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Mohammad Said Kalash, "Offering Reconciliation" exhibit (photo: Ilan Amihai)

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Posts Tagged ‘two-state-solution’

Steve Walt: Obama’s Policy Options With a Recalcitrant Israel

Tuesday, April 14th, 2009

Steve Walt has offered Pres. Obama a remarkably clear set of policy options that he could use serially or in combination, should Israel’s new rightist government prove recalcitrant about entering serious negotiations or should it refuse to accept a two state solution.  This is policy analysis that is sharp and pragmatic, something we need to see more of regarding U.S. policy for the region:

The United States has only rarely put (mild) pressure on Israel in recent decades (and never for very long), even when the Israeli government was engaged in actions (such as building settlements) that the U.S. government opposed.  The question is: if the Netanyahu/Lieberman government remains intransigent, what should Obama do?  Are there usable sources of leverage that the United States could employ to nudge Israel away from the vision of “Greater Israel” and towards a genuine two-state solution?  Here are a few ideas.

…Change the Rhetoric. The Obama administration could begin by using different language to describe…Israeli policies.  While reaffirming America’s commitment to Israel’s existence as a Jewish-majority state, it could…start describing the settlements as “illegal” or as “violations of international law”…U.S. officials could even describe Israel’s occupation as “contrary to democracy,” “unwise,” “cruel,” or “unjust.”  Altering the rhetoric would send a clear signal to the Israeli government and its citizens that their government’s opposition to a two-state solution was jeopardizing the special relationship.

Support a U.N. Resolution Condemning the Occupation.
Since 1972, the United States has vetoed forty-three U.N. Security Council resolutions that were critical of Israel (a number greater than the sum of all vetoes cast by the other permanent members).  If the Obama administration wanted to send a clear signal that it was unhappy with Israel’s actions, it could sponsor a resolution condemning the occupation and calling for a two-state solution.  Taking an active role in drafting such a measure would also ensure that it said exactly what we wanted, and avoided criticisms that we didn’t want included.

Downgrade existing arrangements for “strategic cooperation.”
There are now a number of institutionalized arrangements for security cooperation between the Pentagon and the Israel Defense Forces and between U.S. and Israeli intelligence. The Obama administration could postpone or suspend some of these meetings, or start sending lower-grade representatives to them…Such a step would surely get the attention of Israel’s security establishment.

Reduce U.S. purchases of Israeli military equipment…
The Pentagon…buys millions of dollars of weaponry and other services from Israel’s…defense industry. Obama could…slow or decrease these purchases, which would send an unmistakable signal that it was no longer “business-as-usual.” Given the battering Israel’s economy has taken in the current global recession, this step would get noticed too.

Get tough with private organizations that support settlement activity.
As David Ignatius recently noted in the Washington Post, many private donations to charitable organizations operating in Israel are tax-deductible in the United States, including private donations that support settlement activity…It means the American taxpayer is indirectly subsidizing activities that are contrary to stated U.S. policy and that actually threaten Israel’s long-term future.  Just as the United States has gone after charitable contributions flowing to terrorist organizations, the U.S. Treasury could crack down on charitable organizations (including those of some prominent Christian Zionists) that are supporting these illegal activities…

Encourage other U.S. allies to use their influence too. In the past, the United States has often pressed other states to upgrade their own ties with Israel.  If pressure is needed, however, the United States could try a different tack.  For example, we could quietly encourage the EU not to upgrade its relations with Israel until it had agreed to end the occupation.

Obama has already begun acting on these types of ideas in subtler ways.  His Ankara speech contained an implicit rebuke of Avigdor Lieberman’s rejection of the Annapolis process.

As an Israeli journalist noted, it’s been a long time since a U.S. president’s first foreign Middle East trip didn’t include a stop in Jerusalem.  The fact that Obama made two major addresses in Turkey on this trip and never stepped foot in Israel probably wasn’t lost on the Netanyahu government.  It certainly indicates that the next four years are not going to be the cakewalk that they were for Israeli governments under the previous president. Further, the first major Middle East leader to step foot in the Obama White House will not be Bibi, but rather Jordan’s King Abdullah.  Again, as we say in Hebrew: Ha-mayvin yavin (“he who understands, will understand”).

