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Archive for August, 2006

Washington Post Paean to Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings

Wednesday, August 30th, 2006

I was reading the New Israel Fund’s NIF Blog yesterday which featured a column by Larry Garber, the executive director. I have nothing but respect and admiration for NIF and Larry. But I was taken aback by his recommendation of a Washington Post article about Israel’s campaign of targeted killings against Palestinian militants: In Israel, a Divisive Struggle Over Targeted Killing

It is essentially a paean to Israeli military intelligence and its supposed moral conscience when it comes to targeted killings. The article is full of unsubstantiated claims about the targets & victims of these tactics, and is backed up by nothing more than a senior Israeli intelligence officer’s say-so. The supposedly conflicted moral consciences of these officials are presented as the epitome of ethical behavior. No where in this article is a Palestinian–or any doubter’s–point of view on the tactic presented. Could it be that the IDF & Mossad have taken such a shellacking lately that they feel a need to present a more moral face to the world? This is a dream piece for that purpose. I wonder whether it also might not suit Moshe Yaalon’s expected return to Israeli politics when his diplomatic tour ends in Washington soon for him to be presented as the tormented Hamlet of this story.

The article begins with a dramatic flourish worthy of a Tom Clancy movie. The scene is set in the Israeli general’s home with children playing gleefully in the background. So cinematic and so human!

Israel’s top military commander sat on the edge of his bed, talking on the phone, rubbing his forehead. The bedroom door was closed, muffling the Saturday clink and giggle of his children at lunch. His chief of operations was on the gray, secure phone, the line that rang louder and sharper and made his heart beat fast.

The report came from the war room: The bomb was falling .

Of course, this being a potential Hollywood screenplay, the reporter holds back the outcome of the bombing till the very end of the piece. Suffice to say, I’m going to break the spell and reveal to you that the IDF had hit the spook’s jackpot and hoped to kill the entire senior leadership of Hamas, which was meeting in a Gaza apartment building.

The date was September 6, 2003, and Israel and Hamas were in the midst of an ongoing war of terror and counter-terror. But that setting of tremendous mutual violence doesn’t give the reporter the right to make this unverified statement:

Eight Hamas leaders had gathered to plan terrorist attacks, Israeli intelligence reported.

Well, sure we have Israeli intelligence’s word that this was the meeting agenda. But how do we know that its word is accurate?

From the perspective of an Israeli general, all Hamas leaders are terrorists thus the meeting could have been about no other subject than planning terror attacks. But the reality is often different than what Israel proclaims. Here is Dan Halutz setting the scene for us and evaluating the target:

“It was like bin Laden, Zarqawi and Zawahiri in a meeting, and having the capability to hit them,” said Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz, then the air force chief, and now the military chief of staff.

As Ronald Reagan used to say: “There he goes again.” Notice Halutz conveniently associates the Hamas leaders with Al Qaeda much the same distorted way that Rumsfeld and Cheney do. But who were those Hamas leaders meeting that day? One of them was Ismail Haniye, the current Palestinian prime minister. In this single fact, we see the essentially flawed nature of targeted assassination as a tactic. Who can say that the man you kill today would not become the political leader who, in future, might resolve the conflict between your two nations?

The other major figure at the meeting was Sheik Ahmed Yassin, Hamas’ titular leader. Though Israel did not succeed in killing him that day, it did kill him eventually by, in the memorably charming words of an Israeli general quoted in this article, “a missile in his lap.” By killing the relatively moderate Yassin, Israel bumped to the head of the Hamas leadership line, Khaled Meshal. He’s the one who’s caused Israel no end of headaches by masterminding the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit in Gaza. Meshal is generally considered by almost everyone to be among the most intransigent of all Hamas’ leaders. That’s what targeted assassinations do. They bring leaders even worse than the ones you’ve killed.

But if you hear Halutz tell it, targeted killing is a stellar counter-terror tactic:

“It is the most important, the most important, method of fighting terror,” Halutz said.

