Thanks to M.J. Rosenberg of the Israel Policy Forum for finding another terrific chestnut of a resource in the ongoing debate over whether the world should isolate Hamas and bring it to its knees; or engage Hamas and put it to the test to determine whether it can modify its positions in such a way as to become a worthy partner for peace. Rosenberg focuses much of his current weekly online column on a report prepared by Brigadier General (ret.) Shlomo Brom, a thirty-year veteran of the Israel Defense Forces. The report is titled Hamas Government: Isolate or Engage? (pdf version).
Brig. Gen. Shlomo Brom: engage Hamas don’t isolate it (photo: Usip.org)After reading the report summary and Rosenberg’s account of it I can only say that I wish that U.S. intelligence had provided Bush as balanced and probing account of Iraqi WMD before the Iraq war. Before Brom makes clear his own policy preferences he lays out carefully the pros and cons of each of the arguments giving you the right to draw your own conclusion. The following one paragraph summarizes succinctly Brom’s findings:
This paper…assesses the advantages and risks of the two strategies that have crystallized since the election: isolate and undermine a Hamas government, or engage with it in a cautious, selective, and conditional manner. This paper argues that a policy of engagement, if properly executed, could encourage fundamental changes in Hamas’ policies and, eventually, its ideology. Moreover, this approach is preferable to the “isolate and undermine” option because it will be easier to move from a policy of engagement to one of confrontation if it becomes clear that engagement has failed to induce changes in Hamas’ policies and actions. A movement in the opposite direction may not be possible.
Brom points out the draconian nature of Israel’s conditions for engagement with Hamas and how those conditions will likely cause disastrous consequences for the Palestinian people:
Israel has put forward its own preconditions for any dialogue with Hamas, demands that go beyond the Quartet’s. Israeli leaders have said that terrorist infrastructure must be dismantled, and Hamas must repudiate and revise those parts of its covenant that deny Israel’s right to exist. Until these conditions are met, Israel is prepared to cut off relations with the Palestinian Authority by severing economic ties, suspending the transfer of taxes and customs collected on behalf of the P.A., barring the entry of Palestinian workers into Israel, and preventing construction of a seaport and airport in Gaza. Israel has already suspended revenue transfers and intends to implement additional steps following the formation of the Hamas government. These steps will undoubtedly lead to a major financial crisis for Palestinians, if not to a collapse, since Israel’s leverage far exceeds that of Western donors.
The report’s author notes the damage that is likely from a PA collapse induced by Israel and western nations:
…If there is any potential for Hamas to change, implementation of this [pro-isolation] policy forecloses such a possibility. Second, it is more likely to result in anarchy and chaos and possibly a resumption of full-scale violent conflict with Israel. Engineering the collapse of a Hamas government is unlikely to result in greater stability. Furthermore, Hamas will have little interest in keeping even to the limited ceasefire (tahdi’a) it has committed itself to if outside actors are undermining their elected government.
Third, the failures of the Hamas government and the hardships suffered by the Palestinian population will, most probably, not be attributed to Hamas. Instead, Israel and the West will be blamed, and the rift with the Palestinians and the Islamic world will only widen. Fourth, it will be difficult to convince the international community and the major aid providers to maintain such an approach as conditions in the Palestinian territories deteriorate. In fact, such a policy will probably enhance attempts by Iran to expand its role.
He lays out the reasons why it is reasonable to believe that Hamas might moderate its ideology regarding Israel and terrorism:
First, it [Hamas] is not al-Qaeda. Although it is a radical Islamist movement, it is rooted in a national program, not a pan-Islamic cause. Hamas was elected primarily on its promises to provide effective, honest governance. This program depends on wider public support than Hamas currently enjoys, given that only 45 percent of voters chose Hamas in the January election. Moreover, many Hamas voters cast a protest vote against Fatah and what the public perceived as a corrupt ruling elite. The vote was not an endorsement of Hamas’ platform vis-à-vis Israel. Hamas knows the vast majority of the Palestinian public want quiet, law and order, security, good governance, and basic services. It will be up to Hamas to deliver on these expectations…
The behavior of Hamas leaders since the election indicates they are aware of their dependence and have a sober assessment of its implications. This may be why Hamas was initially interested in a coalition government with Fatah headed by a non-Hamas figure. Its own campaign promises, combined with the public’s expectations—not to mention the inherent constraints of the P.A.—may be leading Hamas to acquiesce to more moderate and pragmatic policies.
