Tikun Olam-תקון עולם: Make the World a Better Place

Haaretz reports the devastating news that Hezbollah has kidnapped two IDF soldiers in southern Lebanon:

Hezbollah kidnapped two Israel Defense Forces soldiers on the northern border in the midst of massive shelling attacks on Israel’s north Wednesday morning. The IDF confirmed two of its soldiers were missing on the Lebanese border, Channel 10 TV reported.

Hezbollah fighters attacked two IDF armored Hummer jeeps patrolling along the border with gunfire and explosives. The Hezbollah fighters nabbed two of the soldiers and wounded others in the Hummers.

Immediately following the Hezbollah attack, the organization’s Al-Manar television station began broadcasting clips calling on Israel to release Lebanese prisoners held in Israel. The Hezbollah demands emphasized the release of Lebanese militant Samir Al-Kuntar. Al-Manar also broadcast video clips of previous Palestinian and Lebanese attacks on IDF troops.

Two other Israelis were wounded when gunmen in Lebanon began pounding the IDF’s Zarit position and other posts along the border before 9 A.M. According to Al-Manar, Hezbollah kidnapped the two IDF soldiers at 9:05 A.M. and transferred them to a safe location.

The two Israelis were wounded either by mortar shells or rockets that slammed into Moshav Zarit. One was lightly to moderately wounded and the second was lightly wounded.

This could be Israel’s worst nightmare. Now, instead of fighting a one front war in Gaza to free its other IDF kidnap victim, it is now fighting a two front war. In addition, instead of fighting a war against Gaza’s Hamas militants alone, Israel now fights against Hezbollah and its sponsors, Syria and Iran. Part of this is no doubt Bashar Assad’s “payback” for insulting him by having Israeli jets buzz his summer mountain palace in one of Israel’s more bellicose acts of provocation. This new development ratchets up the pressure immensely on the world community to resolve this crisis and to do so soon if possible. The longer it drags on the more likely one of the parties will make a grievous error that could escalate matters out of anyone’s control.

The problem is now that the Arab militants hold the upper hand, they may no longer be so eager to agree to the deal which I write about below. The fact that the UN, the EU and particularly the U.S. placed the Gaza invasion on the back burner diplomatically until now is a shameful mark against them all. If they’d exerted half the energy of Hosni Mubarak and the Turkish government we might have had a more positive outcome and much more quickly.

Finally, this development points out the utter futility of the Omert government’s Gaza folly. If they’d negotiated the deal that they had in the offing instead of stalling for God knows what they might not be in the terrible bind they now face. Now, they are mired in Gaza as well as facing a crisis in the north. What will they do next? Invade southern Lebanon in order to free their two new hostages? The situation is quite impossible. If we thought the Olmert-Peretz-Halutz nexus was failing in their pursuit of a Gaza strategy imagine what they’ll do now that they have a double-barrel crisis before them.

Possible Deal for Shalit Confirmed by Khaled Meshal

I’ve been wrapped up for the past three days in a huge hornet’s nest Maryscott O’Connor and I stirred up at Daily Kos and have been away from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict since then. Good to get back though I wish I had better and more hopeful news to report about the Shalit kidnapping and the Gaza invasion.

Ariga has his usual excellent post covering Khaled Meshal’s press conference yesterday in which he revealed the outline of a possible deal for the freedom of Gilad Shalit. Robert weaves together Meshal’s statements with what he’s been reading from Israeli cabinet ministers to present an optimistic and pessimistic scenario. First the optimistic one:

..>Speculation has the two sides, while blaming each other for the apparent stalemate, broadening the terms of reference for a deal from returning the Israeli soldier and ending the Qassams, into a much broader hudna, involving not only prisoner releases but other Israeli gestures of goodwill — if Hamas is prepared to take charge in Gaza, to prevent attacks on Israel. And added to the brew this morning by at least one report, is the possibility that somehow the final deal would include some form of closure of the case of Ron Arad, the Israeli jet navigator who fell into radical Islamic hands in Lebanon nearly 20 years ago and not heard from for 19 years.

But that’s the optimistic spin. It depends on some creative diplomatic move that seems beyond Israel’s capabilities to initiate, and beyond the power of the Europeans to implement. The Arabs involved in trying to solve the crisis — Hosni Mubarak and King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia — might have the ingenuity, but despite all the praise Olmert heaped on Mubarak, Israel won’t easily trust an Arab-devised solution. The Americans are likely going to hear from Abbas that he is eager to meet Olmert, while the Israeli prime minister will likely say no meeting is possible until the crisis over Shalit is solved.