For any Walt-Mearsheimer trashers out there–yes, Walt does call for pressure on Hamas to moderate its positions and he also acknowledges that the U.S. has put pressure on the Palestinians to change their own stances. Nor does Walt shrink from our reasserting such pressure should it be necessary. But clearly Walt, and probably Obama himself, notes that the major obstacle is not going to be Hamas or Fatah, but the Israelis–especially in Israel’s current political configuration.

I would take slight issue with one of Walt’s more optimistic statements:

I suspect it would not take much U.S. pressure to produce the necessary shift in Israel’s attitudes.

Having been an observer of this conflict for several decades I never underestimate Israel’s ability to abscond from inconvenient realities in its relationships with friend and foe alike. As Reagan was the Teflon president, Israel is the Teflon ally. When it doesn’t want something to stick, or seeks to avoid the unpleasant, it manages to finds ways–thousands of ‘em.

If Walt is right then I’d be delighted. But I fear it will not be as easy as he believes.  But that is no reason not to give our best effort.

David Kimche: On the Gaza Crisis

Sunday, May 27th, 2007

David Kimche must have undergone something of a conversion during the 1990s after he left the Israeli foreign ministry as its director general. His involvement with the Iran-Contra scandal cost him his most coveted wish–to become Mosad chief. After leaving government service, he’s become something of a dove, which is rather remarkable considering his earlier championing of the first Lebanon War and his reputation as one of Israel’s pre-eminent spooks.

In the Jerusalem Post (yes, I guess they do have to fill a quota of dovish op-ed pieces and do let some slip by their neocon political filter), Kimche provides his recipe for ending Palestinian civil strife and engaging Hamas in the peace process:

Just think of it. Mighty Israel is helpless in the face of a bunch of terrorist thugs spewing out deadly homemade, primitive rockets onto our citizens. If ever there was proof that we cannot solve our problems by the use of force alone, this is the ultimate witness to that fact.

We do, of course, have the capability to launch a massive incursion into Gaza, as our bellicose commander of the Southern front, Maj.-Gen. Yoav Galant, has been urging us to do. We may well, eventually, do his bidding.

Yet we have been down that road before, and each time we swore that this time we would smash the Kassam manufacturers and the gangs that fire them into Israel. Yet after each such attack, after the thousands of shells fired, and the hundreds of terrorists – and civilians – killed, after the death and the destruction, the Kassam workshops would spring up again, like poisonous plants after a spring rain, and our citizens in Sderot and in the Negev kibbutzim would yet once more be forced to suffer.

For seven long years we have endured the Kassam scourge. It began long before then-prime minister Ariel Sharon decided to evacuate our settlements in Gaza and to disengage. In those seven years our military has been repeatedly in action in Gaza, all to no avail. The daily barrage of Kassams on Sderot is ample evidence of that.

…The killing of a few Hamas operatives will not deter the Hamas leadership, and even the resumption of targeted killings will not do that. Remember Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and all the other Hamas big shots we sent into the next world?

History has shown us that military might is not, on its own, an answer to the sort of situation that exists in Gaza. The French sent their mighty army into Algeria to quell the insurrection there, and were thrown out. The Americans sent their mighty army into Vietnam, and were thrown out. And even here, in what was then Palestine, the British heaved a great sigh of relief with their targeted killing of Avraham Stern after capturing him, only to be confronted by Yitzhak Shamir, who led Lehi, the so-called Stern Gang, into even more audacious attacks on them. Faced with the determination of the Jewish community, the mighty British army, like the French and the Americans in later years, was forced to leave.

If military might won’t solve the problem, what will? Quoting William Morris, the director of the British Next Century Foundation, he writes:

…There are some interesting ideas floating in Gaza that could bring change. Sami Abd e-Shafi, the nephew of the venerable Haidar Abd e-Shafi, one of the scions of the Gazan Palestinians, is pressing for a referendum on the recognition of Israel. Hamas stalwarts lean toward the idea of a two-state solution, which would implicitly entail recognition of Israel. The need for a return to the hudna (truce) with Israel, provided it includes the West Bank, is a widespread belief.

