Tikun Olam-תקון עולם: Make the World a Better Place

My title is of course a reference to those ringing words of Kohelet (Ecclesiastes): Hevel havalim amar Kohelet (”Folly of follies says Kohelet”). After reading today’s stinging Haaretz editorial about what we’ll soon be calling the Gaza debacle, I thought the title appropriate for today’s post.

The newspaper begins by noting the contradiction between Israel laying blame at the feet of Khaled Meshal and Syria; while also blaming those local Hamas political leaders who not even Israel claims knew about or condoned the kidnapping:

On the face of it, Israel wishes to exert increasing pressure both on Hamas’ political leadership and on the Palestinian public, in order to induce it to pressure its [military wing] leadership to release the soldier. At the same time, the government claims that Syria - or at least Khaled Meshal, who is living in Syria - holds the key. If so, what is the point of pressuring the local Palestinian leadership, which did not know of the planned attack and which, when it found out, demanded that the kidnappers take good care of their victim and return him?

A few days ago I wrote about parallels I saw between Gaza, 2006 and Lebanon, 1982. The editorial conceives of some new and very salient ones which I hadn’t thought of:

The tactic of pressuring civilians has been tried before, and more than once. The Lebanese, for example, are very familiar with the Israeli tactic of destroying power stations and infrastructure. Entire villages in south Lebanon have been terrorized, with the inhabitants fleeing in their thousands for Beirut. But what also happens under such extreme stress is that local divisions evaporate and a strong, united leadership is forged.

In the end, Israel was forced both to negotiate with Hezbollah and to withdraw from Lebanon. Now, the government appears to be airing out its Lebanon catalogue of tactics and implementing it, as though nothing has been learned since then. One may assume that the results will be similar this time around as well.

Israel also kidnapped people from Lebanon to serve as bargaining chips in dealings with the kidnappers of Israeli soldiers. Now, it is trying out this tactic on Hamas politicians. As the prime minister said in a closed meeting: “They want prisoners released? We’ll release these detainees in exchange for Shalit.” By “these detainees,” he was referring to elected Hamas officials.

The editorial writer here introduces some very telling Zionist movement history and notes parallels between it and the political points we’re scoring on behalf of imprisoned Hamas leaders in the eyes of their constituency:

The prime minister is a graduate of a movement whose leaders were once exiled [this refers to Etzel and Lehi members exiled by the British for their violent nationalist politics during the Mandate], only to return with their heads held high and in a stronger position than when they were deported. But he believes that with the Palestinians, things work differently.

As one who knows that all the Hamas activists deported by Yitzhak Rabin returned to leadership and command positions in the organization, Olmert should know that arresting leaders only strengthens them and their supporters. But this is not merely faulty reasoning; arresting people to use as bargaining chips is the act of a gang, not of a state.

The government…must return to its senses at once, be satisfied with the threats it has made, free the detained Hamas politicians and open negotiations. The issue is a soldier who must be brought home, not changing the face of the Middle East.

A gang, not a state. An uncharacteristically savage and caustic characterization by Haaretz of this government. But certainly apt. I also like the closing phrase: Forget about changing the face of the Middle East. Can there not be a clearer lesson for George Bush as well in Iraq? And could there not be a clearer message for Ariel Sharon who invaded Lebanon with grand ambitions to remake that nation so it would become a quiescent neighbor. By the time Israel left southern Lebanon with its tail between its legs, it realized that Sharon’s grand plan was based on lies and deceit and never stood a remote chance of working as its creator had hoped. If Ehud Olmert and Amir Peretz are not very careful, Gaza 2006 could turn around and bite them and their political careers in much the same way as Iraq did Bush and Lebanon did Sharon.

Oh Condi, Oh George–Where are you?

In wondering what the hell the U.S. is doing while the Middle East threatens to burn, the situation reminds me of the early computer game, Where’s Waldo? Look for him in the crowd. He’s not there. Look for him here, look for him there. Not a trace. That’s pretty much the impact we’re having on some of the most dangerous developments in this part of the world since the second intifada.

Here’s how Reuters characterized our ‘muscular’ foreign policy:

The United States has privately urged Israel to be careful over its military action, worried that tough moves in Gaza will boost Palestinian support for Hamas and further escalate tensions.

