Tikun Olam-תקון עולם: Make the World a Better Place

This is the second blog installment profiling Moshe Yaalon’s interview in Haaretz that was published in full yesterday. The first installment was Yaalon: ‘Going to War Was Scandalous’. The interview is doubly interesting because it represents his political “coming out.” It is the equivalent (well not precisely equivalent, but similar) of Bill Clinton’s A Town Called Hope at the 1992 Democratic convention in that he used it to introduce himself to the American electorate for the first time.

For this reason and for the actual substance of the article, it is an extremely interesting gauge of the views and mindset of an up and coming political leader (if he does indeed enter politics, which almost everyone expects him to do).

It is also interesting that he chose the liberal Haaretz as his mouthpiece rather than the more conservative Maariv or Yediot. It would be as if John McCain chose the NY Times when he first decided to run for political office. I think he’s making the case among Israeli intellectuals and political liberals for an alternative view of the war and the leaders responsible for it. And perhaps he’s trying to inoculate himself from the charge, should he join the Likud as many expect, that he is the typical nationalist extremist thriving in that party. If that is his strategy, I’m not sure it will work as Likud seems irremediable rejectionist and extremist to the core. Unless he toes the line, I don’t see how he will be comfortable there.

Before we read Yaalon’s views, I want to add another caveat that I neglected to mention yesterday. Much of the criticism about IDF preparedness for the war can legitimately be laid at Yaalon’s doorstep, so in effect the interview is an attempt to defend his reputation as chief of staff. Naturally, should he enter politics this (his military position) will be his currency. Should his reputation be sullied by a state investigation it would devalue him as a political leader. Therefore this defense.

But let’s get to the meat of the interview. In this passage, he sets out a contrarian (to Olmert and Halutz at least) view of the importance of Syrian negotiations:

Did you favor negotiations with Syria?

“Yes. In the summer of 2003 I suggested to prime minister Sharon that he accede to the requests of Bashar Assad and enter into negotiations with him. I thought that the very existence of negotiations with Syria on the future of the Golan Heights would crack the northern alignment of Iran-Syria-Hezbollah and perhaps also cause its dismantlement. Sharon rejected my suggestion outright. He preferred the disengagement.”

Would you be ready to cede the Golan Heights in return for peace with Syria?

“I never sanctified any piece of ground. If a territorial concession will bring about true peace and full recognition of Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state, I am not against that. However, even if we did not reach a land-for-peace agreement, the very fact of the renewal of the dialogue channel with Syria would have distanced it from Iran and would have weakened the northern alignment, which I defined as a strategic threat.”

Here Yaalon returns to a more traditional and constrained conception of Israeli military power which makes it all the more striking in light of recent grandiose projections of such power in Lebanon:

“You have to understand that the use of military force is a last resort. You don’t use it offhandedly. And in order to use military force a legitimate strategic context is required. There was no such context regarding Hezbollah. However, beyond all that, it was clear to me that Hezbollah is a rooted phenomenon and will not be eradicated by military action. It was also clear to me that there is no unequivocal military solution against the rocket deployment. I therefore encouraged political activity, which in the end would lead to the disarming of Hezbollah as a result of an internal Lebanese process, and concurrently I drew up a military plan intended to address a scenario of a Hezbollah offensive that would oblige us to deal with the organization militarily.”

When you compare Yaalon’s original plan for action in Lebanon to what actually happened under Halutz’s direction, you can’t help regretting his forced removal as chief of staff (though the reason he was forced to resign, his rejection of the Gaza withdrawal, was more than justified):

What were the plan’s basic assumptions?

“That the IDF must act in a way that would set in motion a political process that would lead to the disarming of Hezbollah, the removal of the Iranians from Lebanon and perhaps also the imposition of sanctions on Syria and Iran. In a scenario of the abduction of soldiers, exactly as occurred on July 12, the IDF was supposed to respond with an aerial attack and the mobilization of reserve divisions, which would act as a threat to the Syrians and to Hezbollah and would encourage Lebanon and the international community to take action to achieve the desired goal. If the threat itself did not achieve the goal, a ground move would have begun within a few days aimed primarily at seizing dominant terrain as far as the Litani River and the Nabatiya plateau.

“The ground entry was supposed to be carried out speedily, for an allotted time, without the use of tanks and without entering houses or built-up areas. Because of our awareness of the anti-tank missile problem and our awareness of the bunkers and of the fact that the routes are mined, the intention was to activate the IDF in guerrilla modalities. That was the operational idea, that was the plan and that is how the forces were trained.”

Had this been Israel’s strategy, it might or might not have worked. But it would not have drawn Israel into the maelstrom it found when it adopted Halutz’s ’scorched earth’ strategy in Lebanon.

In the following passage, Yaalon critiques the Olmert-Halutz mindset that maintained that military power alone could exterminate Hezbollah. If it is sincere on his part, it is a very wise formulation:

When did you understand that there had been a failure, that something had gone wrong?

