Salah Shehadeh, assassinated by IDF in 2002 (Image via Wikipedia)

The Israeli army has won a victory on behalf of impunity in its war against the Palestinian people with this week’s announcement that the Spanish High Court has rejected jurisdiction over the case of the assassination of Palestinian militant Salah Shehadeh and 18 civilians by the IDF in 2002.

After an appeal by Israeli human rights lawyer Michael Sfard to the Israeli Supreme Court, the State established the Inbar commiittee, ostensibly to investigate the incident and determine whether criminal charges were warranted. As insurance, anti-Occupation activists brought cases against the IDF principals in Britain and Spain.

Now it appears likely Gens. Doron Almog and Dan Halutz, the senior chain of command for the attack, may never be held accountable.  The Spanish court, in its decision pointed to the creation of the Inbar committee as proof that Israel itself was pursuing its own investigation.  Under international law, the nation in which the violation occurred is given first opportunity to prosecute the case.  If they don’t, then other states may take up the case.

The hypocrisy of the Spanish decision is noted by Sharon Weill’s International Journal of Criminal Justice article in which she described the members, structure and mandate of the Inbar committee:

…Following the recommendation of the HCJ [Israeli High Court of Justice], the state agreed to establish an objective and independent commission of inquiry investigating into the killing of Salah Shehadeh. The structure, nature and mandate of that commission would be entirely determined by the state: the very entity whose actions were to be investigated. On 23 January 2008, the commission was appointed by the Prime Minister: it was composed of three members, two of them former Military Generals and another a former official from the security services.

The commission was mandated to investigate the legality of the killing of Salah Shehadeh according to the same legal framework as a military inquiry….While all the procedures, testimonies and even the final report remain confidential, it is authorized to bring to the attention of the relevant authorities criminal recommendations. Later on, if theMilitary Advocate General finds that there is a basis to open a criminal investigation, he can do so only after consulting a Major General.

Brig. General (Res.) Zvi Inbar, formerly the Military Advocate General and the Knesset Legal Counsel was appointed head of the commission; with him were appointed as members of the commission Maj. General (Res.) Iztchak Eitan, formerly the head of the IDF Central Command and Mr Iztchak Dar, who formerly held a large number of operative positions in the General Security Service (GSS), amongst others as the Head of the Service’s Israeli and Foreign Interests Section.

In other words: the fix was in.  Proof of this is that since its creation in 2008 it has not actually investigated the incident, let alone made recommendations.  And as Prof. Weill points out the longer the period from the actual crime to its investigation the greater likelihood witnesses die or disappear and evidence is lost or compromised.  Given Israel’s reputation in these matters this certainly shouldn’t be suspected in this case.

The inactivity of the Committee hasn’t stopped both the Israeli and Spanish Supreme Courts from pointing to its existence as proof that Israel was dealing with the matter.  So here you see the weakness of international law, which allows accused nations like Israel to use smoke, mirrors and obfuscation to exploit loopholes.  In addition, often the legal systems of other nations which might eliminate such impunity refuse to do so out of lack of political will.

Israel, of course, takes maximum advantage of this situation.  Like many authoritarian regimes and serial human rights violators, it develops maximally bureaucratic responses to maintain the network of terror and impunity behind the Occupation.  Whether this involves appropriating (i.e. stealing) Palestinian private land to build settlements or undermining the principle of universal jurisdiction, such regimes become quite skilled at the game.

But this doesn’t mean the game is over.  It means a skirmish has been lost and activists must redouble their political and legal efforts.

Dan Halutz's Facebook page

Psst, are you ready for some fun?  I’ll let you in on it on one condition: don’t blow the secret.  This is too good and funny to be true and I don’t want to spoil it by having anyone squeal.

I was looking through my Facebook profile and noticed one of my Friends had linked to a new page seemingly created by Dan Halutz.  He’s the former chief of staff of the IDF who commanded the ignominious Lebanon war while he wheeled and dealed with his stock broker over his investment portfolio.  Perhaps his distraction contributed to the IDF’s lackluster performance in the war.  I say lackluster not because the Israelis didn’t kill enough Lebanese.  They did that–somewhere around 1,200 died during the month of that war.  But the performance was lackluster in that over 100 Israelis were killed, all of northern Israel was a barren wasteland for a month, and Hezbollah was neither dislodged nor vanquished–all of which was promised by Halutz before and during the war.