“These beliefs could be the basis for private discussions by intermediaries of the sort we had with the IRA,” Morris suggested. “The last thing you want is for Gaza to deteriorate into a second Somalia, which would happen if you take out their infrastructure – water and electricity – which is what some of you have been advocating, or if you target political leaders. Somalia on your doorstep, a mere hour’s drive from Tel Aviv, would be disastrous for Israel.”

A long-term strategy must include a policy to improve the economy of Gaza, by setting up industry to create new jobs. It must entail an initiative to kick-start the moribund peace process, with the Palestinians, with the Syrians or with the Arab League, and it should include contacts with the Hamas, even if only by intermediaries.

“These are the carrots that you should dangle before their eyes,” Morris declared. “And at the same time, by all means use your stick, and hit them with your military if they continue to fire Kassams.”

Best of all, he concluded, ask NATO to send troops to Gaza. “That should do the trick to bring quiet to your citizens of Sderot.”

Who knows, maybe we should have someone with that sort of thinking in our prime minister’s shoes.

Tzipi Livni and even Avigdor Lieberman (believe it or not) have advocated a similar international force to police Gaza. This indicates something of Israel’s level of desperation about the situation since it historically detests the idea of international forces on its doorstep. But since Ehud Olmert didn’t think of it first and Livni is his political rival, you’ll never hear him acknowledge the idea as worthy. Meanwhile Gaza, like Rome before it, burns. And a second Israeli was killed by Qassam fire on Sderot. “When will they ever learn?”

Abbas Calls for National Referendum on 2-State Solution

Saturday, May 27th, 2006

Some major developments on the Palestinian side of the Mideast conflict. Mahmoud Abbas, in a move that has managed to shock both Hamas, Israel and the U.S., called on Hamas to accept the Hadarim peace proposal formulated largely by Marwan Barghouti and his fellow prisoners in Israeli jails (including many Hamas prisoners). The Hadarim proposal in turn is closely modeled on the 2002 Saudi/Arab League peace initiative which Israel never seriously entertained at the time. It calls for Israel to return to 1967 borders in return for full recognition of it by all Arab states. It also calls for a Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital and for a “just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem.”

mahmoud abbas at national dialogue day conferenceAbbas at National Dialogue Day conference (photo: Muhammed Muheisen – AP)

Palestinians have just begun ten days of national dialogue about their strategy to achieve their national aspirations. In one fell swoop, Abbas has turned the tables on Hamas in this dialogue. Now, instead of being co-equals in the process, Abbas has essentially taken the initiative, determined the agenda, and almost guaranteed the political outcome. I’ve got to say–I never thought he had it in him. But now I say–more power to him.

If, after the ten days of discussion end Hamas is not prepared to endorse Hadarim, the Abbas will put the referendum before the people. All Palestinian public opinion polls show overwhelming support for Hadarim’s main principles. In addition, Palestinian prisoners are held in especially high esteem within Palestinian society. In fact, they’re virtually the only constituency within that society which is admired and respected by all. For Hamas to consider campaigning against their proposal in a referendum would be both a lost cause and foolhardy politically.

That doesn’t mean that Hamas won’t rant and rave about it as PA prime minister minister Haniyeh did:

We will not make political concessions,” Haniyeh told worshipers at a Gaza mosque in response to Abbas’s surprise ultimatum for the militant group to back the proposal for Palestinian statehood or face a referendum on the issue.

“Even if they besiege us from all directions, they should not dream that we will make any political concessions,” added Haniyeh.

What is brilliant in Abbas’ move is that it forces Hamas to do precisely what Haniyeh says the group will never do. It is simply unfeasible for it to stop this process. If they refuse to agree to Hadarim than Abbas will stage the referendum and he will win. Then Hamas will have no choice to acquiesce in what the Palestinian people have decided for them.