“At the end of the first week. Until then things were conducted reasonably well. I was critical of the fact that the reserves were not mobilized, but I understood more or less what the goal was. But then, instead of plucking the political fruits of the aerial offensive, they continued to use force. They over-used force. And instead of coordinating with the Americans for them to stop us when the operation was at its height, and setting in motion a political process to disarm Hezbollah, we asked the Americans for more time. We let the Americans think that we have some sort of gimmick that will vanquish Hezbollah militarily. I knew there was no such gimmick. I knew the whole logic of the operation was that it be limited in time and not be extended.

“And then I lost all logical connection with the events. I understood that there was a deviation from the plan that was based on some sort of false feeling that there is a military means to pulverize Hezbollah and bring about its dismantlement and disappearance. Because the goals of the war were not defined and because no one clarified what the army is capable of doing and what it cannot do, the pursuit began of an impossible achievement. Instead of sticking to the IDF’s operative plan, they started to improvise. They improvised, improvised and then improvised again. Instead of grabbing political achievements at the right moment, they went on with the use of force. The excessive use of force in a situation like this is ruinous. It becomes a two-edged sword. When you turn a screw and reach a certain point you have to stop. If you keep going you end up pulling it out: you open instead of closing. That is what happened here.”

The following is a savage critique of the entire Israeli strategy of facing down Hezbollah in its populated strongholds:

So you believe the Bint Jbail move was also mistaken?

“Bint Jbail was imposed by the chief of staff. There was no orderly plan here. There was no dialogue between the General Staff and Northern Command and the field levels. The idea to capture Bint Jbail was born out of the desperate attempt to create a picture of victory, because Bint Jbail is a symbol. Because that’s where Nasrallah made his ’spider webs’ speech. But it was clear that this was folly. Why are you even messing with a built-up area? Seize the dominating terrain. Use infantry according to the original plan. Don’t enter killing areas in which Hezbollah is waiting for you. Listen to the command levels that are telling you that this is a mistake.”

Here, Yaalon enters the delicate territory of what you say to the young Israelis who followed orders and were sent into a Hezbollah death trap basically for naught:

Your wife’s nephew was seriously wounded in the land skirmishes in the village of Debel.

“The question that arises from Moran [his wife's nephew] and from his buddies is a simple one: Why? I am familiar with the loss of friends in war. And with bereaved families, and with serious wounds. But if it is clear why and for what, it’s easier. And here the young soldiers were sent to execute a mission whose logic and purpose were not clear to them. Nor did they understand why they found themselves in a house when it was clear to them that it wasn’t smart to enter houses. When Moran was drafted I told his father one thing: no tanks and no houses - I was that aware of the antitank threat. And when he shouted there, ‘Don’t send us into houses,’ nobody listened. Two antitank missiles entered the house, leaving nine killed and 32 wounded.

“So he and his buddies are asking why. Why the mistake in the tactical execution. And why the entering and leaving villages. And I, with them, also ask why. Yes, in war people are killed, wounded. But that is why the political echelon and the military echelon have to make their decisions in the most judicious and precise way. Not to get carried away. Not to act emotionally. Not to kick a wall with a bare foot. Because when you kick a wall with a bare foot the satisfaction of the kick lasts exactly as long as it takes for the foot to make contact with the wall. After that the foot is broken, while the wall continues to stand. And what happens in the meantime is not only that soldiers are killed. What happens is that the most basic element that leadership needs is eroded: trust. And that is what happened here. The trust of the soldiers and the commanders in the political echelon and in the senior command was eroded.”

In Israeli society, the IDF maintains a delicate balance with politics. It is ostensibly insulated from politics by civilian management. In truth, the boundary between military and politics is quite ambiguous. Many Israelis believe that the IDF essentially runs the nation’s security policy with a virtual carte blanche.

Certainly, the IDF senior echelon plays an over-sized role in political life after retirement from the army filling the ranks of prime minister and defense minister to an inordinate degree. The U.S. thankfully does not have such a tradition. Besides it’s a lot more lucrative for U.S. ex-generals to go to work for the defense industry than to go into politics.

In this passage, Yaalon decries the politicization of the military echelon, including the system of promotions, observed under Sharon’s reign:

“I see a war of cultures here. In recent years the public sector in Israel has undergone a process of corruption. It began in politics but, regrettably, also penetrated the army. A cycle of discussion has been created here in which the core is not the essence but marketing. In the war we paid a price for that. We paid a price for disengaging from the truth. We paid a price for the loss of integrity and the moral fog. We paid a price for accepting a process in which officers are promoted because they have political connections.”

Allow me to translate. You are saying, in effect, that Ariel Sharon’s ‘Ranch Forum’ corrupted the top level of the IDF.

“I have no doubt of that.”