Some Israeli jokester has created a spoof website that is deliciously ironic.  Not to mention that fabulous real photo of Halutz looking like George Clooney in a tank and yukking it up.  Here are some of the more hilarious Wall segments:

Personal Information

Activities:

Fighter jet pilot, soldier and general.
love extreme sports. modern weapons.
I also love jogging in the early morning, and play the African game of Homboh.

Interests:

exploding bodies
long range bombing, financial portfolio

Favorite Music:

the sound of napalm in the morning

Favorite Quotations:

What do you feel when you drop a 1-ton bomb on a residential building? “A slight bump to the (airplane’s) wing” – D. Halutz

About Me:

I have a Wikipage:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dan_Halutz

Some of the comments by Dan’s Friends are pretty funny:

Dan Halutz Going off-line untill monday. happy new year!

December 30, 2009 at 9:08pm ·

Mary Woodward

What? You putting extrajudicial murders on hold till then, Generalissimo??
PS Happy New Year to you, also, Sir.

December 30, 2009 at 11:12pm

Tom Vee

Happy New Year! Maybe your New Year’s resolution should be not to kill as many children, yes?

Dan Halutz I am Mr. Halutz and Dr. King

December 29, 2009 at 7:13am ·

Mary Woodward

And I am…confused, Generalissimo?

December 29, 2009 at 8:01am

Dan Halutz

On one hand, I am a war-machine, nothing but a bump in the wing. On the other hand, lately I started felling this pain, or a twitch, somewhere in my chest every time I blow a kid to smithereens.
Dr. Jakyl & Mr Hyde…

December 29, 2009 at 8:10am

Mary Woodward

Don’t break my heart, Generalissimo!

December 29, 2009 at 8:14am

What makes all of this even more delicious is the fact that real live right wing Israeli politicians have been hoodwinked by the satirical page and have “friended” Dan, including Likud MK Danny Dannon and settler extremist Moshe Feiglin. It’s all too funny for words: enjoy. But let’s keep this our little secret.

Aftermath of 2002 Shehadeh attack (AP)

When I first read the headline in Haaretz, Panel to Look into Civilian Deaths in 2002 IAF Attack on Shehadeh I was pleased and surprised that one of the bloodiest civilian massacres of recent IDF history would finally be investigated. But I quickly realized that there is probably less here than meets the eye:

The State Prosecution has agreed to establish an independent commission to investigate the circumstances surrounding the targeted assassination of Hamas’ former military leader in the Gaza Strip, Salah Shehadeh, in June 2002.

Shehadeh died when the Israel Air Force dropped a one-ton bomb on a Gaza City neighborhood, killing 14 innocent people – mostly women and children – in the process.

The panel will establish whether a criminal investigation should be opened against those involved in the decision to bomb the neighborhood. The State Prosecution told the High Court of Justice of its decision during a hearing on a petition filed the peace organization “Yesh Gvul.”

The organization filed the petition in September 2003 against then-military prosecutor Menachem Finkelstein, who refused to order a criminal investigation into the deaths of the 14 civilians.

This incident is the source of the famous comment by Dan Halutz, then IAF commander, when asked if he felt anything when he dropped a bomb on a Palestinian target. “Just a slight tremble of the wings [of the plane] is all,” was his mordant reply. Any number of famous Israeli commanders are well known for similarly cold boasts, and this one stuck with Halutz. The IDF commander at the time of the raid was Doron Almog, who was nearly arrested at a London airport under an international warrant for his role in the massacre.

Which takes us to the issue of why there may be less here than meets the eye. Yesh Gvul, the Israeli group, sued the IDF for this incident, taking the case all the way to the Israeli Supreme Court. The Court was put in what for it was a terrible bind. Clearly, the IDF had engaged in a horrible massacre which in the normal course of legal events should be reviewed. But also clearly, the Court was loathe to second guess military commanders even when they stepped over a moral-legal line (as they certainly did here). The justices knew they should review the case, but detested the idea of doing so. They held off for years on hearing it.