Oh really? Let’s hear from the reporter herself on that subject:

In Lebanon last month, Israel targeted a bunker that officials believed held Hezbollah’s leadership, pounding it with 23 tons of explosives.

Didn’t work that time now did it? Didn’t work numerous times in the past months in Gaza when the IAF serially erred in killing numerous civilians in multiple failed targeted killings. I have a question to ask this reporter: why has she provided no voice questioning this bald, unproven assumption by Halutz? Are we to trust the general’s statement on faith? Remember, this is the same dude who brought Shock and Awe II to Lebanon where it seemed to flop big-time at the box office. How trustworthy is this guy’s judgment that he should go unchallenged?

Here is another Israeli general’s moral argument for extrajudicial assassination:

“We face a tragic dilemma,” said Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, chief of military intelligence. “A terrorist is going to enter a restaurant and blow up 20 people. But if we blow up his car, three innocent people in the car will die. How do we explain it to ourselves?”

That’s all very nice. Except that the scenario is entirely out of date. The chosen weapon of Palestinian militants is no longer the suicide bomb. Rather, most energy seems to be directed toward the questionable tactic of raining Qassam rockets on southern Israel. So almost all recent targeted killings have been against rocket launching crews. Yadlin neglected to use this as his example because Qassams have caused very little damage to Israel and it just doesn’t make as compelling an argument.

This is one of my favorite sections from the argument which supposedly bolsters the image of Israeli intelligence as morally sensitive souls:

One morning in 2002, Yadlin recalled, he “woke up horrified” to learn that 15 Palestinian civilians had been killed in an operation. That afternoon, Yadlin called Asa Kasher, a philosophy professor, and began working on ethical guidelines for fighting terrorism. They also asked a mathematician to write a formula to determine acceptable civilian casualties per dead terrorist.

I find it amusing that Yadlin needed a philosophy professor to help him make this tactic ethically acceptable. As for the mathematician, that one literally made me belly laugh the first time I read it. It was a dark, bitter laugh by the way. But hey, the Israelis really do have such a formula. I kid you not:

How many civilian casualties were acceptable? The mathematician whom the military had enlisted had failed to produce a formula. Reisner, who had stipulated that targeted killing was legal “only if all is done to minimize civilian casualties,” served on a seven-member committee that also failed to agree on a standard they could use. The numbers the men had suggested averaged 3.14 civilian deaths per dead terrorist, Reisner recalled. If the civilians were children, the figure was smaller.

Israel has a cost-benefit analysis for an acceptable number of civilian deaths in its attacks. To me, this is the ultimate abuse of mathematics and statistics. How do you possibly with a straight face contend that there is an acceptable margin of error in these attacks??

Blumenfeld, in her ongoing attempt at cinematic storytelling, presents a good cop, bad cop relationship between Avi Dichter, head of the Mossad, and Moshe Yaalon, military chief of staff. Dichter is the bloodthirsty killer. Yaalon the general with a tormented conscience:

But for Yaalon, military chief of staff from 2002 to 2005, the Talmudic precept, “If he comes to kill you, kill him first,” conflicted with a Biblical commandment, “Thou shall not kill.”

You mean to tell me that Yaalon thinks about the Ten Commandments before he kills Palestinians? Gimme a break. I think this is a question of the reporter getting a bit overwrought in her prose style.

And in case, you didn’t catch the fact that Yaalon is the good guy in this piece, Blumenfeld writes:

“It’s the lives of Israelis on one hand, the lives of Palestinians on the other,” Yaalon said, balancing his palms like the scales of justice. He is a tall, balding man, with sloping shoulders, thick glasses and a taste for meditative poetry. As a youth, Yaalon joined the leftist kibbutz movement. Despite decades of fighting, he still seems startled by its viciousness.

“When I sign the orders,” he said, “my hand trembles.”

I’m touched. But you do have to give Yaalon credit in one sense. His successor as chief of staff, Dan Halutz, made a memorable comment when asked if he felt anything when he dropped a bomb on a Palestinian target. “Just a slight tremble of the wings (of the plane) is all,” was his reply. Israel seems to have transferred supreme military authority from a man with some conscience to one who has never been burdened by one.