You are arguing that the chief of staff and his deputy were appointed to their positions because they are close to the Ranch Forum.

“That is what the papers said.”

And this corruption, which has its origins in the Ranch Forum, caused many of the ills that were exposed in the war?

“The present chief of staff is a very talented person. He was an excellent commander of the air force. But there is a moral debate here. He carries with him a problematic message. The connection of officers to politics is undesirable. It is a corrupt connection. There is a problem today in the IDF of very senior officers who are too close to political elements.”

Yaalon also detects a ‘culture of complacency’ in the IDF which allowed it to become diverted from where its attention should have been focused:

The senior command distanced itself from details, and when the senior command does that it creates laxness. You get slackness. The muscle tone changes. At the same time, the processes of deep thought were severed. A clear message was conveyed that everyone has to toe the line. That decisions are made before the discussion and not in its course. Too much value was attributed to charisma, to the speed with which decisions are made. Anyone who held a different view was distanced or silenced. An unhealthy spirit emerged of not being meticulous and of not making an effort. Of uniformity of opinion and of complacency. And worst of all: a feeling was created that anyone who preserved rectitude and integrity was liable not to be promoted. A feeling was created that anyone seeking promotion has to cross the lines and join the spinfest and learn how to serve the politicians. That is why the chief of staff cannot now put the IDF through a rehabilitation of values. Because he reflects saliently the flawed culture of values from which release is needed, which has to be cleansed.”

This is a man who certainly wants to be the next defense minister if not prime minister. Let us hope that if that happens the sentiments expressed here will not fly out the window. Any Israeli politician who carries into his policy deliberations the caution expressed here will be an exceedingly wise leader.

But unfortunately, history is littered with the bodies of generals and politicians who once spoke wise thoughts only later to perform foul deeds. I certainly hope that Yaalon is not one of them because Israel desperately needs the insights laid out in this interview.

tags criticism-of-lebanon-war, defense-minister, idf-control-of-national-security-policy, israeli-military-weak-civilian-control, likud, moshe-yaalon-haaretz-interview

There are so many things wrong with Israel’s current policy toward Lebanon and Hezbollah. It’s about as bad as it gets in terms of the miscalculation and foolhardy assumptions. But it can get worse and it just might if some Israeli ex-generals and the Likud hardline opposition have their way. Those generals fought and lost the last Lebanon war started by Ariel Sharon in 1982. In 2000, Ehud Barak unilaterally withdrew the IDF from southern Lebanon after the country’s misadventure there ended in abject failure. Now, they want to do it again. As Robert Rosenberg writes:

There is talk — but still only talk — of Israel launching a massive ground operation into Lebanon, to once and for all, as the proponents say, to clear south Lebanon of Hizbollah militiamen and their rockets. Those in favor of such an operation tend to be ex-infantry and armored corps generals from the days of the original Lebanon war, wanting to refight that lost war, or Rightist politicians like Likud MK Yisrael Katz, whose rise in Likud politics began when he served as an aide to then-defense minister Ariel Sharon.

On Army Radio today, Katz eerily echoed Menachem Begin, and apparently unwittingly so, when he said that Israel has to get over the ‘Lebanon trauma … and go into Lebanon in full force to get the job done.’ Begin, in his day, proudly explained that Operation Peace for Galilee, more popularly known as the Lebanon War, would ‘once and for all erase the trauma of the Yom Kippur war.’

Katz, now in the opposition and far from the reigns of power, tried to sweeten his vision of a corps of Israeli soldiers riding tanks and APCs into the quagmire of Lebanon, by saying, ‘they won’t be going into to stay there, just to do the job and get out.’ Shades of Begin and Sharon’s promise of an incursion that would only go as far as 40 kilometers, the range of the Katyushas that were in the hands of the PLO at the time.

Cabinet secretary Yisrael Maimon, pressed by Israel Radio’s Ayala Hason did admit today that there are plans for a massive incursion into Lebanon, but those plans are ‘not on the agenda.’ Instead, the current ground operations, he said, would suffice. Those operations are by elite commando units, target spotting for the aircraft overhead or ambushing Hizbollah cells still operating in south Lebanon — or much further north.

The NY Times today notes that Israel has greatly increased its ground operations in southern Lebanon over the past day or so. Two IDF soldiers were killed in a ground engagement yesterday and another two were killed today. These were the first ground force deaths since the war began:

Israeli officials suggested that Israeli ground troops may take a more active role in combating the Hezbollah militia and more strong condemnations were heard of Israel’s massive use of force in Lebanon.