But here’s the pessimistic version:

That leads to the pessimistic scenario, which various commentators note today essentially means a very lengthy — weeks if not months — of Israeli military operations, behind the scenes negotiations and occasional ‘infuriating and frustrating’ public posturing by spokesmen for the other side.

And of course, if the Gaza invasion continues that long there is almost a guarantee of a major public health crisis including food shortages and other brutally inhumane conditions imposed by Israel’s offensive operations:

Yedioth Aharonoth, Israel’s most widely distributed newspaper, blares this morning that the Gazans are out of food — and its commentator warns that a humanitarian crisis there could spoil the IDF’s operations, by forcing Israel to prematurely end the moves meant to squeeze Hamas. The government is beginning to feel the pressure to ease up…on the Palestinians. According to UNRWA, there’s enough food for ten days — but the real problem is that 50 percent of Gaza is without electricity and there’s no fuel for generators. In any case, emergency basic commodities — including fuel — were sent into Gaza today, but hardly enough for the 1.4 million people in the densely populated Strip.

The theory that enough pressure on the Palestinian population will make them rise against the militants has been proven wrong for the last six years, ever since the intifada began in the fall of 2000. But the IDF still believes in it, like most armies believing it has never been truly given a free hand to do what is necessary to reach the outcome the government wants.

Why is the Shin Bet Afraid of this man? (photo: Rikard Larma/AP)

Menachem Froman is an extraordinary person. He is an Orthodox rabbi who lives in the West Bank settlement of Tekoa. He was a co-founder of the right-wing Gush Emunim movement, yet broke with it after Baruch Goldstein’s rampage massacre. Despite this past history, he has very close relationships with Hamas. In fact, he negotiated for the release of Sheik Ahmed Yassin (later assassinated by Israel) from an Israeli prison, later becoming fast friends with him. He’s met with Mahmoud al-Zahar and the group’s leaders seem to like and genuinely trust him. He is a key figure in Jerusalem Peacemakers whose goal is to create an interdenominational dialogue involving spiritual dimensions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

All of these qualities make Froman a very dangerous guy to Israeli intelligence. Here’s how Arthur Neslen described what happened to Froman’s promising initiative by which Israeli peace activists and Hamas leaders would have jointly called for the immediate release of kidnapped IDF soldier Gilad Shalit:

The day before the tanks rolled into Gaza, Froman had been due to launch an extraordinary peace initiative at a news conference in Jerusalem with Muhamed Abu Tir, the Hamas MP, Khaled Abu Arafa, the Palestinian minister for Jerusalem, and three Israeli rabbis.

The panel was to have made a collective call for the release of Corporal Gilad Shalit, the beginning of a process to release all Palestinian prisoners, and the immediate start of negotiations with Hamas on the framework for a peace deal based on 1967 borders.

They would also have announced that Jewish and Muslim religious leaders could achieve peace where Israel’s politicians had failed.

But the response from Israel’s security establishment was crushing.

Hours before the meeting was due to start, the Shin Bet detained Abu Tir and Abu Arafa and warned them not to attend the meeting. The news conference’s organisers were forced to contact the other rabbis — who were already on the road to Jerusalem — and tell them not to come.

Instead of a triumphant statement of mutual respect and dialogue, a subdued and gently defiant three-man panel fended off aggressive questioning from an unruly Israeli press pack.

Nelsen continues by pointing out that Froman’s efforts at finding common ground with Hamas is truly threatening to the Israeli government because it would put pressure on it to negotiate in good faith and make real concessions in order to achieve peace:

Two days after the news conference, Abu Tir and Abu Arafa were kidnapped by Israeli forces, along with a third of the Hamas cabinet. Four days later, Israel revoked both men’s citizenship and residency rights in Jerusalem. As the Jerusalem Post headline put it: Shin Bet foils Hamas-Jewish meeting.

An even more accurate headline might have been the one Israel National Radio’s Arutz Sheva website ran a few days later, pertaining to another story: The peace process is a bigger danger than Hamas.

In this opinion piece, Ted Belman said that “the threat of rockets raining down on Israel from Gaza isn’t nearly the threat that the peace process was and is” because peace talks would require Israeli concessions.

To give some perspective, Belman, one of the powers behind right-wing pro-Israel blog Israpundit actually finds the Qassam rockets fired into Israel useful in some warped way since it means (according to him) that there will be less pressure on Israel to negotiate with the Palestinians.