In discussing the history of Israeli targeted assassinations, the Post writer interviews Ehud Barak about his experience as a IDF assassin. He again provides charmingly witty banter about his experience:

In 1973, in Beirut, wearing high heels and a woman’s wig, Barak helped gun down three of the terrorists who murdered 11 Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics. “I was a brunette, I had a strawberry blonde behind me,” Barak said, with a small smile.

This must be what passes for pleasant cocktail banter at parties in the Barak household. You get the feeling that he’s told the story a million times before and has that ‘small smile’ down pat.

And lest you think that this policy of extrajudicial murder was devised by some bloodthirsty Likud PM like Netanyahu or Sharon–not true. It comes to you thanks to that Labor paragon of peace: Barak. Seems he wanted to get some of that fun back in his life in 2000 and decided to go back to his Munich days and ways. This time he needed some legal cover to justify what he intended to do:

Barak…secretly asked Daniel Reisner, a legal adviser to Arab-Israeli peace talks, to determine whether targeted killings were legal. Reisner agonized for six weeks. “It was a feeling of — what on Earth has happened?” Reisner recalled. “Instead of two states living amicably side by side, I have to write opinions on how and when we kill each other.”

Yes, indeed. I’m sure he agonized. He knew what his client wanted and he provided it. Is there any doubt what he advised Barak despite all these tortured moral misgivings?

Reisner concluded it was legal, with six conditions: that arrest is impossible; that targets are combatants; that senior cabinet members approve each attack; that civilian casualties are minimized; that operations are limited to areas not under Israeli control; and that targets are identified as a future threat. Unlike prison sentences, targeted killing cannot be meted out as punishment for past behavior, Reisner said. In 2002, a military panel established that targeting cannot be for revenge, but only for deterrence.

Israel no longer seems to observe several of these criteria. The most glaring one is ensuring the “civilian casualties are minimized.” This past summer my blog has been full of IDF mistakes in Gaza in which scores of Palestinians have been killed in such incidents. In addition, now instead of killing masterminds of massive terror attacks the IDF kills guys running through the streets with rocket launchers which inflict almost no damage on their intended target. As for the other criteria, they sound laudable. But how much do you think they’re honored in the breach? And especially now that the IDF is run by a man who feels nothing more than a slight tremble of the wings when he orders a man’s death.

If Yaalon comes across as Hamlet in this story, Dichter comes across as Atilla the Hun. He has no remorse, no conscience. He’s there to get the job done and the job is killing them before they kill us (or at least how he views it):

…For Avi Dichter “After each success, the only thought is, ‘Okay, who’s next?’ We really have a bottleneck,” the former Shin Bet chief said. One time they completed a killing at 5:30 a.m. “I said, ‘What are we going to do for the rest of the day?’ Nothing limits Hamas attacks, except terrorists still prefer their heads attached to their shoulders. If the M-16 delivers the message, the F-16 delivers it better.”

Splendid. Do I hear ‘war criminal’ anyone?

Here Dichter reveals the profound limitations of his counter-terror world view:

For Dichter, “the barrel of terrorism has a bottom.” If you captured or killed enough terrorists, Dichter believed, the problem would be solved. “They deserved a bomb that would send the dream team to hell,” Dichter said. “I said, ‘If we miss this opportunity, more Israelis will die.’ “

The truth is that the barrel has no bottom. You can kill them by the barrel-full and it will not slow the process of terror down. And it certainly will not “solve” the problem though it may give you an short interval until the next terror leader emerges, who may be more dangerous, more lethal and more intransigent than the previous one.

But I regret to say that Yaalon’s perspective isn’t much more persuasive:

Yaalon disagreed: “We won’t get to the bottom of the barrel by killing terrorists. We’ll get there through education.

Is this the best that Hamlet can muster? ‘Educate’ your enemy and he will become your friend?