So why would Israel fall into a trap it has already snared itself in to its great cost? First, you must understand the paucity of strategic vision that Olmert and Peretz possess. While I’m no military strategist, even I understand that when you use force you must have clear and limited objectives. You must have benchmarks to tell you when you’ve achieved them. And once you do you must stop and turn to political negotiation to achieve the remainder of your goals. What Israel has done both in its Gaza and Lebanon invasions is to weigh down the operations with many overlapping and sometimes conflicting objectives. Free the prisoners. Destroy Hamas and Hezbollah. Force the “moderate forces” in Lebanon and Palestine to “take control” of the situation. Strike blows against so-called proxies like Iran and Syria. With so many objectives you practically guarantee you will realize none.

There is also an improvised, catch as catch can element to both operations as if the commanders are making it up on the fly. If Hezbollah does one thing, we respond with another. If we see an opportunity to engage Hezbollah ground forces we take it even though a ground engagement may not be part of our operational mission.

Second, Olmert fronting a relatively weak government coalition is always looking over his shoulder at his political right (his original home). And Netanyahu and the other rabble-rousing extremists smell blood in the water and are in a feeding frenzy for the head of Nasrallah. As Robert said above, they and the former generals are itching to refight the last war they lost. Since the nation mistakenly perceives itself “winning” the Lebanon war the siren call of “finishing them off” beckons ever so seductively. And the best way to do this supposedly would be through a ground assault.

The concept of a ground assault is a fatal vision for Israel. It would be oh so easy to get sucked into a protracted ground war and ongoing occupation of southern Lebanon. Israel is not like Hezbollah or Hamas. It does not have endless stocks of recruits to expend in the process of pursuing its military objectives. A guerrilla insurgency is the worst type of war for Israel to fight as we are seeing ourselves in Iraq because it slowly bleeds your side dry with each new death or wounded victim.

Aron Trauring believes Israel will invade with ground troops. I doubted him. But now I’m not so sure. One thing we both agree on is that such an operation would only compound the blunder of Israel’s initial strategy of invading Lebanon and turning much of it to cinders. I pray that there are enough cooler heads in the IDF officer corps and military intelligence to persuade Halutz, Peretz and Olmert that this is not in Israel’s best interest. But somehow I doubt there are.

tags aron-trauring, idf-generals, israeli-ground-invasion-of-lebanon, likud, new-york-times, olmert, peretz, robert-rosenberg

The Israeli election results are pouring in. Haaretz reports that Kadima won 28 seats, Labor 20, Shas 13, Yisrael Beitenu 12 and Likud 11. Voter turnout was just over 63%, the lowest in Israeli history and ‘worsting’ the 68% previous record for the previous election. What does it all mean?

First, the losers: Ehud Olmert has put on a disappointing show as Kadima’s party leader and prime minister designate. It may be reasonable to assume that the 5% decline in turnout consisted of Kadima voters who voted with their feet and took Election Day as a vacation day. As recently as a week ago, polls predicted 42 seats for Kadima. So 28 seats is a shocking fall off. He ran a lackluster campaign and aside from kidnapping Palestinian terrorists from Palestinian jails and a dubious plan to set Israel’s permanent borders unilaterally, he gave his supporters precious little over which to enthuse. While Olmert still gains the right to create a governing coalition, his hand will be weaker than it would have been had he won the 36 seats projected in polls as recently as three or four days ago.

Bibi Netanyahu also loses dramatically, seeing Likud decline from 38 seats in the current Knesset to 11 in the coming one. Such a grievous outcome couldn’t have happened to someone more deserving of it. After picking the pockets and the meat off the bones of the poor and elderly as Sharon’s finance minister, Netanyahu had nothing to offer the Israeli electorate. Likud was stripped of its main campaign talking points. Settlements had become a non-issue because Sharon ensured that Israelis no longer found them terribly relevant in their domestic politics. The typical Likud red-baiting and Arab-baiting didn’t work either, perhaps because Olmert and Kadima were draped in Sharon’s bullet-proof security mantle.

And the winners: Amir Peretz definitely comes out smelling like a rose. In winning 20 votes (as opposed to 19 in the last Knesset), he took a moribund party which Shimon Peres had essentially run into the ground via his accomodationist politics and breathed new life into it. He gave the party a new relevance in direct response to Netanyahu’s draconian politics of fiscal austerity. And Peretz has done something equally important in putting a Mizrahi face on Labor. Never before has a major party put forward a Mizrahi for prime minister. But make no mistake, as Menachem Klein said tonight in analyzing electoral results, a good number of veteran Labor voters abandoned the party in a a racist gesture of anti-solidarity. But perhaps an equal number of Sepharidm abandoned their traditional Likud base to return to the Labor party for whom their parents perhaps had one time voted. Those eastern Jews who fled Labor and flocked to Likud during the days of Menachem Begin never returned to the “home” in Labor. And now, some of them have. And this could break an ethnic logjam in Israeli politics and allow Labor to break out of the elderly Ashkenazi ghetto to which Shimon Peres had consigned the party.