Brom argues against the Israeli ultimatum approach to Hamas by saying that a less polarizing one would be more effective:
…To succeed, this alternative approach will have to differentiate between what realistically can be expected from Hamas now and what can be expected at later stages. It should be made absolutely clear to Hamas that recognition of Israel is a necessary end following the process of engagement, but it should not be presented as an ultimatum that requires immediate acceptance.
Finally, he sums up the benefits of the engagement strategy:
The main advantage of the engagement approach is that it provides a framework to test the new Palestinian leadership, while at the same time denying it excuses for failure to change its ways. Should Hamas fail because of outside pressure, which remains a likely outcome, it will be more difficult to attribute its failure to its obduracy. They will shift blame to outside parties. Furthermore, this [pro-engagement] approach could widen the Palestinian consensus for a two-state solution without compromising support for Palestinian democracy. It could also create a relatively stable and secure situation on the ground. Past experience shows that cautious, selective, and conditional engagement, when combined with the right mix of pressure, can be productive, particularly in terms of alliance management. Should engagement fail, it will be easier to build a coalition that supports confrontation. The present case of Iran is instructive.
What is especially important about this report is its author, a senior intelligence analyst with the IDF. Here is what how his bio at the U.S. Institute for Peace describes his background:
He most recently served as senior research associate at the Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv University. He was deputy national security adviser under former Prime Minister Ehud Barak. From 1996 to 1998, Brom was director of the Strategic Planning Division in the Israel Defense Force’s General Staff. From 1988 to 1990 he was the Israeli defense attaché in the Republic of South Africa and from 1969 to 1987 he served in the Israeli Air Force, mostly in different intelligence positions. Throughout the 1990s, Brom participated in peace negotiations with Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians. He also represented Israel in multilateral talks on Arms Control and Regional Security.
I may have little credibility for the full-fledged pro-Israel chicken hawks who frequent this site, but it becomes much more difficult to dismiss the arguments of an Israeli general (though no doubt they will try to find a way to do so).
I find this report from Aljazeera today (Sunday March 12) interesting, too:
I’d be interested in reading your thoughts . . .
That’s fascinating. Thanks for the story. I’ll prob. post about this tonight. I think this shows that Hamas has some pretty good political strategists. They’re trying to finesse a difficult question in the midst of some horrific political & economic pressures. I’ll give them credit for that. But of course we need to see how they follow through on this. If they don’t, then we’ll be back where we’ve been with no trust possible concerning them. Here’s hoping…
The problem is time. The more time passes with Hamas as the acknowledged government, the greater Hamas’s resources will become. Financially, once Israel agrees to their receiving funds, the Europeans will feel free to provide support as well. However, just as we saw with the Fatah PA, once the attacks begin, Europe finds a way to claim their money isn’t being used for terror. Furthermore, any dollar that makes its way to Hamas, will have some portion going to its military build-up. There is no way to prevent this and the threat is real.
What is even more important, however, is the concept of accepting a terror group whose platform espouses the destruction of a country as a legitimate government. Once acceptance and acknowledgement are given, they are rarely taken back. The Taliban would still be in power if it hadn’t been for Bin Laden. Conferring legitimacy in this instance is immoral from any standpoint, but it is worse than this because if Israel does it, the rest of the West follows and this acknowledgement will not be revoked.
At that point, the constant attacks on Israel by the forces of the Left, the Right, some Europeans and their media will continue, but across from them, the Israelis will have a Palestinian entity and government sworn to destroy the state and receiving aid and acceptance from the very same governments and forces that are attacking Israel.