Today, another two Qassam rockets hit Ashkelon despite the fact that the IDF simultaneously moved troops into northern Gaza in order to quell precisely such rocket fire:

It [The IDF] intends to capture a broad swath of territory of about one-and-a-quarter kilometers into Palestinian Authority territory, close to Beit Hanun, in an effort to hinder Qassam rocket launchers from targeting Ashkelon and to push them back toward Gaza City and the Jabalya refugee camp.

A lot of good it’s doing. And even if the latest IDF incursion does swallow up ground the rocketeers used for their launches–do we doubt for one second that militants will find some other way to achieve their aims of hurtling missiles at Israeli territory? And here’s another little bit of self-delusion:

“We won’t sink in the Gaza swamp, but will enter any necessary area to carry out our missions,” Defense Minister Amir Peretz said Wednesday.

It’s as if Peretz were smart enough to recognize the criticism but too dumb to realize that it will prove prophetic.

Gideon Levy has written yet another stellar and incisive piece of analysis of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians, this time regarding the increasingly doomed invasion of Gaza. One of his most important points is that Israel’s behavior there is in many ways almost a perfect mirror image of Palestinian militant behavior. Not to say that means that I’m attempting to legitimate one or both. Both are equally reprehensible:

The “summer rains” we are showering on Gaza are not only pointless, but are first and foremost blatantly illegitimate. It is not legitimate to cut off 750,000 people from electricity. It is not legitimate to call on 20,000 people to run from their homes and turn their towns into ghost towns. It is not legitimate to penetrate Syria’s airspace. It is not legitimate to kidnap half a government and a quarter of a parliament.

A state that takes such steps is no longer distinguishable from a terror organization. The harsher the steps, the more monstrous and stupid they become, the more the moral underpinnings for them are removed and the stronger the impression that the Israeli government has lost its nerve…

Levy points out the the emperor, in the form of the government and its claims that the invasion is meant to free the kidnapped Israeli soldier, has no clothes. The Gaza operation, like Sharon’s invasion of Lebanon 23 years earlier, was a ‘wish list’ for strategic goals the IDF had not been able to accomplish (stilling the Qassams) by other means:

Everything must be done to win Gilad Shalit’s release. What we are doing now in Gaza has nothing to do with freeing him. It is a widescale act of vengeance, the kind that the IDF and Shin Bet have wanted to conduct for some time, mostly motivated by the deep frustration that the army commanders feel about their impotence against the Qassams and the daring Palestinian guerrilla raid. There’s a huge gap between the army unleashing its frustration and a clever and legitimate operation to free the kidnapped soldier…

Here Levy reminds us that Hamas’ kidnapping of Shalit is not that much different from the IDF and Shin Bet’s kidnapping of Palestinian civilians for the alleged purpose of combatting terror:

The legitimate basis for the IDF’s operation was stripped away the moment it began. It’s no accident that nobody mentions the day before the attack on the Kerem Shalom fort, when the IDF kidnapped two civilians, a doctor and his brother, from their home in Gaza. The difference between us and them? We kidnapped civilians and they captured a soldier, we are a state and they are a terror organization. How ridiculously pathetic Amos Gilad sounds when he says that the capture of Shalit was “illegitimate and illegal,” unlike when the IDF grabs civilians from their homes. How can a senior official in the defense ministry claim that “the head of the snake” is in Damascus, when the IDF uses the exact same methods?

True, when the IDF and Shin Bet grab civilians from their homes - and they do so often - it is not to murder them later. But sometimes they are killed on the doorsteps of their homes, although it is not necessary, and sometimes they are grabbed to serve as “bargaining chips,” like in Lebanon and now, with the Palestinian legislators. What an uproar there would be if the Palestinians had grabbed half the members of the Israeli government. How would we label them?

Levy reminds us that IDF policy regarding Gaza violates the Geneva Convention prohibition against collective punishment of civilian populations:

Collective punishment is illegitimate and it does not have a smidgen of intelligence. Where will the inhabitants of Beit Hanun run? With typical hardheartedness the military reporters say they were not “expelled” but that it was “recommended” they leave, for the benefit, of course, of those running for their lives. And what will this inhumane step lead to? Support for the Israeli government? Their enlistment as informants and collaborators for the Shin Bet? Can the miserable farmers of Beit Hanun and Beit Lahia do anything about the Qassam rocket-launching cells? Will bombing an already destroyed airport do anything to free the soldier or was it just to decorate the headlines?