Blumenfeld presents as a core ethical argument in this incident the decision of how large a bomb to drop on the building where the meeting was occurring. Dichter argued for a larger payload and Yaalon for a smaller one to minimize the possibility of civilian casualties. Though how Yaalon could believe that dropping even a quarter ton bomb in a densely packed urban area would eliminate the possibility of civilian deaths–is beyond me.

In pondering the problem of civilian casualties, the Washington Post journalist presents the usual IDF statistics claiming it has improved its error rate over the years. But she does acknowledge a certain fall-off in that department with the murders of scores of Gaza civilians this year. But it all can be explained so neatly and tidily by the IDF, and believe me they will:

David Siegel, a government spokesman, said the air force launched three times as many targeted attacks in the first eight months of 2006 as it had in all of 2005, increasing the probability of mistakes.

I feel reassured, don’t you? It’s all a matter of statistics, not pilot or spotter error. And certainly not an error in the relying on the tactic in the first place.

Now let’s return to our Hamlet:

Only once, Yaalon said, did he knowingly authorize a hit that would also kill a noncombatant, the wife of Salah Shehada. Shehada helped found Hamas’s military wing, which had asserted responsibility for killing 16 soldiers and 220 Israeli civilians. In 2002, the air force dropped a one-ton bomb on his home. The blast also destroyed a neighboring house, which Yaalon said he had thought was empty. Fifteen civilians were killed, including nine children. It felt, Yaalon said, “like something heavy fell on my head.”

I’ll bet he did. Something else heavy may fall on him sometime in the future–a indictment by the International Criminal Court. But never fear, when our good general kills the innocent wife of a guerrilla, he can still stand himself in the morning when he looks in the mirror:

When Yaalon makes this kind of decision, he said, it must pass “the mirror test”: At the end of the day, will he be able to look at himself in the mirror?

For those of you sitting on the edge of your seat wanting to know how it comes out: they dropped the bomb and it missed. But discovering the thought process that went into this decision is unnerving:

Then an agent offered an intriguing piece of information. The house was three stories high. The curtains were closed on the third floor. Perhaps the Hamas leaders were meeting up there?

Gallant, the prime minister’s adviser, called Sharon with a revised battle plan from Yaalon: The air force could drop a smaller bomb — a quarter-ton — destroy only the third floor and spare the civilians next door.

You decide to drop a bomb on a particular floor of a building based on the supposition that closed curtains mean that people are meeting there? Are they kidding? I’m no intelligence maven, but this bit of “thinking” doesn’t pass my smell test. It’s no wonder they were wrong:

…The [Hamas] men were gathered on the ground floor of the house. The quarter-ton bomb destroyed only the third floor. Abu Ras’s wife and four children, on the second floor, survived. And the Hamas leadership was safe.

What lesson has Dapper Dan Halutz learned from all this? Drop a bigger bomb:

“I’d say we should have used the heaviest bomb to ensure this leadership would be eliminated, and to save Palestinian and Israeli lives.”

It’s arguable that such killing would save Israeli lives, but that it will save Palestinian lives?? Is the man out of his mind??

Joe Lieberman Says ‘Think About the Good Stuff’ and I Am–His Retirement

Wednesday, August 30th, 2006

Mr. Lieberman released a television advertisement on Tuesday, which is scheduled to run at least through the weekend on major networks in Hartford and cable systems in Fairfield County.

…The ad features a picture of beach at sunset, while soft music plays in the background.

A woman’s voice says: “Joe Lieberman thought you might enjoy a break from Ned Lamont’s negative attacks. So just sit back and think about — good stuff. Like Senator Lieberman saving jobs, improving health care and keeping us safe.”

Just sit back and think about–good stuff. Like the end of Joe Lieberman’s political career.

From today’s NY Times.

Haaretz: Israel Delaying Release of Kidnapped Soldier

Wednesday, August 30th, 2006

Haaretz published a report today claiming that Israel is responsible for holding up the release of kidnapped soldier, Gilad Shalit:

Gaza source: Israel delaying deal for Shalit

The source, who is located in the Gaza Strip, said Israel and Hamas have agreed on the principle of exchanging Shalit for Palestinian prisoners, but that the two parties have not yet decided the exact nature of the deal or how it will be carried out.