For example, what I’ve read from you so far has included suggestions that Israelis should go to the Hague to be tried for war crimes. While this is already occuring in some Western European countries where theoretically an Israeli general could find himself being arrested and charged with war crimes, nowhere do I see a similar development concerning any Hamas or Fatah members. In fact, right now the UN cannot even come to terms with the meaning of terrorism because the Arab and Muslim nations along with their many supporters are trying to modify the agreement to include language excluding actions such as by Palestinian terrorists.
In other words, Brom is advocating giving up practically the only leverage Israel has in this situation just so we can all hope that a group that has religion as its primary driving force will somehow give up one of the key tenets of its religion.
Isn’t the contrary assertion just as valid? Give them nothing, let them suffer and carry the burden of making the Palestinian people suffer, isolate them, reject giving them any semblance of respect in any international forum, and see whether all this pain causes them to give up one of the central tenets in their religion.
There is almost no chance that the PA will ever have sufficient resources even with the tax funds and European support. Palestine was a basket case before Israel began withholding the taxes and will be even more so after.
Again, what’s with the Hamas military build-up thing?? You talk about them as if they’re buying F-16s on the open market. Hamas is observing a ceasefire. Hamas intends to continue the ceasefire. You can worry all you want about eventualities. But it would be much more useful to focus on what’s happening in real time and not on what could happen (or in your view “will happen”).
And the concept of democracy in which results of elections are honored–does that not hold any sway in your view? Who says Israel has to “accept” Hamas? Israel shouldn’t do that till it gets assurances that Hamas will negotiate in good faith and that it will recognize Israel after a peace agreement is concluded. But paying the PA its rightful tax funds and not deliberately provoking crises to undermine Hamas does not constitute “acceptance.” And that’s all I’m arguing that Israel should do. Be neutral but not hostile.
I have advocated for precisely that here. If Israel had a less bellicose and intransigent “rep” in the world community and made more serious efforts to rein in its thugs & miscreants, then Israeli herself could lobby for this. I don’t know why we’re not hearing more about Palestinians terrorists being hauled before the World Court. But I for one am all for it.
Again, I think you underestimate Hamas’ ability to read the Palestinian tea leaves. Hamas did not emphasize its religious program during the campaign and has not done so since its election victory. Hamas realizes that its votes did not come from those embracing its religious agenda.
BTW, just for the hell of it–do you view the Israeli religious establishment as a similarly pernicious force within Israeli society? I do. Though luckily they never took control of the government (though they did have monopolistic control of certain aspects of social policy).
First, this is not a constructive policy. It is destructive and will only result in reaping the whirlwind. Second, if my enemy puts the screws to me and tells me they plan to deprive me of everything they can unless I do X. Does that in any way encourage me to do X? Or does it convince me that I must, with all my heart, stay steadfast in NOT doing X? Have you ever tried to beat a donkey which has made up its mind that it’s not moving? That would be the equivalent of Israel attempting to destroy the PA and lay siege to the Palestinian economy all because of Hamas being such nasty people.
The Israeli religious forces are not as powerful as Hamas. They don’t win elections although they can influence outcomes in coalitions. Within their ranks I see positives and negatives. The negatives are related to those among the Israeli Orthodox who support the settlements from a religious observance POV. I also see some attempts to control Israeli society, such as marriage, divorce and conversion laws as harmful to the unity of the state. On the other hand, they are also reminders of our heritage and culture and have forced some social changes that I view positively. For example, I think it’s positive that no public transportation works on the Sabbath. I also perceive them to be positive forces in their enthusiasm for Zionism, which is deep and meaningful. I also believe that many are truly good people in the sense of morality and justice. In part it is their faith that gives them this character, although there are a small number for whom the same deep faith has caused a severe disconnect with respect to morality because they view this conflict with the Arabs in religious terms.