Avigdor Lieberman certainly wins taking a party that didn’t even exist during the last election and bringing it into the new Knesset with 12 seats. According to Klein, Lieberman too breaks an ethnic logjam of sorts. Previously, he and Natan Sharansky were the political representatives of Russian Israelis. Their appeal never really transcended that community. But with Yisrael Beitenu, Lieberman has drawn to his side the Israeli’s Israeli he needs to broaden his appeal within the Israeli electorate. Among his list, are former Labor intelligence officials, academics, etc. He himself has said that he plans to use this victory as his stepping stone to the prime ministership in the next election. Heaven forfend! But he is a force to be reckoned with.

Shas, with 13 seats also is a force to be reckoned with. It increased its representation from 11 in the last Knesset. But their position possibly doesn’t change much because they were a key element of Sharon’s ruling coalition in the last Knesset. And they may play such a role in the new coalition should they choose to do so. Of course, with its shrill, shallow and corrupt ethnic politics, it will do Olmert no favors by joining him. But almost every Israeli government includes a religious party as some form of insurance or balance to more secular political elements and the next coalition will prove no exception. The only question is whether the religious partner will be Shas or one of the other parties.

Finally, and perhaps the most shocking development is that Jonathan Pollard’s old “handler,” and the Mossad operative who single-handedly brought Israeli-U.S. relations to its knees for a time, Rafi Eitan, has led the Pensioners’ (Gil in Hebrew) Party to seven seats in the new Knesset. This may be the only blog in the world where you’ll learn this relevant background information about Eitan:

The 80-year-old Eitan fought in the Palmach pre-state army, where he won the nickname “Stinker” after falling into a pit of sewage while on a mission.

This is another party that didn’t exist before this campaign. Like Peretz, this party’s platform responds to the threat Netanyahu posed to Israeli citizens, like pensioners, who live on fixed incomes. If you add its seven votes to Labor’s 20, you find that parties running on a progressive economic platform polled as many votes as Kadima, which seemed to run away from social equity and the economy as political issues. This posed another one of Olmert’s tone-deaf weaknesses in this campaign.

How does this affect Israel’s relations with the Palestinians? Alas and alack, it probably doesn’t affect it at all in the sense that Olmert will likely continue his same tone-deaf unilateralist policies (it didn’t work for Bush regarding Iraq, so why does he think he’ll have any success at it?) toward the Palestinians. I do note one possibly slightly hopeful sign is that both Mahmoud Abbas and Olmert have called for face to face meetings to get negotiations under way. Until tonight, Olmert had told the electorate he had no interest in meeting with Abbas. However, there is little reason to be excited about this development until we know how serious Olmert is and how substantive he wishes that conversation to be. If I were a betting man, I couldn’t lose betting against Olmert. But he could fool me and I’d be delighted if he did.

In his talk tonight with Joel Migdal, Menachem Klein rejected Olmert’s unilateral approach as serious or viable. He asserted that only face to face negotiations with the Palestinians and Israeli willingness to return to ‘67 borders (with adjustments to allow annexation of Maaleh Adumim and Ariel) would bring a true peace settlement. When I asked him how he expects that any Israeli political party to move the current consensus anywhere close to his parameters, Klein replied that no progressive party like Labor was likely to create such consensus. Laughingly he deprecated himself: “I’m under no delusions that I and my leftist colleagues in the Geneva Initiative are going to take over the Israeli government and singlehandedly bring peace. We shouldn’t be fools enough to believe that Yossi Beilin will ever be prime minister. No, a centrist party is the only one which can bring such change. And I don’t care who brings peace. Let it be Ehud Olmert or Avigdor Lieberman for that matter. I’d be delighted. The most I ever expect to be is a mosquito flitting a few good ideas into the ears of Israeli politicians.

tags amir-peretz, ehud-olmert, israeli-elections, labor-party, likud, netanyahu, pensioners-party

Prime Minister Ariel Sharon suffered a “significant” stroke with “massive bleeding” in his brain late Wednesday night, according to an official at Hadassah University Hospital, Ein Karem and Sharon’s authority has been transferred to Deputy Prime Minister Ehud Olmert.
–Haaretz

This is a dreaded day in the life of Israel. The day that Ariel Sharon became incapacitated and could no longer play the super-sized role he’s played on the Israeli political scene for several decades (but especially in the time he’s been premier). While Sharon’s departure from the scene is not a given (many people can recover from such strokes and continue to function somewhat normally), it’s worthwhile speculating on what the future bears. Before I speculate, Robert Rosenberg today (before the news of Sharon’s stroke) published a prescient column at Ariga.com:

The poll [giving Kadima an increased mandate of 41-42 seats] came out on the eve of the prime minister’s angioplastic surgery, meant to repair a small, congenital hole between two of his heart cavities, which doctors say was the reason he suffered a minor stroke recently as a result of a blood clot making its way through the hole. The entire procedure due in Thursday, is said to take about three hours from the time he is given general anesthesia to the time he awakens. His deputy, Ehud Olmert, has been formally named as Sharon’s replacement for those few hours.