He said the kidnappers, with whom he is in contact, have made realistic demands. The source would not say how many prisoners Hamas is demanding in the swap, but he did say the number is not in the thousands, as had previously been stated.

“Moreover, Hamas has not completely rejected the Egyptian proposal that Shalit first be transferred to the Egyptians, after which Israel will free prisoners,” the source said. “The problem is that the Egyptian mediation team has no response from Israel, like as to when the prisoners would be released, how many and what type. Only with these responses will the mediators be able to offer something to the kidnappers. But Israel is not clarifying its positions. It is not taking any initiative that indicates its desire to complete the deal. There is no sign of readiness, there are no messages via Israel’s overt channels, and the problem is  there are no messages even via the covert channels.”

It is hard to read into these blasted unnamed sources used by Israeli publications, but it would appear to me that the source must be from Hamas or from someone very close to Hamas. It would also appear that Olmert’s government has been so crippled by the Lebanon war that it cannot make any significant policy decision such as agreeing to a prisoner swap to liberate one of Israel’s most important detainees. Olmert of course denies this:

The Prime Minister’s Office said the charges are incorrect, and would not discuss the talks taking place. Israel would not conduct negotiations with Hamas regarding the release of prisoners, and the country is using all means to bring home the abducted soldiers, it said.

If Olmert won’t negotiate with Hamas then he isn’t “using all means to bring home” Shalit, now is he? And if the charges are incorrect and Israel isn’t stalling–then why hasn’t Shalit been freed? It seems clear that there is some merit, and perhaps a good deal of merit, to the charge against Israel. When will it get off its duff and get this thing done?

My guess is that Olmert is petrified at the threat from his right regarding the failure of the war. He is afraid that by releasing Palestinian prisoners in exchange for Shalit that he will leave himself open to a frontal attack from the Netanyahu types. And this is true. They will go after him. But if it were Sharon he would laugh in their faces and dare them to land a blow on his reputation. Unfortunately, we’re dealing with a far more fragile political figure than Sharon. And it seems a shame that a young soldier’s fate is held hostage not only to Hamas, but also to Ehud Olmert’s perhaps waning political career.

Annan Accuses Israel of Lebanon Ceasefire Violations, Calls for Lifting Blockade

Tuesday, August 29th, 2006

Israel lifted its air blockade of Lebanon long enough to allow Kofi Annan’s helicopter to fly from there to Tel Aviv where he met with families of the kidnapped soldiers and defense minister Peretz. But after hearing the statements he made Israel may’ve wished it hadn’t let him in:

Annan said this week the Lebanese saw the blockade as a “humiliation and infringement of their sovereignty”. But he also urged Beirut to exert control over its borders to stop arms smuggling.

“I will also discuss … with the prime minister the need to lift that blockade as soon as possible in order to allow Lebanon to go on with normal commercial activities and also rebuild its economy,” he said.

Israel provided a semi-response which at least puts it on record as signaling an indefinite time in the future when it would end the blockade:

Mr Peretz said told the secretary-general that Israeli troops would remain in southern Lebanon for “several weeks, no longer than that”, and would pull out once the UN’s expanded peace force was on the ground in “reasonable” numbers.”

But those Israelis must think Kofi’s a big kidder because this is what Haaretz reports on the subject:

However, a diplomatic source told Haaretz Tuesday that while Annan has publicly expressed reservations over the ongoing blockade, the UN quietly recognized that the blockade had to continue until UNIFIL forces completed their deployment along the Lebanon-Syrian border.

Interesting that Haaretz quotes a “diplomatic source” who in turn quotes an unnamed UN source leaving you unable to determine whether this statement is worth a wad of toilet paper in terms of credibility. I’d tend to question it myself as Israel doesn’t have a stellar record of truth-telling when it comes to this war.