When Israeli human rights lawyers began pursuing the case outside Israel under the jurisdiction of international law, then the Supreme Court’s inaction made it look witless. Then they finally devised a way out of their predicament that preserved a fig leaf of judicial probity. They heard a separate case about targeted assassinations and ruled (don’t ask me how they reached this conclusion) that they were legal under international law in limited circumstances.

This allowed them at least to ratify the commanders’ original decision to kill Shehadeh. But they still had to deal with the other deaths. Which brings us to the independent commission concept:

Three months ago, the High Court ordered the state to declare whether or not it would agree to the establishment of an independent panel. When the court ruled in December 2006 that targeted assassinations are not illegal under international law, it also determined that the state is obligated to “objectively” investigate decisions taken by the Israel Defense Forces in cases where innocent civilians have been killed.

“Despite the fact that the regulations determined by the High Court’s verdict on the policy of targeted assassinations are not applicable to the incident in question,” wrote deputy State Prosecutor Shai Nitzan, “the state agrees that the circumstances under which innocent civilians were hurt [!!] in the course of the action against Shehadeh will be examined by an objective investigative committee that will be appointed for this purpose by state authorities.”

The attack in July 2002 leveled an entire residential building in Gaza City. High Court justices repeatedly delayed the hearing on the petition, deciding it would be heard only after ruling on the targeted assassinations policy.

My guess is that the Supreme Court has just engaged in a bit of a nod and a wink to the state prosecutor which allows both of them to say that they dealt with the issue without dirtying their hands with it. There will be an independent commission which will find that despite the terrible loss the judgment of the commanders was sound and the civilians were an unfortunate casualty of a nasty but necessary war on terror.

Cynical? Perhaps. But if you don’t become cynical watching how Israel operates regarding matters like these then you’re either a flag-waving true believer or Pollyana. And I’m neither. That being said, one always preserves the hope that some justice will be done in this case and some officer’s judgment will be questioned if not excoriated.

Haaretz publishes an eye-opening inside account of the General Staff deliberations that went into the planning and execution of the IDF strategy during the Lebanon war. It shows a curiously tentative and hesitant set of senior commanders who propose ideas only to see them dismissed by chief of staff Halutz; after which the same commanders abandon their original ideas and embrace Halutz’s prescriptions. It shows the army is disarray and dysfunction.

This passage struck me as prophetically ironic in light of the symbolic defeats that the IDF suffered in the village of Bint Jbail:

…On July 16, Bint Jbail is raised for the first time as a target for a possible IDF operation. Major General Benny Gantz, head of the ground forces, makes the recommendation to the chief of staff. “Hassan Nasrallah’s victory speech [in May 2000 after the IDF's withdrawal from southern Lebanon] was made in Bint Jbail. We must dismantle that place, it is a Shi’ite place – and they must be driven to the North. I would even consider a limited ground operation in this area, which can be held.”

Lest anyone still believe the IDF’s then defense of its gruesome tactics in Lebanon, in which it claimed it was only targeting military locations and not civilian, note Gantz’s pointed reference to “dismantling” the village and displacing its civilian residents. He wants to do this not because Bint Jbail is a military target, but because Nasrallah has made the village a symbol of Hezbollah resistance to Israel.

I also note the chilling final sentence: “I would even consider a limited ground operation in this area, which can be held.” The IDF, of course, lost 8 soldiers in Bint Jbail in a single day and never completely took control of it. As a result, the status of the town has risen to legendary proportions in the eyes of Hezbollah and its supporters. So in effect, the IDF created a myth on behalf of Hezbollah and only burnished it further in its attempt to “teach Hezbollah a lesson” there. A case of MAJOR hubris.

During a later period of the war, after major Israeli losses occurred there, the General Staff has this colloquy:

Kaplinsky: “Regarding Bint Jbail, I agree with Udi [Adam] on one thing. There is no tactical military significance to conquering Bint Jbail [but] there is another sort of significance … that of symbolism and what we are doing, we are doing for those who are going to tell the story tomorrow.”