Of course, despite all the efforts by the premier’s doctors to put a good face on the show, saying the operation is nearly routine, ’simple,’ etc., any invasive operation is risky, particularly for an overweight man in his 70s who has been taking pills for gout for years and is essentially blind in his left eye.

So far, Sharon’s heath problems have obviously not affected his Kadima campaign adversely, if anything, he is perceived as much more of a machismo, able to go into surgery without batting an eyelash and still manipulate the political arena any way he wants.

But a Sharon departure from the political arena, now or in the inevitable future, is going to be the real ‘big bang’ of Israeli politics, as he and Shimon Peres are the last two Israeli politicians who were adults (albeit young adults) in the War of Independence, the last two who remember the shock of the news about what happened in Europe to the Jews, the last of those who remember the Israeli nation-building of the 1930s-1950s, the last two who remember the nation’s founding father, David Ben Gurion.

When Sharon goes, whenever that happens and for whatever reason, the last of the titans will disappear from the arena and suddenly, it will become a more or less even and level playing field, something it has not been since Sharon’s arrival in the prime minister’s office five years ago. Since then, he has not merely dominated Israeli politics, he has controlled it almost completely, first imposing a no negotiations with the Palestinians policy, and then inventing his unilateral evacuation of Gaza and the northern West Bank around Jenin, a move that was predicted to start an Israeli civil war but in the end took only barely a week from start to finish.

Sharon’s departure is inevitable, of course, since he is only human. But neither his health problems nor his legal problems seem likely yet to drive him off the stage before the national elections on March 28. Still, the possibility that he might be forced out is not far-fetched. Much can happen between now and March 28…

The NY Times also notes this major news story broadcast on Israeli TV on Tuesday night which certainly couldn’t have much reduced Sharon’s stress level:

And Tuesday night, Israeli television showed a document provided by the police to a court seeking the right to investigate computers belonging to two Austrian-based brothers, Martin and James Schlaff, who own part of a casino, now closed, in Jericho, on the West Bank. The police say they believe the computers will contain evidence of a $3 million payment to the Sharon family, at least half of which was used to repay illegal campaign contributions from that same 1999 campaign. The Schlaffs are clients of Dov Weissglas, Mr. Sharon’s own lawyer and close political adviser. But there is apparently no evidence that links any payments to Mr. Sharon himself, making a bribery indictment highly unlikely.

My first impression was that Sharon’s medical team did him a tremendous disservice (and possibly is guilty of malpractice) by not repairing Sharon’s heart immediately after his last stroke. They will certainly come in for much criticism in the coming days especially if Sharon’s health deteriorates or he cannot resume his duties. It would be unconscionable for the nation to lose its political leader due to a doctor’s mistake.

Now, of course, Kadima will be in a shambles. Ehud Olmert takes over. He is a political veteran and longtime number 2 to Sharon. He may be able to fill his shoes. But odds are he will simply not take over Sharon’s mantle. Who could? Tonight, Bibi Netanyahu has to be a happy (if you can use that word in this situation) man. All of a sudden, his arch-nemesis has been sidelined. Doubtless, Bibi feels the prime ministership is his for the asking. No doubt Likud will surge in future polls without Sharon in the picture. But God help us (and the Palestinians) if he wins.

But Labor will also surge because many new Kadima votes have been coming from moderate voters who left the Labor party to join Sharon (and Shimon) when he founded Kadima. Doubtless, those voters will be looking elsewhere and Amir Peretz’s Labor will start looking good to them once more.

In fact, I’m afraid that Sharon’s crisis will revert the Israeli political scene back to the same old stale choices they had before the split from Likud: a hardline ultra-nationalist Likud and a defanged Labor. The only wrinkle to this view is that Peretz’ leadership will guarantee that Labor is no longer defanged. But whether he can carry masses of voters with his renewed vision of Labor remains to be seen.

Doubtless, there will be many Palestinians publicly or privately expressing glee at this development. If those individuals or groups want continued war with Israel then they are right to celebrate. But I’d caution them if they are in favor of the creation of a Palestinian state and full sovereignty for Palestine, then their mirth is misplaced. A Peretz victory might move them closer to their vision for Palestine. But a Netanyahu victory means disaster on the peace front. I’ve deliberately left out the option of a Kadima victory because it now seems so remote. But one must assume that everything is fluid in Israeli politics. There could be a wave of nostalgia and empathy flowing Kadima’s way from the Israeli electorate which might push Olmert to victory. If he does win, he will probably try to carry forward Sharon’s vision, but I doubt he will have the deft tactical political hand of a Sharon. And he will need it if he is to survive as PM.

Israeli politics has not faced a more confused, bereft night since the one on which Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated in 1995, a little more than 10 years ago. And the comparison between the two events is instructive.