Levy warns that Israel’s unstated policy objective of toppling the Hamas government is one whose repercussions have been left unexamined to potentially fatal results. In fact, this lack of policy planning reminds me precisely of the Bush Administration’s complete lack of a plan for administering Iraq after military ‘victory’ was secured. After winning, what would we do to secure and maintain the peace? How would we guarantee the ‘natives’ wouldn’t get restless once they realized we were occupying their country with no plans to leave anytime soon? None of this was foreseen by U.S. military planners just as the long-range effects of the Gaza invasion have remained ‘out of sight, out of mind.’ But we Americans know that unexamined issues have a way of rearing their ugly heads and biting you in the ass:

Did anyone think about what would have happened if Syrian planes had managed to down one of the Israeli planes that brazenly buzzed their president’s palace? Would we have declared war on Syria? Another “legitimate war”? Will the blackout of Gaza bring down the Hamas government or cause the population to rally around it? And even if the Hamas government falls, as Washington wants, what will happen on the day after? These are questions for which nobody has any real answers. As usual here: Quiet, we’re shooting. But this time we are not only shooting. We are bombing and shelling, darkening and destroying, imposing a siege and kidnapping like the worst of terrorists and nobody breaks the silence to ask, what the hell for, and according to what right?

My title is of course a reference to those ringing words of Kohelet (Ecclesiastes): Hevel havalim amar Kohelet (”Folly of follies says Kohelet”). After reading today’s stinging Haaretz editorial about what we’ll soon be calling the Gaza debacle, I thought the title appropriate for today’s post.

The newspaper begins by noting the contradiction between Israel laying blame at the feet of Khaled Meshal and Syria; while also blaming those local Hamas political leaders who not even Israel claims knew about or condoned the kidnapping:

On the face of it, Israel wishes to exert increasing pressure both on Hamas’ political leadership and on the Palestinian public, in order to induce it to pressure its [military wing] leadership to release the soldier. At the same time, the government claims that Syria - or at least Khaled Meshal, who is living in Syria - holds the key. If so, what is the point of pressuring the local Palestinian leadership, which did not know of the planned attack and which, when it found out, demanded that the kidnappers take good care of their victim and return him?

A few days ago I wrote about parallels I saw between Gaza, 2006 and Lebanon, 1982. The editorial conceives of some new and very salient ones which I hadn’t thought of:

The tactic of pressuring civilians has been tried before, and more than once. The Lebanese, for example, are very familiar with the Israeli tactic of destroying power stations and infrastructure. Entire villages in south Lebanon have been terrorized, with the inhabitants fleeing in their thousands for Beirut. But what also happens under such extreme stress is that local divisions evaporate and a strong, united leadership is forged.

In the end, Israel was forced both to negotiate with Hezbollah and to withdraw from Lebanon. Now, the government appears to be airing out its Lebanon catalogue of tactics and implementing it, as though nothing has been learned since then. One may assume that the results will be similar this time around as well.

Israel also kidnapped people from Lebanon to serve as bargaining chips in dealings with the kidnappers of Israeli soldiers. Now, it is trying out this tactic on Hamas politicians. As the prime minister said in a closed meeting: “They want prisoners released? We’ll release these detainees in exchange for Shalit.” By “these detainees,” he was referring to elected Hamas officials.

The editorial writer here introduces some very telling Zionist movement history and notes parallels between it and the political points we’re scoring on behalf of imprisoned Hamas leaders in the eyes of their constituency:

The prime minister is a graduate of a movement whose leaders were once exiled [this refers to Etzel and Lehi members exiled by the British for their violent nationalist politics during the Mandate], only to return with their heads held high and in a stronger position than when they were deported. But he believes that with the Palestinians, things work differently.

As one who knows that all the Hamas activists deported by Yitzhak Rabin returned to leadership and command positions in the organization, Olmert should know that arresting leaders only strengthens them and their supporters. But this is not merely faulty reasoning; arresting people to use as bargaining chips is the act of a gang, not of a state.

The government…must return to its senses at once, be satisfied with the threats it has made, free the detained Hamas politicians and open negotiations. The issue is a soldier who must be brought home, not changing the face of the Middle East.

