Muslim and Jewish Women in Nazareth

'We can live in peace'...John Lennon (photo: Dafna Tal)

Mahzor

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Sarajevo Haggadah

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Sarajevo haggadah

Antaea Darom

Israeli women's art

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Torah as music

Ben Heine

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ceramic bowl

Mohammad Said Kalash, "Offering Reconciliation" exhibit (photo: Ilan Amihai)

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Punch and Judy/Pinchas and Jamila

Avi Katz

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David Grossman

Ben Heine

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Eldrige Street shul

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Dove

Ben Heine

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Hoda Jamal

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Israeli and Palestinian boys

from documentary, Promises

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Daylight through the Wall

Banksy: graffiti art on Separation Wall

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Maurice Sendak's Brundibar set

New Victory Theater (photo: Nan Melville/NYT)

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Daniel Barenboim, West-Eastern Divan Orchestra

Palestinian-Israeli musical ensemble (photo: Kerstin Joensson/AP)

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Great Day on Eldrige Street

N.Y.'s klezmer greats celebrate shul rededication (photo: Leo Sorel)

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Joint Appeal for Peace

(Avi Katz)

Joint Appeal for Peace

Ketubah, Ancona, Italy (1772)

(Jewish Theological Seminary library)

Ancona ketubah

Posts Tagged ‘israeli military censorship’

Censorship of Shalit Deal Betrays Israeli Democracy

Monday, November 30th, 2009

In writing about this story, I find myself in a dilemma.  On the one hand, I am an advocate of free speech (though not an absolutist on this as some on the left are); on the other, I want a prisoner exchange to end the Shalit imprisonment.  Currently, the Israeli military censor has dictated that there be no release of the list of Palestinian prisoners to be released.  Such a release would allow the Israeli right to lobby against the entire deal by profiling the bloody hands of specific terrorists to be released.  The government wants no such public release until the cabinet signs an agreement approving the prisoner exchange.  This would have the effect of taking the wind out of the sails of the far-right anti-exchange forces.

Interestingly, there is a High Court ruling that governs the censor and in this case the government is clearly violating that 1989 decision:

Justice Aharon Barak wrote that the military censor is authorized to prevent publication of an item only in circumstances in which “there is near certainty of actual harm to security” and in which there is no “other alternative means to prevent the risk without avoiding damaging freedom of expression.”

In the same ruling, which subsequently served as the basis for an agreement on the subject of censorship between the security authorities and the media, Barak wrote that it is precisely because of the implications the decisions involving security have on the life of the nation that “it is appropriate to open the door to an open exchange of views on security matters” in which the press “will be free to serve as a forum for the exchange of views and criticism regarding essential issues for society in general and for the individual.

There is absolutely no basis on which even the most draconian adherent of national security might argue that release of the names would harm anyone except possibly Gilad Shalit, whose freedom would be postponed.  That makes the actual government argument in favor of censorship all the more ludicrous:

The state prosecutor wrote that unlike a prisoner release representing a diplomatic agreement or goodwill gesture, the current negotiations for Shalit are tantamount to “an ongoing terror attack” in which Israel is “bargaining” to reach a deal that would exact the lowest possible price.

…The state prosecutor wrote that ambiguity is essential to Israel’s very existence, and that without it, “it is impossible to hold effective negotiations and reach the goal of returning the abducted soldier to Israel.”

What he meant I think was not “ambiguity” but opacity.  For opacity is what the military censor wishes in this case.  And what is even more clear from this statement is that censorship is being used for a political, rather than national security purpose.  Of course it’s possible to hold effective negotiations to release Shalit without ambiguity or opacity.  Israel has done so before.  The difference now is that Israel has a hard right government for whom democratic values are peripheral considerations.

Though I’m 100% in favor of the exchange, I think the entire process of negotiating this exchange is important, including how it is approached within Israel itself.  If there is to be a debate why not have at it?  Let everyone know who will  be released.  Let the far right do their damndest to undermine the deal.  That will make the actual deal, which I have little doubt would go through anyway, all the more solid.

To negotiate a deal without such a full democratic debate undermines the validity of the enterprise itself and diminishes Shalit’s freedom when it is actually won.  To me, this abuse of military censorship is of a piece with the general decline in so-called Israeli democracy. And what is so strange about this case is that I’m on the same side as some of these far-right pro-settler militants who I so despise.  But of course, we are on the same side for completely different reasons which what is crucially important.  For them, they’d like to wreck a prisoner exchange because essentially they’d prefer to nuke Hamas and Gaza back to the Stone Age rather than negotiate with the Islamist movement.  For me, I see the prisoner exchange as a smallest chance of a fuller dialogue taking place at some later date between Hamas and Israel.

