Shin Bet Alleges Iran Spy Network Active for Two Years

Haaretz reports that Iran has conducted a two-year campaign to build a major spy network in Israel.  It has recruited Israeli Jews and Palestinian citizens in several different cells, each tasked with different missions, including reconnaisance of military sites and targeting a retired senior nuclear scientist.

CBS News describes the mission one cell, the arrest of whose members was announced this week:

“The network conducted extensive reconnaissance missions on IDF bases nationwide, focusing on air force and navy installations, ports, Iron Dome system locations, and energy infrastructure such as the Hadera power plant.”

…The work…involved photographing and documenting strategic sites, with the collected data…handed over to Iranian agents, the police said.

“The investigation led to seizure of substantial materials compiled by the network members for Iranian agents,” an official from Israel’s internal security agency [Shin Bet] was quoted as saying in the police statement.

“These included photographs and videos of numerous IDF bases across Israel, ports, and energy infrastructure. It is assessed that these activities have inflicted security damage on the state,” the police said.

Members of the group were also tasked with collecting intelligence on several Israeli citizens at the behest of the Iranian agents, it said.

Haaretz mentions other high-value sites:

They were tasked with collecting intelligence on Israel Air Force bases in the south and north [including Nevatim, home of the F-35 squadron] and on other military sites. Other targets were the headquarters of Mossad and intelligence Unit 8200, both…north of Tel Aviv.

Members of one of the cells were Azeri-Israelis who emigrated to Israel ten years ago.  They were allegedly approached by Iranian agents in Azerbaijan and Turkey, who successfully recruited and tasked them, in exchange for hundreds of thousands of dollars in crypto currency.

The choice of Azeris is interesting because Azerbaijan is a hotbed of espionage with Iranian and Israeli agents competing there for information, leverage and intelligence-gathering.  Recruiting an Azeri-Israeli would be a valuable achievement, depending on the skills of the recruit.  In this case, they appear to have been wanting.  Also, two Russian-Israel spies were paid in Russian digital currency.

The Iranians trawled social media platforms, in particular Telegram, seeking potential recruits. After identifying them as potential targets they approached them in chats and expanded the relationship through further contact.

Gaza war spurred Iran to escalate espionage efforts

Clearly, the Iranians have intensified their efforts to penetrate Israel’s military-intelligence apparatus given the Gaza conflict and Iran’s support for both Hamas and Hezbollah.  The country’s intelligence services realized they needed spies inside Israel to offer them knowledge they could not obtain from outside Israel.  That information would enable them to identify suitable targets should hostilities break out (as they have).

The list of espionage activities was impressive and one can see why the indictment indicates that they endangered state security.  For that reason, it defies belief that the Shin Bet’s counter-intelligence unit would not have detected these reconnaissance missions at the country’s most secret military installations. Also, such extensive payments should have been detected and raised alarm bells.  Haaretz recounts that one of the cells had been operating for two years “under the nose” of the spy agency.

The Shin Bet scrutinizes virtually every facet of Iran’s intelligence and military apparatus.  Among them, would be detecting penetration of the country by Iran via Israeli assets.  It seems unlikely it would not have detected such activities by Iranian agents.

Another possibility is that the Shin Bet did detect the operation and allowed it to proceed in order to collect information on Iranian intelligence methods.  However, the former would never permit any actual espionage materials to be transferred to the Iranians as was alleged in the italicized passage above.

Finally, I raise the possibility that many of these spies may not have been recruited by Iran at all, but rather entrapped by the Shin Bet into committing crimes for which it could charge them. I queried an Israeli security official about whether they were approached by Iranians or lured by Shin Bet agents. He refused to comment.

It is even possible that they were not told who they were working for; or told they were working for a country other than Iran.

The Politics of Espionage

Nothing happens in Israel these days that doesn’t have an ulterior political motive–from Gaza to this “spy scandal.”  There are two separate interests at work. The simplest is the Shin Bet, whose preferred narrative is that, once again, it has proven that it protects the security of the state and its citizens. This is critical to its image, which took an enormous beating on 10/7. That was a catastrophic security failure for the entire military-intelligence apparatus. A failure which neither has been willing to face; and one the nation has not faced.

Exposing Israeli spies working for Iran within the state itself, while endangering their own for grubby lucre: this was a role the spy agency was meant to play. It would redeem some of that lost cachet.

But it’s difficult to know precisely what the spy agency exposed.  Was it as serious as it now claims?  What was the quality of the intelligence gathered?  We know what the Shin Bet claims: that it caught Mata Hari and the Rosenbergs, all rolled up into one. However, from what little is known about the suspects, they were not exactly high-quality or model citizens.  They were in debt, psychologically troubled, members of criminal gangs.  Precisely the sort of down-and-outers that predators seek out as victims.  The question is: were the predators Iranian or Israeli?

Iran spy scandal plays right into Bibi’s hands

But Netanyahu’s interest is even greater.  Israel plans to attack Iran.  I believe it will not be a restrained attack; rather that it will be devastating.

Bibi is a shrewd politician. He knows that if Israel is going to strike such a blow, he must prepare Israelis and the world for it. He must trot out something more persuasive than the usual bellicosity and UN visual aids.  What better to offer than serial spy scandals: Iran infiltrating Israel, coaxing Israelis to betray their own.  It leaves Israelis feeling naked and exposed, with their leader stepping forward to assure them that all is well.  Bibi takes care of his own. Neutralized the threat.  You are safe now, Bibi is in charge.

He has another audience he’s concerned about: the world. In order to attack Iran, he must persuade the world that it deserves the punishment he’s going to mete out.  Iran’s missile attack on Israel is a start.

But a spy scandal is a special gift.  Every country has them: Britain had Kim Philby. The US had the Rosenbergs.  They tap into a deep vulnerability in humans: betrayal by one’s own.  Thus, Bibi tells the world that Iran doesn’t just maintain a “terror network,” but it penetrates into the heart of its enemies.  Turning citizens into traitors. That is a dramatic script Bibi, the consummate pitchman, can milk.

Mission: Killing Bibi

In a separate case, an Israeli businessman living in Turkey, Moti Maman, age 72, was also snared.  He had been tasked by his handlers with preparing to assassinate Bibi Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant, the defense minister.  They directed him to purchase equipment and materials needed for the job.  But apparently things didn’t progress much beyond that.  His compensation was substantially less than the alleged spy ring described above.

His neighbors described him as someone with a vivid imagination (charitably put) who claimed at various times that he worked for Mossad or Unit 8200.  They “laughed” in disbelief.  Little did they know he worked for (or believed he was working for) Iran.

Among Maman’s misadventures: he’d been lured by a Romanian woman, who took him for all he was worth.  In another, he signed a business deal with a partner in Africa, then absconded with the funds he’d been given.  According to another acquaintance, he frequented a criminal crowd in Nahariya. He also dealt with the Palestinian underworld.  Others say he may have been exploited and lured into this trap due to his gullible nature.  Local Israeli residents who knew him surmised that he may have been planning a reverse scam, in which he pretended to do what the Iranians asked in return for compensation, leaving them holding the bag.

At any rate, Maman’s case seems dubious.  Either the Iranians were fools to recruit him; or the Shin Bet is a fool for treating him as a dangerous spy and threat to the state.

There will always be such individuals in every society. It is a human frailty.  Only despicable spy agencies desperate for a “catch” would exploit such people, who aren’t capable of killing a fly, let alone a prime minister.