Just as important as outfoxing Hamas, the referendum puts Israel on the defensive. Olmert has banked on Hamas’ continued intransigence to allow him to tell the world that he has no partner willing to accept Israel’s existence and renounce terror. In one stroke, a yes vote by Palestinians will remove all this political detritus from the path. In effect, Abbas will be presenting a Palestinian society which HAS accepted precisely those conditions which Olmert has laid down in return for peace negotiations. Then, of course, it will be on Israel to come up with a new excuse why it simply cannot negotiate with such people. One can only guess what the new political charade/stratagem will involve.

The only problem for Israel will be that the entire international community (likely including the U.S.) will tell it that the jig is up and it’s time to get down to brass tacks and talk seriously about what peace will look like for both sides. By then, Olmert’s “wiggle room” will have been seriously reduced. He may be hardpressed to get out of Israel’s ultimate responsibility to help resolve a conflict which it helped start and perpetuate over many decades.

A Jerusalem Post interview with the Arab League’s Amr Moussa delineates Israel’s current objections to the 2002 proposal:

“We have two main problems with it,” a Foreign Ministry official said this week. “One, it contradicts the road map by predetermining that the borders between Israel and the Palestinians will be based on ’67. The road map says let’s sit together and agree together upon the borders.”

Isn’t it interesting how Israel trots out the Road Map when it’s convenient and otherwise tells its citizens and the rest of the world that the Road Map is “dead.” But further, there is nothing in the Road Map that prevents both parties agreeing on the ’67 borders; or on different borders entirely. The only thing that is necessary is mutual acceptance of whatever is proposed. The one thing not in the cards is unilateralism, which is precisely Olmert’s plan.

In his response, Moussa affirms the flexibility of the Arab League document in this reaction to the Foreign Ministry statement:

Not so, said Moussa. Everything, including the ’67 borders, he said, “is subject to the negotiations that will take place between the two parties.”

“What we are offering in the Arab initiative is two states,” Moussa said. “An Israeli state with the Jewish people living there and a Palestinian state, dividing the land of Palestine along the lines of 4 June 1967… If there are changes in the borders, or around the borders, they have to be astride the borders. You take this, I take that. Just to adjust.”

Everything must be negotiated, he said, “in order to reach a solution that if this piece of land is to be given to Israel… the Palestinians should be compensated with another piece of land.”

Israel also objects to the Right of Return called for in the Arab League/Hadarim proposal, fearing that it would flood the country with hundreds of thousands of Palestinians returning to reclaim their native homes. But Moussa retorts that this issue too is negotiable:

Moussa said that the issues of refugees was also subject to negotiations…

“How many will return, how many will return to the Palestinian state, how many will return to the Israeli state, how many will be compensated, how many are ready to return to either state or a third state… It can take its time,” he said. “They can agree on the time frame of such negotiations. But meanwhile, withdrawal can take place, a Jerusalem solution can be reached, certain security arrangements for a certain period of time can be agreed, then we move on.”

No doubt, Israel will also object to the Hadarim document because it does not fully renounce the use of force to fight the Occupation. Here’s how the NY Times characterizes this portion of it:

The Palestinian prisoners’ plan says that resistance to Israeli occupation, while “a Palestinian right,” should be “limited only to land occupied by Israel since 1967.” That effectively endorses attacks against Israelis in the West Bank, where Israeli soldiers and settlers are present, but not inside the borders Israel had before the 1967 war.

As Robert Rosenberg writes in Ariga.com, there is much that could go wrong with Abbas’ initiative: Israel could put the kibosh on it. The international community could continue its attempt to pummel Palestinians into submission through economic boycott and so undermine the peace effort. God knows, George Bush could bomb Iran or some other idiocy could occur–after all this is the Mideast. But the key point is that this could be a turning point that gets us closer to final status negotiations happening in months rather than years or even decades. But I certainly get ahead of myself in my optimism and should tie my tether much closer to the ground of political reality which is still fluid and terribly unstable.