Adam does not agree: “We do not need a heroic battle in order to conquer that crap-hole [Bint Jbail].”

Halutz decides on a renewed operation against Bint Jbail and tells Adam: “On point of principle, I tell you this: You say there is no story. Well, I think there is one – and it is not on their side, it’s on our side.”

It’s ironic that the IDF command here confuses its strategic objectives with pure symbolism. Instead of winning a war it tries to deliver a symbolic blow to Hezbollah in attacking Bint Jbail. In the end, it lost the war AND created a strong symbol on behalf of its enemy.

There is further irony in the fact that only Uzi Adam, the commander responsible for actually fighting the war, understands the fatal mistake his comrades have made in focussing their energy on Bint Jbail. And the concluding irony is that Adam was the officer removed from command and blamed by Halutz for the failure of the latter’s war. In this nuthouse, Adam was the relatively sane one.

Haaretz closes its account with more prophetic, and ironic words from Amos Yadlin, chief of military intelligence. Here he speaks of Hezbollah’s rockets which are raining down on northern Israel:

On the matter of the Katyushas, we must show that it is possible to defeat this thing, otherwise it will follow us for years. Apparently this can only be done on the ground … Come on, our fathers beat all the Arab states in six days and we are not able to go in with two divisions and finish off [the area] south of the Litani?”

What does this tell you about the comparative worth of this generation of IDF officers vs. Yitzchak Rabin and his commanders during the Six Day War??

As they say in Hebrew: Higia zman (“it’s about time”). Or as a droll Haaretz commenter, SD wrote: “He felt a bump.” This alludes to Halutz’s famously cruel statement that he felt no pangs of conscience when he dropped a bomb on a Palestinian militant. Rather, he said, he felt only a “slight bump” in the wings of the plane.

And as Tom Lehrer used to sing: “Who’s next?”

Halutz has finally bowed to the almost inevitable and resigned as IDF chief of staff. He said he would resign if the Winograd Commission found him guilt of malfeasance. Though the Commission hasn’t yet released its findings, I’m sure he has some idea of what it will say. He found it more convenient to remove himself before the other shoe dropped so to speak.

Yesh Gvul poster: “Fly Halutz home–return Tzahal to the code of military conduct” They just got their wish

Interesting that Olmert apparently tried to talk him out of it:

Ehud Olmert’s bureau said the prime minister knew ahead of time of Halutz’ intention to resign, and had asked him reconsider.

Now, why would that be? Because he loved the man so? Hardly. Once one of the Top Three Incompetents (Halutz, Olmert and Peretz) goes, there is much more pressure on the other two to go as well. And make no mistake, there is already tremendous pressure on Olmert to do so. MKs began clamoring today for it following an announcement of a criminal inquiry into Olmert’s involvement in the privatization of Bank Leumi. Haaretz notes that two separate inquiries are also anticipated into potential Olmert financial chicanery. If Winograd criticizes Olmert strongly enough, the pressure only mounts.

Hat tip to Arieh Leibowitz of Meretz who turned me on to this outrageous public statement by IDF chief of staff, Dan Halutz:

“There are two genders – men and women, actually there is another one which you are not allowed to mention,” Lt. General Dan Halutz said in a public speech, coolly referring to gays and lesbians.

His clumsy slip of the tongue, by no means his worst act of public relations recently, has secured him a place in the ever-growing camp of opponents to the…[gay]) community in Israel…

Halutz’ lack of sensitivity and inadequate sense of public morality, which was well demonstrated when he got rid of his stocks at the outbreak of the war, are only shadowed by his poor performance as chief commander of the war. The statement in question, however, only contributes to his public image as a man who fails to think before he speaks

While Dan Halutz’s mind is a deep, dark place I’d rather not plumb the depths of–I think it’s instructive to examine his statement. First, he distinguishes homosexuality as a gender apart from male and female. Second, he pretends that being gay is something “you are not allowed to mention.” While this may be a feeble attempt at humor, it is interesting that Halutz only allows himself to speak about homosexuality in terms that pretend one can’t speak about it at all. Third, what Halutz unconsciously is saying is not that homosexuals are a gender apart from the two human genders; but that they are a species apart from human beings. In other words, gays are altogether alien from us, a figure worthy of mocking laughter and ridicule.