In both events, you had a formerly hawkish prime minister who’d discovered a way to moderate his positions in order to advance the cause of peace. Both Rabin and Sharon faced enormous demonization for moderating their politics, Rabin from Likud & other far right groups (one of whose members killed him) and Sharon too from the rump right of Likud. No doubt the stress and hatred both faced contributed significantly to their downfall (though thankfully, Sharon may someday recover at least somewhat from his stroke).

But what is most important in both events is what happened–and in tonight’s case what will happen–after. In the case of Rabin, Shimon Peres inherited his mantle and with the “help” of Palestinian militants who launched a massive terror campaign lost the next election, which in turn brought Bibi to power. This meant the end of Rabin’s turning toward peace and a retrenchment of the Occupation & Israeli intransigence in the face of Palestinian demands for freedom.

If Kadima wins minus Sharon, then one assumes the latter’s policies of creeping toward some sort of peace process (albeit a unilateral one) will continue. Though for how long is a big question. If Peretz wins, then that could mean the biggest breakthrough for peace. But it’s questionable whether his bold social democratic/peace politics can carry enough voters with him in order to win. And if Netanyahu wins it will be just as disastrous when he won in 1996 after Rabin’s murder.

Everything hangs in the balance on this fateful night…

I have one very personal connection to this sad story. My father, Jule Silverstein, died (as with Rabin, also in December, 1995) of a cerebral hemorrhage. Like Sharon, he had gout and serious pain in his legs. His doctor worried that he might have a blood clot in his leg and so prescribed coumadin, a blood thinner. Unfortunately, my dad didn’t monitor his medication level monthly as he should have and it drifted dangerously high. Coumadin at such high levels is likely to cause blood vessels to rupture. I wouldn’t be surprised if coumadin contributed to Sharon’s stroke. It’s a drug that needs to be monitored very carefully.

tags ariel_sharon, ehud_olmert, israel, Kadima, labor_party, likud, mideast_politics, stroke

Peres: I’m Outa Here

As usual over the past month, yesterday had tons of fast-paced developments on the Israeli political scene. Peres made public the worst kept secret of Israeli politics–that he’s done with Labor and throwing in his lot with Sharon and Kadima. What I find interesting about Peres’ choice is that while all of Israeli politics has, in the past month, shifted left by a striking degree (Peretz’s Labor leadership victory and Sharon’s abandonment of Likud), Peres is the only one shifting right. To me it indicates that he himself has lost his bearings after his loss to Peretz and that a good portion of his decision is due to rancor toward the new leader. It’s always a shame to make long-term political decisions out of pique and personal hurt.

Peres explained his thinking at a press conference yesterday:

“I don’t believe that it is possible to push forward the peace process in the current political constellation [i.e. by staying in Labor],” Peres said. “I believe the most qualified person for this is Ariel Sharon.

“He will restart the peace process right after the election. I decided to join him and work with him. My party activities have concluded,” he added.

“…I am convinced that he is determined to continue the peace process. I was informed that he is open to creative ideas to attain peace and security. I have decided to support him in the elections and to cooperate with him in attaining these goals.”

“This is a difficult day for me in which I ask myself: What is the central issue standing before the state of Israel in the coming years and at present? I have no doubt that it is the unavoidable combination of peace and diplomatic advances. I ask myself how I can contribute in the coming years, and the answer is by advancing the peace process that will contribute to a thriving economy and social justice.”

“It was not easy but I made the choice and decided.”
[Haaretz]

You’ll note that Peres lauds Sharon for being “open to creative ideas to attain peace and security.” The only creative idea Sharon has had was Gaza disengagement. Now that it’s complete I see no significant new ideas coming from Sharon. The idea of withdrawing from outlying West Bank settlements, which is what Sharon says he’s willing to do does not fall into the “creative” category. From Peres, I see even less creativity.

Peres’ decision was lambasted by former Labor minister Ophir Paz-Pines, who said:

“Fabricated ideological stories of Shimon Peres are embarrassing and fake. There’s no doubt that no one will buy them. The Labor party is committed to peace more than every other party, and Peres’ attempt to excuse his abandonment by talking about peace is pathetic.”

“It’s too bad, because Peres did so much for the State, but he’ll be remembered as someone who abandoned the home which he lead for dozens of years for a party based on personal career interests. No one knows where it [Kadima] came from, and where it is going.”

Haaretz’s latest poll indicates that Peres may (note my reservations below) help Sharon significantly in pulling center-left votes toward Kadima:

Some 30 percent of Israelis said that the departure of former Labor chairman Shimon Peres from the party and his announcement that he was supporting Kadima would increase their chances of voting for the newly formed party headed by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.

The survey…asked how Peres’ departure from Labor and his decision to join Kadima would influence respondents’ chances for voting for Sharon’s party. The findings are unequivocal: As of now, Peres is of prime value to Sharon.