Hamas Foreign Minister Zahar Endorses ‘Two State Solution’

Tuesday, April 4th, 2006

In a letter to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, Hamas foreign minister, Mahmoud Zahar, called Israel’s settlement expansion and Separation Barrier obstacles to peace. But the language he used to do so was striking and unusual for any Hamas leader and particularly for him, who is known as more hardline than his counterparts. Here’s how Haaretz described the letter’s contents:

The letter, referring to Israel’s expansion of its West Bank settlements and its construction of a barrier on Palestinian land, says at one point:

“This will ultimately diminish any hopes for the achievement of settlement and peace based on a two-state solution,” a possible reference to recognizing Israel’s right to exist.

The unofficial translation of the letter’s final paragraph, provided by the Palestinian UN Observer Mission, states:

“Like all other people in the world, we look forward to live in peace and security for our people to live a dignified live in freedom and independence, side by side with our neighbors in this sacred part of the world.”

Of course, we must add a proviso that Zahar later “clarified” to Israel Radio that he denied recognizing Israel’s right to exist and claimed he had not mentioned the concept of a two-state solution. Go figure.

All I can say if the Hamas leadership keeps vacillating in this way by making conciliatory public statements and then withdrawing them, their credibility will eventually diminish even among those who have some sympathy for their views.

Bill Clinton Would Shake Hands With Hamas…With Some Conditions

Monday, April 3rd, 2006

Haaretz reports today that Bill Clinton was interviewed on BBC TV this weekend (why no link at the BBC site??) speaking of U.S. Mideast policy and specifically about our approach to the new Hamas government. He brought a breath of fresh air to the table compared to the stale stuff the Bush Administration and Olmert government have been expelling on this subject (quoting from the Pakistan Daily Times:

Asked if he would shake hands with Hamas in the name of negotiation as he did with Arafat in 1993, Clinton said: “If they made the same assurances that Arafat did.

“He had made private assurances, and he made public assurances, that he did not support terror any more and would try to restrain it.

“So if Hamas would say, suppose they say, OK, look, we can’t change our theory, we can’t change our document, we can’t change our history, but we’re in government now and the policy of the Palestinian government is no to terror and yes to negotiations. As long as we’re in government, we’ll honour that policy.”

There is one problematic aspect of Clinton’s quote. Arafat DID assure Clinton he would renounce terror. And perhaps he did for a time. But it is clear that sometime after that 1995 handshake Arafat renounced his commitment and pursued terror and other forms of violent resistance through the first and second intifadas. Israelis have every reason to doubt whether Hamas, making such a similar commitment, should be believed considering its history of terror attacks against Israel.

All that being said, I commend Clinton for having the most realistic appraisal of Hamas I’ve read from just about any international leader since Hamas won the election. We should test Hamas’ resolve on issues like this (renunciation of violence, recognition of 2-state solution, etc.). Why can’t Olmert, Bush and Rice see the merits of this approach as well?

Fayyad at Kabobfest has his own view on Clinton’s sentiments that diverges from my own:

If they did that? I guess the president with the newly-found intelligence still does not read the news. Did he hear about Hamas’ offer for a 10-year extended truce Hamas made as part of becoming the ruling party? Or even better, the 30-year truce offer of 1997?

Demands of more than a halt to military action by all parties must not be preconditions for negotiations. One need not make peace with friends, peace is always sought after with enemies. It would be rather foolish to expect both Hamas and Israel to agree to a series of condition that in effect would, if applied, solve the conflict. Now let’s hope the new Israeli government agrees to respect and acknowledge the treaties previous governments reached with the Palestinians.

To which I’d point out that Clinton’s conditions demand that Hamas say “no to terror and yes to negotiations.” So I must be missing something, because Fayyad seems to be agreeing with Clinton when he (Fayyad) accepts (if I read him correctly) the need for negotiations and a halt to military action “by both sides.”

But I might add that Hamas attached its own conditions to such a “10 year extended truce” which included a return to 1967 borders (a policy I approve of by the way). Israel certainly is nowhere yet near supporting ’67 borders as a consensus position. So that means Hamas has essentially put forward a non-starter condition. If Hamas can put an end to terror then I have no doubt that Israelis will come around to accepting ’67 borders. But they will not do so as long as terror continues unabated.