The NY Times notes that Annan also charged Israel with numerous ceasefire violations:

A daily report from Unifil that Mr. Annan gave to Israel’s defense minister, Amir Peretz, Tuesday evening showed that Hezbollah had violated the cease-fire four times, while Israel had done so nearly 70 times. “Hezbollah is showing incredible discipline,” Mr. Annan said.

The BBC notes that it highly unusual for a UN secretary general to visit Israel:

Put simply, Israel currently needs the UN…

Mr Olmert’s only hope of regaining public support is a secure northern border – and that can only happen through the UN force, our correspondent says.

In fact, I can’t remember this happening in my lifetime going back to 1967, though my memory may be faulty. It’s quite astonishing to see, since the only thing that Israelis hate more than the UN is Palestinian terrorists–or so it has seemed to me when I lived there. The idea of an Israeli PM “needing” the UN so much that he welcomes the Secretary General there is something akin to Alice watching herself grow taller and smaller in Alice in Wonderland–it’s just that strange. And it illustrates how tenuous Olmert’s hold on political power is right now.

Tuesday, August 29th, 2006

Land of the South

New York Times Ignorant Of World West of Hudson River

Monday, August 28th, 2006

The Times is great at covering New York City and even Washington, DC. It’s excellent as well with most of its international coverage. But anything happening west of the Hudson River or more specifically on the west coast–fuhgeddabowdit! They sometimes just don’t have a clue. To rib them a bit more, here’s a Correction from today’s Style section (not appearing at nytimes.com):

An article last Sunday about transgender lesbians referred incorrectly to Judith Halberstam, a gender theorist and professor of literature whose books include Female Masculinity. She teaches at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles; it has no San Diego campus.

Indeed. As any southern Californian would know. But not apparently, many New York Times reporters.

Lebanon War Fallout: Peretz’s Career Over; Nasrallah’s Regret; and the War Protesters’ Confused Message

Sunday, August 27th, 2006

God, if this interview with Sheikh Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, doesn’t make you pissed then nothing will. I bet many of my fellow bloggers in Lebanon are enraged:

Hezbollah would not have abducted two Israel Defense Forces soldiers on July 12 had it known that the action would lead to war in Lebanon, the movement’s secretary general Hassan Nasrallah said in an interview on Lebanon’s NTV Sunday.

“We did not think that the capture would lead to a war at this time and of this magnitude. You ask me if I had known on July 11 … that the operation would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say no, absolutely not,” he said.

Nasrallah also said he did not believe there would be a second round of fighting with Israel, and stated that Hezbollah would adhere to the cease-fire…

Well, gee. Thanks for your candor and admitting that you goofed big time but…1,000 Lebanese dead, $1-billion damage, 1 million displaced and only now you say you miscalculated. Goddamn. The guy should be flogged within an inch of his life for the utter stupidity of his remarks and strategy. From Beirut to the Beltway has a much fuller and clearer portrayal of Nasrallah’s remarks.

Not that I’m letting the other side off the hook either. Far as I’m concerned, Olmert and his crowd are a perfect match in horrific miscalculation for Nasrallah. The latter didn’t expect Israel’s PM to turn into a virtual madman; and Olmert didn’t expect Hezbollah to fight. Oh how they both erred and both deserve each other! So far none of the leaders have paid for their cruel mistakes–only their people have paid with their lives, the homes, and their livelihoods. To quote a famous 19th century Hasidic rebbe: Leyt din v’leyt dayan (“There is no justice, there is no judge”).

Can Amir Peretz’s political career be over? If recent polls are any indication it might be:

As public criticism against the country’s leadership mounts in the wake of the war in Lebanon, senior sources at the Labor Party predicted Sunday that Defense Minister Amir Peretz might be forced to fight to keep his position as party chairman sooner than in the primaries scheduled for May 2007.

Peretz plummeted in polls held on the weekend, and Labor was shown to have lost half of its support.

According to the sources, “when Amir Peretz scores a single percent on the question whether he is suitable to be prime minister, his public career is over.”