I’m no pollster but that term “increase their chances” is vague enough to mean almost anything. I’d rather see them ask would Peres’ switch actually bring them to vote for Kadima. That’s a more solid, quantifiable question. So while the poll is a valid indicator of a positive effect for Sharon, I’m not sure it means all that Haaretz claims.

The poll also claims that 35% of those who voted Likud in the 2003 election and the same percentage of those who voted Labor “said that the Peres factor would increase their chances of voting for Kadima.” Again, note my objection above.

47% of respondents felt that Sharon was “most suited” to be prime minister while only 18% saw Peretz as most suited. Several things should be noted here. First, Israelis don’t vote for prime minister. They vote for parties. So a real test of a voter’s opinion would be to find out which party he supported. It’s less important to know which person he feels would make the best prime minister (though this is not an insignificant issue either). Second, as Sharon has been prime minister for some time and Peretz has been Labor leader for a very short time, I would expect such a gap between them. The key question will be whether Sharon can retain the voters approval in the face of a hard-fought Labor/Peretz campaign. Peretz is known for being a charismatic speaker and forceful personality, something Labor has been without for many years (most of them when led by Shimon Peres).

To all this should be added a Ynet poll which indicates that Kadima would win 34 seats if the election were held yesterday while Labor would win 27. Each party is up by one seat over last week’s poll. So if I were Peretz I wouldn’t despair and if I were Sharon I wouldn’t celebrate. There’s a lot of campaigning to be done between now and March 28th.

Yossi Sarid quits politics

It’s sad to note that one of Israel’s most prominent progressive politicians, Yossi Sarid, has decided to leave the Knesset and politics altogether. He was a former Labor MK and currently serves in the Meretz faction. I had great admiration for his courage and forthrightness in confronting the evils of the occupation.

Sarid appears to feel like someone with little influence in the current political situation:

“Had I known I was to become Education Minister in the next government, I would have had a reason to stay because of my commitment to education,” Sarid said. “Had I known I was to become Justice Minister in the next government to clean the filthy stables, I would have stayed,” he added.

“But being a realist, I know my chances are slim to none, and I have no need to break Guinness World Records like Shimon Peres. I am sick and tired of those who seize the horns of the altar,” Sarid concluded.

Note the zinger he gets in against Peres. He also gets in another dig against Sharon and a heap of praise for Peretz:

The former party leader lauded newly-elected Labor Chairman Amir Peretz, and said that “he already won his first victory by succeeding to shake the entire political system. People have started talking about humanistic values, instead of focusing only on the security situation and the Palestinians.”

“Sharon is an illusion, given the acts he has performed in the occupied territories and Jerusalem, and against the Bedouins and other minorities,” she said.
[Ynet]

Likud in Free-Fall

Perhaps the biggest news is that Likud is rapidly fading into political oblivion (though reports of its demise would be premature at this point). Last week’s Dahaf poll showed them gaining 13 seats if the election had been held then. This week’s poll indicates they’d win 10 seats and fare even more poorly than Shas (the third largest party in today’s Knesset). The party is in deep trauma from which no amount of strategizing seems able to lift it.

As an example, party bigwigs met yesterday to discuss their election plans and their best effort produced this campaign slogan: ““Vote Sharon – get Peres.” I can’t begin to count the ways that this is a lame choice. First, it indicates that you don’t have your own program. You’re only against the other guy. It might work in some situations. But it won’t work in this one because Israelis realize this is a critical election in which their future is at stake regarding issues of war and peace with the Palestinians. They simply won’t settle for someone asking for a vote because he’s not the other guy.

tags amir_peretz, ariel_sharon, labor_party, likud, shimon_peres, yossi_sarid

The Big Man has done it. He's quit the Likud. It just won't be the same without him. Now the Party can become the right-fringe, loony tunes outfit it always had the potential to be. But what can we expect from Sharon? Will he run to the center? Or will he run a campaign that mouths centrist positions but really tilts right after the next election? So far, they're talking the good talk: Ariel Sharon meets with President Katsav seeking to dissolve Knesset (source: Ynetnews) The prime minister's decision to leave the party testifies to a significant about-face in his ideology, which is likely ...

Seems like Israelis are peering at tea leaves almost as intently regarding Ariel Sharon's future as Washington, DC is regarding the identity of Bob Woodward's Plamegate source. Just as everyone here has a theory about who Deep Throat II is, everyone in Israel knows what Sharon will do. He'll bolt Likud and form a new centrist party. He'll stay in Likud and face down Netanyahu and the latter's "rebels." I realize that wading into this muddy thicket is perilous for one's reputation as a prognosticator--but Haaretz pretty clearly indicates that Sharon (based on anonymous sources it labels Sharon "associates") will leave Likud: Most senior Likud figures, including ministers, reportedly believe that Sharon is planning to leave and split ...