Why Israel Can’t Win the War

Ashraf Ismail, writing in ArabNews describes a depressing war scenario for the IDF in which it has no hope of vanquishing its foe or winning this war. In fact, the war can only lead to a weakening of Israel’s position vis a vis its adversaries. He first writes about Hezbollah:

The world is witnessing what could be a critical turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel is now engaged in a war that could permanently undermine the efficacy of its much-vaunted military apparatus.

Ironically, there are several reasons for believing that Israel’s destruction of southern Lebanon and southern Beirut will weaken its bargaining position relative to its adversaries, and will strengthen its adversaries’ hands.

First, Israel has no clearly defined tactical or strategic objective, and so the Israeli offensive fails the first test of military logic: There is no way that Israel’s actions can improve its position relative to Hamas or Hezbollah, much less Syria or Iran.

The logic of power politics also implies that a no-win situation for Israel is a definite loss, because Israel is the stronger party and thus has the most to lose. In an asymmetric war, the stronger party always has the most to lose, in terms of reputation and in terms of its ability to project its will through the instruments of force.

The lack of any clearly defined objective is a major miscalculation by Israel and its American patron.

Second, Israel cannot eliminate Hezbollah, since Hezbollah is a grassroots organization that represents a plurality of Lebanese society. Neither can Hamas be eliminated for the same reason…

Consequently, while Hezbollah will obviously pay a short-term tactical cost that is very high, in the long run, this conflict demonstrates that it is Hezbollah, and not the Lebanese government, that has the most power in Lebanon.

Next, Ismail describes the degradation of Israeli and U.S. power vis a via the Syrians and Iranians:

Third, Israel’s failure to achieve anything at all greatly enhances Syria’s influence over Lebanon and its bargaining position relative to the US and Israel itself. No solution in Lebanon can exclude Syria, and so now the US and Israelis need Syria’s approval, which certainly weakens both the US and Israel.

And even Israel’s accusations against Iran, although largely baseless, greatly enhance Iran’s prestige in the region, and may bring about exactly what the Israelis are trying to prevent.

Fourth, Bush’s impotence is a clear demonstration that America has lost a great deal of global power over the last three years. If Bush cannot control Iran, Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah, or Israel, then what real power does the world’s “hyperpower” possess?

And one of the more intriguing aspects of this essay is how Ismail relates the weakening of Israeli and American power to a decentralization of power, information and technology in the global age. Ultimately, these arguments are harder to quantify and substantiate than his earlier political-military analysis. But he’s definitely onto something here:

The global diffusion of the news outlets is obviously important for understanding why Bismarckian [conventional as opposed to guerrilla] warfare has become so ineffective. For instance, Hezbollah has its own media network, and can draw upon the global satellite network to get its message out, and can also use the global media to take advantage of Israel’s targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure.

And although the American media largely supports Israel, the information about the Americans stranded in Lebanon limits Israel’s freedom of action, and makes Israel look like it cares nothing for the lives of American citizens.

At an even deeper level, the rate and density of global information transfer, and lack of any centralized control over the global distribution of information, is causing the fabric of space and time to contract, and so Israel’s crimes can much more quickly create a global backlash.

Time and space, as we experience them, are contracting because the global diffusion of technical and scientific knowledge is permitting events in one part of the world to increasingly influence those in other parts, and events that once took years or even decades to unfold can now occur within mere months or weeks.

As a consequence, the disenfranchised peoples of the world are developing the ability to affect the lives of the more privileged members of humanity, which means that anything that Israel does to the Palestinians or Lebanese will have effects upon Israel that are more direct and more negative than ever before, and that further, these effects will occur in an accelerated time scale.

Thus, as it becomes self-evident that Israeli military power is no longer as effective as it once was.

The global micro-diffusion of military technology is also critical, and so military innovation and its global diffusion will only strengthen grassroots rebellions and allow them to more effectively resist the instruments of Bismarckian control, as well as the depredations of the military hippopotami that are the ultimate guarantors of statism and statist regimes.

For all of these reasons, Israeli attempts to impose terms on Lebanon, or to redraw the political map of Lebanon, or even to impose a NATO force upon southern Lebanon, are not militarily feasible nor politically achievable, and if attempted, will prove ultimately unsustainable.

As will soon be demonstrated by events on the ground, Israel will not be able to destroy or even disarm Hezbollah. Neither will Hamas, Hezbollah, Lebanon, or Syria permit Israel or America to dictate terms to them. Consequently, if Israel lingers too long in southern Lebanon, its presence will be paid for at such a high cost, that it will be forced to withdraw in ignominy, as it has so many times in the past.

In the end however, Israel’s loss of power will make it even more dangerous, because the more threatened the Israelis feel, the more likely they will launch destructive wars against the Palestinians and Israel’s other adversaries.

Finally, the same can be said of the US, with respect to its loss of global power. Instead of becoming more careful with its use of force, the erosion of America’s global dominance will likely make the US government more aggressive, as it attempts to reassert its former position relative to its adversaries and competitors.

And it is precisely because America and Israel are losing influence over global events, that an American attack upon Iran in 2007 becomes more likely.

I wish I could say that this pessimistic, alarmist view of Mideast developments does not ring true because it bodes quite ill for the future. But, alas, it does ring true.