A senior State Department official said on Thursday a firm message had been delivered to the Israelis,

We delivered a ‘firm message’ behind closed doors to the Israelis giving them ‘what for’ as the Brits used to say. Yes, that’s certainly going to have a dramatic and immediate impact. You see we understand Israel’s frustration. We understand how one nation can arrest fully one-third of the elected cabinet ministers and parliamentary representatives of a neighboring statelet:

Publicly the United States, Israel’s staunchest ally, has said Israel has the right to defend itself and actively seek the release of the soldier, while urging restraint on all sides.

But there is a fear among some Bush administration officials that Israel might go too far.

“The Israeli measures might not only affect innocent civilians but could build support for Hamas,” said the senior official in an interview with Reuters.

“We have told them to be careful because plainly when you have this kind of military force deployed close to civilian populations there is a very high risk of accidents and I think that can further worsen this crisis.”

Why certainly Israel has a right to defend itself and seek Shalit’s release. That’s precisely what it’s doing by telling the residents of Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahiya to run for their lives. And precisely what it’s doing by arresting Palestinian legislators who had nothing to do with the kidnapping. And precisely what it’s doing by bombing power plants and PA infrastructure like the Interior Ministry building. This is all certainly plainly defensive action and done with the sole purpose of winning Shalit’s release.

And when, I’d like to know, WOULD Israel go “too far” in Bush’s book? When it carpet bombs Rafah or Khan Yunis? Or when it carpet bombs Damascus to teach Assad a lesson?

Israel “runs a very high risk of accidents” when you deploy military force “close to civilian populations.” Duh, I think the U.S. would’ve already learned the IDF has no capability or interest in distinguishing between militants and civilians given the history over the past month even before the latest incursion.

The absolute torpor of the American response is breathtaking. But it gets worse:

Asked about arrests of Hamas officials and whether President George W. Bush endorsed that, White House spokesman Tony Snow replied: “We are going no further than what we’ve said, which is we are encouraging both sides to practice restraint.”

RESTRAINT?? You’re asking jailed Hamas hostages to show restraint? They’re already being restrained…in Israeli shackles. So Tony Snow can’t actually say anything meaningful in response to the outrage of arresting Palestine’s elected government. I’d like to know if the British had actually captured James and Dolly Madison during the War of 1812 and brought them to the brig in chains, whether Tony Snow still would’ve urged the U.S. to show restraint?

What’s wrong with this picture?

U.S. diplomats, in a bid to secure the release of the soldier and ease the crisis, are shuttling between the Israelis and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

There has been no U.S. contact with Hamas and Egypt is the go-between with the militant group, which the United States and others refuse to deal with until it renounces violence, recognizes Israel and accepts past agreements between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

“The Egyptians are playing the most important role of any of the outsiders and they are directly in touch with the Israelis and all the Palestinians,” said the senior State Department official.

The U.S. is talking to Israel and Abbas. Yet the kidnappers are Hamas. There’s something wrong here. Of course you have no capability of talking to the party that’s actually responsible for the kidnapping thanks to our stupid anti-Hamas policy and Aipac, which has tied the Administration’s hands on this score. So who do we rely on? The Egyptians. Instead of showing our own leadership and vision in the midst of crisis, we must take a back seat to a tinpot megalomaniac Egyptian virtual dictator who may or may not represent our best interests, but who certainly will represent his own. If I were George Bush, I’d sleep well knowing we’re in the best of hands.

tags abbas, aipac, haaretz, idf-Gaza-invasion, israeli-army, israeli-invasion-of-lebanon, kidnapping-of-israeli-soldier, olmert, shalit, sharon, u.s.-policy-toward-hamas

Anyone following the Mideast conflict will notice one strange fact. If you explore public opinion within Israeli and Palestinian societies, there is mutual consensus on what the final settlement will look like. Writing for Common Ground News Service, Daoud Kuttab, Palestinian journalist and the director of the Institute of Modern Media at Al Quds University outlines such a consensus view and asks why it is not implemented:

The Palestinian Israeli conflict is very strange. It has lasted so long that public opinion has lost its power to affect policy or leaders’ decision making. No matter what the Palestinian or Israeli public wants, what happens on the ground and in decision making circles in Tel Aviv and Ramallah rarely reflects public opinion.

