious real estate indeed.
Scenario.
The dynamic of the whole situation now changes markedly. Israelis, through violence and the like, would be seen to be promoting, even ratifying, the Palestinian cause while, similarly, Palestinians might well be perceived as carrying forward and cementing the dream of a permanent Jewish homeland. Prospects guaranteed to give even the most militant in either camp considerable pause for thought. ‘He brought home the other sides’ bacon for them’ – quite possibly the least coveted obituary of ‘martyr’, soldier and politician alike. Very salutary, though, if a permanent end to these hostilities is ever going to emerge from the present fog of contention.
Now, back there in Nurnburg, I felt that, as a theory, the concept had some small merit but little practical value. And I said as much to my German companion, detailing what I felt to be major obstacles in its path.
1. Too biased. The Israelis might go for it – the novelty alone makes it an idea worth exploring. Not so the Palestinians – and with some justification. Yes, this might lock down the violence – and appreciably so – but to what end? To preserve the status quo? To stifle any movement towards change or progress? Not entirely a welcome outcome where Palestinian interests are concerned.
The answer, apparently, is to acknowledge the objection and offer to take the system ‘off-line’ for one or two months. In that time slot, the whole question might readily be referred back to the field of battle – if calmer counsels have not prevailed in the interval.
2. Too easily sabotaged. Disaffected elements in both groups could easily overload the process, manufacturing spurious claims and stage-managing acts of violence. A futile endeavour therefore and not worth the effort.
Any halfway decent sampling technique should be more than adequate to discourage such activities. Those seeking to choreograph events could find their efforts ineffective, or worse still, counterproductive.
3. Wouldn’t it be imperative to obtain at least tacit approval from both principals in this matter? Given the long-standing enmity between them — and their even longer memories — acceptance of so radical a departure from familiar norms and customs of warfare seems doubtful in the extreme.
Curiously enough, agreement on the issue need not be a mandatory requirement here. In fact both parties could initially ignore the whole procedure and continue on much as before. However, there comes a time when the areas of land so designated must reach something of a critical mass. At such a point, one side or the other might very well decide to go with what’s on offer. Holding such clear and universal title to any major tract of this much disputed territory might prove progressively more and more difficult to resist. Thereafter, further violence becomes increasingly untenable. Fighting against a conventional enemy is all very well – but when that enemy is also a mathematical construct, the numbers themselves soon begin to outweigh all other considerations.
4. But who could – or should – debate, decide, pronounce on changes of such magnitude? Who would accept the awesome responsibility entailed in decisions of this significance?
We are all, it seems, as ever, still our brother’s keeper. It must fall to us, the world community – or representatives thereof – to perform the deed. And, with such godlike powers theirs to command, the expectation is that there would be no great shortage of volunteers.
Now whether all this has any relevance as to our view of the Middle East today is, of course, debatable. But it would be well to note that, in our various dealings with the Angel of Death, any increase in our choices here must certainly be welcome. A template capable of ending once and for all, not just this business, but also others of an equally intractable nature, would go a long way towards making some sense out of all that’s happened – even if only as an intellectual exercise.
And if, for some reason, it didn’t work out, some unforeseen flaw in the design perhaps, well then, we could at least comfort ourselves with the knowledge that, in the final analysis, …… we can always blame the Germans!
John Yorke,
Wirral,
UK