Getting back to the question of being nice and neutral versus trying to crush the Palestinian entity headed by Hamas, I don’t buy your argument that Israel will reap anything worse than it is reaping. You give too much credit to this hudna when everybody knows it’s nothing more than a stalling tactic intended to allow for a buildup of arms and forces. Nobody is sitting around tanning and wasting days in leisure. They are arming themselves, training and trying to acquire weaponry. You speak as if one needs F-16s to harm Israel and Israelis gravely, but really all one needs is a couple of successful attacks by Strellas against planes taking off from Ben Gurion airport to completely transform the face of the Israeli economy.
That’s a mite careless don’t you think?? You mean “everybody” on the political right “knows it’s nothing more than a stalling tactic.” I ‘know’ no such thing. This is a very tired, very cynical, very self-fulfilling attitude toward a political phenomenon which has produced real benefits for both Palestinians and Israelis. Do you call lessening the number of Israeli victims of terror a “stalling tactic?” If so, that’s sad.
Yes, this is a war. That’s what warring parties do. Do you deny that the IDF is not doing the same thing? But aside from this argument, please provide documentary proof of your charge. I can’t tell you how many times I’ve read this tedious piece of propaganda without any substantiation.
Actually, the “face of the Israeli economy” has already been “transformed” by the entirely destructive impact of the conflict on it. Without such conflict, the economy would be booming (as it did during periods of relative calm over the past 10 years or so) and Israel would return to the prosperity it enjoyed then.
We agree that Israel could be booming…but Israel didn’t start this war. The point is that its economy could be severely harmed by a couple of rockets.
My evidence for the arms buildup are the occasional explosions of bombmakers in the territories where Israel states that it had no hand in the death, along with Ha’aretz reports on the flow of military goods into Gaza. This is a no-brainer, Richard, they are preparing for a new stage in the war. It may not happen for a while, but until they change their objectives, we can be certain this will happen.
And yes, it is a stalling tactic. Show me where you have seen language from any Palestinian entity that suggests their conflict is over or that this is anything but a hudna, which by definition is a cease-fire leading to another attack.
That’s right–and all the more reason for Israel to begin negotiating seriously right now with the Palestinians to ensure that current & future Israeli generations can live prosperously and securely.
Possibly. However, one must know which terror group the bombmaker was associated with. Odds are he was affiliated with Islamic Jihad. While IJ can do damage to Israel, it is a weak group which has no real footprint among the Palestinian populace.
“Anything but a hudna??” Hudna is an overwhelming improvement over pre-hudna and all the wars that preceded it. And “ceasefire” does NOT by definition lead to attack. In MANY cases a ceasefire is what leads to the ends of wars. After all, when two sides fight ea. other for decades, spill the blood of thousands of their countrymen & enemies, & have nothing to show for it–then both sides get tired and despondent. That’s when ceasefires can happen. And if played right ceasefires can, and HAVE, led to peace.
Your dull drumbeat of war, war, endless war is terribly defeatist and a self-fulfilling prophecy. Of course there will be endless war if you believe your enemy is an irredeemable beast. But those of us with another vision will try to bring about a different, better future for our (yours and my) people.
I’m sorry but in 1949 the Arab states refused to agree to permanent peace and instead demanded a cease-fire. That didn’t work too well, did it.
As for my drumbeats of war, I have no interest in war and have no interest in anything other than moving back to Taba offer lines and separating from the Palestinians forever. I don’t even care if they make the West Bank judenrein as they have in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Gaza. Nope, let them live apart in their own state and let Israelis live in peace.
If you, however, truly want a vision of peace, have you considered that instead of coddling the Palestinians and excusing Hamas as if it’s somehow an organization of well-meaning decent peaceniks, you could INSIST instead that the Palestinians dig up some true moderates who want to quash the terror groups and negotiate a peace agreement based on mutual recognition instead of these maximalist destroy-Israel demands? Where is the Left in its demands upon the Palestinians?!