If public opinion counted we would long ago have solved this conflict. It is a scientific fact that the majority of Palestinians and Israelis know exactly what the solution to the conflict will look like: two sovereign states roughly along the 1967 borders, some adjustments for the big settlement blocks, a few refugees returning for symbolic value, and a functional solution for Jerusalem.

But public opinion doesn’t count. Just look at the victims of those who tried to follow public opinion. Quite a few PLO representatives who wanted to reflect Palestinian public opinion by beginning dialogue with Israelis were assassinated [i.e. Issam Sartawi]. A popular Israeli prime minister who was doing what the majority of Israelis wanted was similarly killed. In both instances the killers were not from the other side, but from their own people. Yasser Arafat and his Israeli counter parts had to negotiate in secret to reach the Oslo Accords. And Yasser Arafat told Clinton that he would be killed if he agreed on the ideas that Barak was offering. Ariel Sharon had to have an exaggerated number of body guards to protect him from assassination while he was enforcing what polls showed was a popular decision to withdraw from Gaza. He has not been able to do anything else despite polls showing that any further withdrawals in the West Bank would also gain majority support from Israelis.

The reasons for the lack of effectiveness of public opinion vary. For issues that are of higher national and strategic interests, the public gives those in power much more leeway. The average person in the Middle East feels that those in power have a lot more information at their disposal than they do that will allow them to decide what is best for the nation. The public might argue with authority on almost any issue except subjects dealing with security and of national strategic importance. Leaders are given the benefit of the doubt in these areas and their judgment is rarely questioned.

Unfortunately, leaders take advantage of this public position. They tend to carry out decisions reflecting what they want, assured that the public will rarely question them on issues relating to security.

This issue is more felt in the case of Israel. As a young country that was established against many odds, the Israeli public has an exaggerated sense of faith in their security forces. And since the majority of the Israeli political leaders have come from the army, the public has blind support for whatever their leaders have to say in security related matters. And while the Israeli public will question almost any other decision, they tend to be unanimously silent on strategic issues or security related subjects.

Kuttab notes there are only two ways to effect peace in the Mideast. One is by overwhelming force of public opinion. That is, when 2/3 of society agrees that something should happen, then the political elites will sit up and take notice. Until then, the powers-that-be know that the public will acquiesce in whatever policies they pursue in the areas of national security.

The second means of bringing change is when:

…Outside pressure [is] exerted on leaders. We saw this in the case of the Gaza withdrawals as the international pressure on Sharon to move in the peace process (within the Road Map framework) forced him to come up with a political plan that received the approval of the White House, even though it didn’t have overwhelming support in Israel.

What’s ironic in this statement is that Sharon originally thought of the Gaza withdrawal as a way to satisfy U.S. and international pressure while at the same time circumventing it. He wagered that his unilateral action would satisfy outsiders that he was doing something for peace, while delaying the final status issues (like the creation of a Palestinian state) for at least ten years.

I say ‘ironic’ because his withdrawal has proved far more substantive than Sharon had expected. Its aftermath led to the demoralization of the settler movement and creation of the rump rebel faction in Likud which drove Sharon from the Party. This in turn energized the left-wing of the Labor Party to elect Amir Peretz their leader, which in turn allowed (or perhaps forced) Sharon to quit Likud. The result of all this may be that after the next elections there will be momentum toward serious negotiation with the Palestinians leading to creation of a state. I doubt Sharon in his wildest dreams expected this to happen when he first plotted his Gaza withdrawal.

tags daoud_kuttab, gaza_withdrawal, israel, Mideast_Peace, palestinian, public_opinion, sharon

I am heartened that Israeli-Palestinian relations are on such positive footing these days. The image of Abbas and Sharon speaking together yesterday outside the Prime Minister’s office and shaking hands (with gusto-as opposed to the Arafat-Rabin reluctant handshake) afterward…plus the warm, humane words spoken-all of this gives me great hope for the future. Yes, there is a long road to go and groups like Hamas can stain that road with much blood. But the end is in sight and I am confident that there is a good chance that both sides will reach it.

tags abbas, Mideast Peace, sharon