6 thoughts on “Israeli Ex-Security Chiefs Endorse Iran Nuclear Deal – Tikun Olam תיקון עולם إصلاح العالم
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        1. If I wanted to spend time refuting Aipac talking pts, which is what Schumer has adopted I would do so. They’re not worth my time. But my friend Muhammad Sahimi may be doing so. Also, you’ll find rebuttals of Aipac ‘ s positions in Obama’s speech earlier this week, on the White house & NIAC websires. Now go & study!

  1. Here is the answer to the question of Mitchell Blood to show why Senator Schumer is 100% wrong.
    There are two direct nuclear explosives. Pu239 (a plutonium isotope) and U235 (a uranium isotope). Hydrogen fusion requires a direct explosive. Of the two the production of Pu239 is “easier” than that of U235 which is why the US arsenal is based on Pu235 and not on U235.
    Pu239 can be produced in nuclear reactors but must be separated from other elements by a technique which Iran does not now have. Moreover, its current nuclear reactor (still not started) must be modified to greatly reduce the annual output of Pu239 which will be taken out of Iran anyway. The Vienna agreement has essentially closed the Pu239-path to an Iranian nuclear arsenal. Mitchell, do you disagree? If so, why?
    Uranium oxide ore is the source for U235. Once uranium has been extracted from the ore U235 must be separated from the much more abundant U238 isotope which is not an explosive. For the Hiroshima bomb that was done by electromagnetic separation and gas diffusion, both consuming huge amounts of energy which is why these separations were done in the Tennessee valley.
    It was only after a Dutch laboratory successfully developed the enrichment of U235 by ultracentrifugation in the 1970’s that this method has become the currently favored one. It is a vulnerable technique. The spinning drums are made from a special aluminum alloy. They are spinning on a fairly narrow “pin”. A single centrifuge cannot produce enough U235 for a nuclear arsenal. Hence a large number must be combined in a so-called “counter-current cascade”. What does “counter-current” mean? This method needs uranium in the form of a gas. The gas used is UF6, uranium-hexafluoride. UF6 enriched in U235 at the axis is continuously pumped from drum-to-drum in one direction and the UF6 depleted in U235 at the wall is pumped in the other direction hence “counter current”.
    UF6 is an extremely corrosive chemical. It reacts with water immediately to form uranium oxide and HF which is another aggressive chemical. All parts of the cascade must be UF6 and HF resistant.
    Now let us assume that Iran wants to cheat. It cannot use the existing facilities and materials because these are under constant surveillance. Hence the following must be done absolutely secretly.
    Iran must either mine or import uranium ore by smuggling. That might actually be the one step that can be kept a secret but not easily and not for very long because of satellite monitoring. The ore must be transported to the processing plants.
    Meanwhile Iran must secretly build the following new underground facilities. That cannot be done in 24 days. No way.
    A facility to extract uranium-oxide from the ore.
    A facility to produce fluorine from molten potassium fluoride by electrolysis.
    A facility to produce uranium hexafluoride by the chemical reaction of uranium or uranium oxide with fluorine.
    A new centrifuge cascade to enrich U235 in UF6
    A facility to transform the uraniumhexafluoride to the compound used in a bomb.
    Laboratories, living quarters, computer centers, power stations.
    A bomb assembly facility
    Numerous products must be brought into and removed from these facilities.
    Vast amounts of electrical power must be piped into these facilities.
    Building these in separate places requires transports of materials and instrumentation among the facilities which can be easily spotted. Hence the only way to do this “secretly” is in one location and that is impossible without early detection.
    Actually Iran would have to build at least two bombs. The first one must be used to test. That test could be a dud which means yet another bomb must be assembled. In fact, it makes absolutely no sense for Iran to aim at the production of enough U235 for only two or three bombs. The facilities mentioned above must be designed for a full nuclear arsenal.
    Iran will not cheat. Iran will not get a single nuclear bomb let alone a nuclear arsenal.
    I base my opinion on my active participation in the science and technology of U235 enrichment, fluorine production, and UF6 chemistry.

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