This is a man who could not successfully prosecute a war. He cannot lead an army. And he dare not speak the name “homosexual.” This is a man with whom we wish to entrust the security of the nation and the lives of our young soldiers (including many gays)?

Haaretz reports deep political difficulties facing three of the nation’s more bombastic leaders. The most important is Dan Halutz, the IDF chief of staff. The newspaper reports that three hours after the kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers on the northern border he went personally to his bank to liquidate a $30,000 investment account. Though he’s given no reason for his action other than saying he did it to cover previous losses, clearly everyone in Israel believes that he judged that the market would tank in light of the coming war and that Halutz wanted to avoid the consequent losses:

The IDF chief said he sold the portfolio because of losses he sustained prior to July 12.

“It was my portfolio of shares, on which I had lost NIS 25,000,” Halutz told Ma’ariv. “It is true that I sold the portfolio on July 12, 2006, but it is impossible to link that to the war. At the time I did not expect or think that there would be a war.”

Senior sources in the IDF General Staff and field officers who took part in the war in Lebanon said Tuesday that Halutz cannot escape resignation. The sources say there is a clear ethical flaw in the chief of staff’s behavior during the hours when soldiers were being killed in Lebanon and others were attempting a rescue operation. Halutz should resign the moment the military completes its pullout from south Lebanon they said.

At this stage however it seems unlikely that Halutz intends to quit of his own accord.

It smells to high heaven. And most people believe that the army’s abysmal performance against Hezbollah along with his ethical peccadilloes will cost him his job. I can’t see that Olmert would feel any loyalty toward him at all and would probably gladly dump him overboard as a sacrificial lamb who might distract the attention of those who want Olmert’s hide for the war’s failure.

Israeli police feel they have a very strong sexual harassment case against Haim Ramon, justice minister, and one of the more hawkish and bellicose of the current ministers. He has made continual brutish comments about both the Palestinians and Lebanese showing you can never overestimate the amount of compassion an Israeli politician can muster for Israel’s neighbors. The calculation by him and others is the meaner you sound the greater your macho image in the body politic. Ramon is a refugee from the Labor Party who has undergone a gradual transformation from young, brainy political hunk to near-dead meat.

When I worked at the Westchester Jewish Federation I once arranged for him to speak to our board of directors. He was one of the coldest fishes and least engaging individuals I’ve ever met in such a situation. He spoke, answered a question and then left promptly. I hardly remember him speaking to anyone informally or even cracking a smile. I won’t miss him if he ‘draws the proper conclusion’ (as the Israelis say in Hebrew) and resigns.

Speaking of sexual harassment, it appears that Moshe Katsav, the current president, has a few sexual peccadilloes of his own to deal with with several former female employees accusing him of making unwanted advances and worse. Before the war began, the Israeli press was predicting his eventual demise as well.

There is a very small silver lining here. Israeli politics has been for decades a bastion of Ashkenazi male he-men types with a few Mizrahim sprinkled in for good measure. There are very few senior female political figures in any major party. It is good that men are being cut down to size and their expectations of dominance of their employees and the Israeli populace in general is being challenged. If this leads Israelis to realize that the lack of women in politics has only encouraged these sorts of shenanigans and more women enter politics and attain more senior positions in government it may be a good thing.

Another political demise I’d welcome would be that of Tzachi NaNegbi, one of Olmert’s political confidants and scion of an extreme nationalist Israeli political family (his mother was famed Arab hater, Geula Cohen). The attorney general accuses him of illegally padding the Environment Ministry payroll with political appointees. He now runs the formerly important Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. Though how long he will retain this portfolio we can only speculate.

I once interviewed HaNegbi when he was Hebrew University student body president and recall him speaking yearningly for the restoration of the Third Temple, a notably extreme hawkish position on the Israeli right likely to create all out war with the entire Arab world. They say he’s become slightly more pragmatic since but apparently more corrupt as well. Nice going, Tzachi.