Shalit-Barghouti Deal Imminent?

Monday, November 23rd, 2009

One never knows what to say about the on again, off again negotiations to free Gilad Shalit and the seemingly unending media stories announcing an imminent deal.  So one approaches this subject with some trepidation.  But there are enough serious signals that haven’t been seen before that a deal is close, that it’s worthwhile considering what could happen and its possible impact on Israeli-Palestinian relations.  The outline of the proposal is that in return for releasing kidnapped IDF soldier, Gilad Shalit, Israel will release 450 Palestinian prisoners including the most prominent, Marwan Barghouti.

Marwan Barghoutis wife sits under his image (James Hill/NY Times)

Marwan Barghouti's wife sits under his image (James Hill/NY Times)

What is different now from previous rumors of a deal?  First of all (and you won’t see this mentioned in Ethan Bronner’s NY Times report because he never acknowledges such issues), the Israeli military censor has thrown up complete embargo over coverage of this issue.  The only thing Israeli media can do is speculate about the matter.  They can’t report on what any minister or intelligence officer or IDF commander might have to say.  This is unprecedented in Israeli history as Haaretz notes.  It can only mean that Israel realizes that any false note introduced into the mix could doom the negotiations.  Even more importantly, this right-wing government is extremely sensitive to criticism from its farther right flank of the idea of freeing Palestinian terrorists.   Blanket censorship is one way to dampen such criticism.  Bronner doesn’t want to deal with the implication of the Only Democracy in the Middle East™ using censorship in order to manipulate political debate as this would not reflect well on Israel’s “democracy.”

Ever since Shalit’s kidnapping speculation has been rampant that Marwan Barghouti would be included in the exchange.  He is the most respected Palestinian political leader (including Abbas and even Haniyeh) and a potential future leader of the PA.  In fact, this Haaretz article speculates that the Palestinian prisoner’s freedom might expedite the resignation of Mahmoud Abbas and his replacement by Barghouti.  In today’s Palestine, his role and stature is roughly akin to that of Nelson Mandela in apartheid era South Africa.

Now, apparently both sides are indicating this VIP (very important prisoner) is slated to be freed as well.  So it becomes important to speculate how this might change the Palestinian political landscape.  Given how depressing (for anyone seeking peace, which excludes the Netanyahu government) the current situation is, it’s important to note that even if Barghouti is released it doesn’t mean that this will single-handedly transform the situation for the better.

I’m afraid that the current Israeli government has proven itself adept at outwaiting and outsmarting a U.S. president and the PA.  So it’s doubtful that a PA headed by Barghouti (were this to happen) could work any immediate miracles.  But it is worthwhile speculating what might happen in the longer term.  The Netanyahu government, secure and stable as it now seems, won’t be so forever.  Indeed, if a strong PA leader comes on the scene, one that Israelis feel could be trusted to deliver on his promises and who could carry Hamas with him, then the electorate might feel more secure in electing a more forthcoming government.  It’s not outside the realm of possibility that a more pragmatic leader like Tzipi Livni could be elected within a year or so who might actually proceed to final status talks and negotiate a deal with the Palestinians.

Of course, there are many rivers to cross before we get to that point.  But I think in the long-term this release could produce positive results for peace.

One aspect of Bronner’s reporting also calls out for critique:

Many governments, including that of the United States, want to end the embargo to relieve the suffering of the 1.5 million people in Gaza, especially after Israel’s military invasion 11 months ago, which destroyed thousands of homes and factories. But Israel has said it will not end until Mr. Shalit’s release.

Therefore, if a deal is really imminent, it may also signal the possibility of some opening of the commercial crossings.

First, no government has been willing to engage in any serious effort to oppose the Gaze siege despite the fact that is a clear breach of international law.  So giving credit to nations for wanting the siege to end is an empty gift to them since they’re not willing to go to the mat to make it happen.  Second, the idea that Israel will feel empowered to diminish Gaza’s suffering because Hamas has freed Gilad Shalit is laughable.  Israel has SAID that it would do so and that the Shalit kidnapping is one of the developments that justifies continuing the siege.  But given Israel’s hatred of Hamas and its imperviousness to the notion of honoring verbal commitments, the likelihood of ending the siege or even lessening it is practically nil.

And to use one of Walter Mondale’s best campaign lines: Ethan Bronner won’t say that.  I just did.