A gang, not a state. An uncharacteristically savage and caustic characterization by Haaretz of this government. But certainly apt. I also like the closing phrase: Forget about changing the face of the Middle East. Can there not be a clearer lesson for George Bush as well in Iraq? And could there not be a clearer message for Ariel Sharon who invaded Lebanon with grand ambitions to remake that nation so it would become a quiescent neighbor. By the time Israel left southern Lebanon with its tail between its legs, it realized that Sharon’s grand plan was based on lies and deceit and never stood a remote chance of working as its creator had hoped. If Ehud Olmert and Amir Peretz are not very careful, Gaza 2006 could turn around and bite them and their political careers in much the same way as Iraq did Bush and Lebanon did Sharon.

Oh Condi, Oh George–Where are you?

In wondering what the hell the U.S. is doing while the Middle East threatens to burn, the situation reminds me of the early computer game, Where’s Waldo? Look for him in the crowd. He’s not there. Look for him here, look for him there. Not a trace. That’s pretty much the impact we’re having on some of the most dangerous developments in this part of the world since the second intifada.

Here’s how Reuters characterized our ‘muscular’ foreign policy:

The United States has privately urged Israel to be careful over its military action, worried that tough moves in Gaza will boost Palestinian support for Hamas and further escalate tensions.

A senior State Department official said on Thursday a firm message had been delivered to the Israelis,

We delivered a ‘firm message’ behind closed doors to the Israelis giving them ‘what for’ as the Brits used to say. Yes, that’s certainly going to have a dramatic and immediate impact. You see we understand Israel’s frustration. We understand how one nation can arrest fully one-third of the elected cabinet ministers and parliamentary representatives of a neighboring statelet:

Publicly the United States, Israel’s staunchest ally, has said Israel has the right to defend itself and actively seek the release of the soldier, while urging restraint on all sides.

But there is a fear among some Bush administration officials that Israel might go too far.

“The Israeli measures might not only affect innocent civilians but could build support for Hamas,” said the senior official in an interview with Reuters.

“We have told them to be careful because plainly when you have this kind of military force deployed close to civilian populations there is a very high risk of accidents and I think that can further worsen this crisis.”

Why certainly Israel has a right to defend itself and seek Shalit’s release. That’s precisely what it’s doing by telling the residents of Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahiya to run for their lives. And precisely what it’s doing by arresting Palestinian legislators who had nothing to do with the kidnapping. And precisely what it’s doing by bombing power plants and PA infrastructure like the Interior Ministry building. This is all certainly plainly defensive action and done with the sole purpose of winning Shalit’s release.

And when, I’d like to know, WOULD Israel go “too far” in Bush’s book? When it carpet bombs Rafah or Khan Yunis? Or when it carpet bombs Damascus to teach Assad a lesson?

Israel “runs a very high risk of accidents” when you deploy military force “close to civilian populations.” Duh, I think the U.S. would’ve already learned the IDF has no capability or interest in distinguishing between militants and civilians given the history over the past month even before the latest incursion.

The absolute torpor of the American response is breathtaking. But it gets worse:

Asked about arrests of Hamas officials and whether President George W. Bush endorsed that, White House spokesman Tony Snow replied: “We are going no further than what we’ve said, which is we are encouraging both sides to practice restraint.”

RESTRAINT?? You’re asking jailed Hamas hostages to show restraint? They’re already being restrained…in Israeli shackles. So Tony Snow can’t actually say anything meaningful in response to the outrage of arresting Palestine’s elected government. I’d like to know if the British had actually captured James and Dolly Madison during the War of 1812 and brought them to the brig in chains, whether Tony Snow still would’ve urged the U.S. to show restraint?

What’s wrong with this picture?

U.S. diplomats, in a bid to secure the release of the soldier and ease the crisis, are shuttling between the Israelis and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas.

There has been no U.S. contact with Hamas and Egypt is the go-between with the militant group, which the United States and others refuse to deal with until it renounces violence, recognizes Israel and accepts past agreements between the Palestinians and the Israelis.

“The Egyptians are playing the most important role of any of the outsiders and they are directly in touch with the Israelis and all the Palestinians,” said the senior State Department official.

The U.S. is talking to Israel and Abbas. Yet the kidnappers are Hamas. There’s something wrong here. Of course you have no capability of talking to the party that’s actually responsible for the kidnapping thanks to our stupid anti-Hamas policy and Aipac, which has tied the Administration’s hands on this score. So who do we rely on? The Egyptians. Instead of showing our own leadership and vision in the midst of crisis, we must take a back seat to a tinpot megalomaniac Egyptian virtual dictator who may or may not represent our best interests, but who certainly will represent his own. If I were George Bush, I’d sleep well knowing we’re in the best of hands.