As these scandals prove, there is much corruption in the Israeli body politic. And this sort of presumptuous behavior may encourage the sort of bad judgment exhibited by the Israeli leadership in this war (though I’m not connecting these two issues directly). Good riddance to bad rubbish. As for the cleaning house that Israel is expecting in the aftermath of this disastrous war–this is a good start.

Israel has reached an inauspicious milestone of sorts. It has crossed the century mark in terms of combined civilian and military deaths in this war. Billmon does something interesting (albeit ghoulish) math tonight to compute how many more Israeli soldiers could be killed if Olmert chooses to advance to the Litani:

Let’s do some rough back-of-the-envelope calculations, just to see what the Israelis have gotten themselves into.

The estimates I’ve seen of the number of Hizbullah main force fighters in southern Lebanon range between 2,000 to 5,000 — let’s say 3,500.

I wouldn’t be at all surprised if Hizbullah’s leadership were be willing to accept 75% casualties in order to bleed the Israelis on the way to the Litani. That’s 2,625. (And Gen. Nasrallah might very well be willing to accept more, since he appears to have other units — in the Bekaa Valley, for example — that could be fed into the battle.)

Let’s assume half of those Hizbullah casualties are KIA. One in three or one in four would be a more normal ratio, but these guys seem pretty set on martyrdom. That’s 1,313, rounded up.

At a kill ratio of 2:1, that would equal 656 (rounded down) Israeli KIA — about a quarter of Israel’s combat deaths in the Yom Kippur War, when it was fighting the armies of two Arab states. At a 4:1 kill ratio, it would be 328 KIA – about half of total Israeli deaths in the first Lebanon War.

Of course, if Israel goes to the Litani it would then find itself waist deep in a prolonged guerrilla war of attrition, which no doubt would result in even more Israeli casualties…

Israel has a total population of just over 6 million — about 2% of the U.S. population. So proportionally, 656 Israeli KIA would equal roughly 33,000 American combat deaths, or about two-thirds of U.S. losses for the entire Vietnam War. And like I said, that would probably just be for starters.

Does the Olmert government have the stomach for that kind of fighting? Is the Israeli public willing to pay so much blood to conquer a piece of ground that almost certainly will have to be given back later? And what if the big push doesn’t stop the rocket attacks but only reduces them temporarily? Would it still be worth such a price?

When you start thinking about somewhere between 300-600 IDF dead in this war it starts reminding you of that ever climbing U.S. casualty rate in that other swamp war in Iraq.

It may be that some of these same cold calculations are going through the mind of Ehud Olmert right about now as he debates whether or not to heed the Svengali like call of Butcher Dan Halutz to take the troops all the way to the Lebanese Big Muddy–the Litani River:

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert is still debating whether to approve the proposed expansion of the Israel Defense Forces’ ground operation in south Lebanon…Olmert fears that the plan presented by the defense establishment will result in hundreds of casualties, and therefore, wants to subject it to a careful cost-benefit analysis. In Tuesday’s fighting in Lebanon, five soldiers were killed and 23 others wounded, two of them seriously.

I’m certain that utterances like this one will boost his confidence in the outcome of such an expansion of the war:

IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz said Tuesday that such an operation is necessary “in order to end this war differently.” People who participated in discussions of the plan with him said they had never heard him speak as forcefully in favor of anything as he did in favor of the proposed ground operation.

While I have said many negative things in this blog about Olmert, he is a lawyer and prides himself on the same type of realpolitik practiced by the likes of Henry Kissinger. If he really has the courage of his convictions, he will run from this plan as fast as his feet can carry him. When Dan Halutz tells you it’s a slam dunk that’s when you know you’re up to your ass in alligators if you take his advice. I can’t say what Olmert will do. Thus far, he has taken all the wrong advice in prosecuting this war. But perhaps now, after he sees how badly it’s going for both his civilians and his troops, he will see reason and bargain seriously for a ceasefire and Israeli withdrawal coordinated with a Lebanese deployment in the south and Hezbollah retreat from the border.