“It is clear to all that a party that wants to survive cannot have as its leader a person who cannot be elected, and it seems that there is no choice but to replace Peretz,” the sources said.

“A single percent?” Wow, that’s amazing. And to think that only six months ago many observers like myself were so hopeful with his victory over Shimon Peres and ascendancy to leadership of the Labor Party. I recall writing here when Peretz accepted the defense portfolio that it was a big gamble which didn’t seem a sure enough bet to be worthy taking. Certainly, if Peretz had been a successful defense minister then his career would’ve been made and he would appear as a truly wise politician. But it seemed more likely that defense might be a trap. He could just as easily fail at a job he’d never had any real preparation for and then be made the scapegoat by his political opponents for his failure. This is precisely what has happened. To quote that old folk song: “I don’t know why he swallowed that fly? I think he’ll die” (politically, that is):

Many at the Labor link the party’s debilitated public standing with Peretz’ agreeing to assume the position of defense minister in the hope this would help build his image as a leader on a national scale.

…Minister Ophir Pines-Paz on Sunday blamed Prime Minister Ehud Olmert for having appointed Peretz as defense minister.

Speaking on Army Radio Pines-Paz said he believes Olmert was wrong in declining Labor’s request to appoint Peretz as finance minister: “This is where the original sin began.”

Yes, indeed the original sin was Olmert’s. But Peretz had the power to say no and ultimately didn’t. It was his career to make or break. And he appears to have broken it.

I have been following the Lebanon war protests as they’ve evolved in Israel over the past week or so. And I must say I’m befuddled. In the U.S., we have an anti-war movement that reflects upon the failure of the Iraq war. But this movement doesn’t say the U.S.’ main mistake has been in not taking it to our enemy forcefully enough. That’s one of the main criticisms offered by the Israeli protesters. I just don’t get it.

You’ve just fought one of the most disastrous wars in the nation’s history. Hundreds killed and wounded. Cities and villages ravaged. The war’s goals unrealized. I’d have thought that the Israeli protesters would have focused on this and drawn the proper conclusion: that the goals and strategy of the war were flawed. But in a country dominated by a military culture and security obsession it is sometimes hard to see things like this clearly.

Gideon Levy has written an incisive critique of the protest movement for Haaretz:

The confused youth who sat crying with their guitars and candles in the city square in Tel Aviv after Rabin’s assassination are now sitting in the Rose Garden opposite the Prime Minister’s Office, no less confused, and seemingly protesting against the war – of course only after it ended.

Just as it was impossible to know what the candle kids wanted, it is difficult to understand what the reservists and the bereaved families want. Most of their complaints should be directed at themselves: Where were you until now? If it is only the demand that some officials go home, it’s a waste of their time and ours. Clones of those who are deposed will replace them very quickly and nothing will change. Olmert, Peretz and Halutz will go home, and Netanyahu, Mofaz and Barak will come to power.

For the first time after many terrible years in which we killed and were killed for no reason, there are question marks hanging over the public discourse. That change should be welcomed. But those who examine the content of the new protest should not hold out great hopes. The arguments of the protesters come down to two main issues, both of them as narrow as the world of the reservist: the IDF wasn’t prepared for the war, and the war was cut short.

On the first matter, many are responsible, and the second issue doesn’t warrant protest. Much weightier and deeper questions hover in the air about why we even went to this war, how it could have been avoided, why is war our only language, what are the limits of power that can be used and where are we going now. The new protest movement is not raising those questions.

…Above all, the petition signers and sit-in protesters in the Rose Garden should ask themselves where they were until now. Except for the “oranges” among them, most voted Kadima, maybe Likud or Labor, many of them served in reserves in the occupied territories, dealt with their personal affairs and kept quiet. For years they took direct or indirect part in worthless national projects, from building the wall to the settlement enterprise and deepening the occupation. With their own eyes they saw how the IDF was turned into an occupying police force, bullying the weak but untrained to deal with the strong.

They protected settlers, saw the suffering caused by the occupation, were witness to or participated in abuse of Palestinians. The responsibility for the IDF’s lack of preparation, therefore, is theirs, partly because of what they did and partly because of their silence. They cannot claim now that they were surprised by the IDF’s failure to execute: they were there when the army changed its face. They knew all these years that checking IDs at roadblocks, invading bedrooms, chasing children in alleys and demolishing thousands of houses is no preparation for war.

Levy raises an important objection to the protesters’ charge that the war was cut short. His sentiment is one I’ve voiced here in praise of Olmert’s decision to curtail the war:

The other matter, the halt in the fighting, certainly does not warrant protest, but actually a compliment. Instead of asking why the war broke out, the protesters are asking why it ended. If there is anything that the war’s command deserves credit for it is its hesitation in the final stages of the war. It is a shame they did not hesitate sooner. And if we had continued the war, where exactly would we have ended up? It was the resolve, hubris and haste of the war’s leadership in the first stages that were the original sin against which the protest should be directed.

Levy concludes with his most telling criticism of the new protest movement: it’s lack of moral focus.

Above all, it is depressing to find out that none of the protesters are raising moral questions. A protest movement that says nothing about the terrible destruction we wreaked in Lebanon, how we killed hundreds of innocent civilians and turned tens of thousands into impoverished refugees is by definition not a moral movement. Even after it has been proved that the excessive force was not effective, no protest has been directed at it. How long will we only focus on ourselves and our distress?

Is it too much to ask for the protesters, who are supposedly the cadres of the avant garde, to look for a moment at what we did to another nation? Why is it that after Sabra and Chatilla massacres, which were not even directly our handiwork, masses of people took to the streets and now nobody peeps about the destruction we sowed in Lebanon with our own hands, and for nothing?

This movement has no clear vision, no clear agenda, no clear purpose other than removing Olmert, Peretz and Halutz from office which, as Levy says is a terribly limited set of objectives. I don’t see how it can gain traction and resonate with the broader public in the long term. And if it does, then I fear the damage that will be done in terms of the quality of politicians who will be ascendant in the wake of Olmert’s demise: Netanyahu, Lieberman and the crazy-quilt of the Israeli far right. What a way to run a country! Put the militarists in charge after the utter failure of a militarist solution to the Lebanon conflict. Makes perfect sense to me.

Moshe Katsav Revives the ‘High Tech Lynching’

Saturday, August 26th, 2006

What is it about testosterone-driven male politicians who can’t seem to keep their dicks in their pants, that makes them drag out histrionic metaphors when charged with sexual misconduct? Remember Clarence Thomas’s boatload of mordant self-pity in response to Anita Hill’s charges of sexual harassment at his confirmation hearings?

[This] is a high-tech lynching for uppity blacks who in any way deign to think for themselves, to do for themselves, to have different ideas, and it is a message that unless you kowtow to an old order, this is what will happen to you. You will be lynched, destroyed, caricatured by a committee of the US Senate rather than hung from a tree.

Katsav has been accused of rape by a former employee. A female Israeli politician just revealed that she met with the accuser and finds her story entirely credible. Not to be outdone in the realm of self-pity, Katsav has played his “lynch” card:

Mr. Katsav, who many expect will have to resign the presidency, said: “I don’t know which is worse: when under a nondemocratic regime people are lynched and physically murdered, or a democratic regime, when a person’s soul is murdered and he is publicly lynched without trial and investigation.”

What’s interesting here is that both Thomas and Katsav describe their treatment as a “lynching.” If we remember that most lynchings (in American at least) involved the charge against a black male of a sexual advance toward a white woman, then the lynching becomes a form of ultimate male castration. In fact, a good number of lynchings included this form of mutilation.

So what both Thomas and Katsav are saying in effect is that they are being castrated for their sexual conduct. Isn’t it interesting that men who don’t understand the meaning of civility and respect for women should complain that their obnoxious behavior is causing them to be sexually abused when it is they in fact who have abused their victims. It would be as if Adolph Hitler could come back from the grave to accuse his Jewish victims of exterminating him.