Tikun Olam-תקון עולם: Make the World a Better Place

Nationally noted political blogger, Peter Daou, who writes the Daou Report for Salon, announced that he would begin doing political consulting for Hilary Clinton’s upcoming presidential campaign. One of his alleged goals will be to try to undo some of the damage done to her reputation by the savage attacks emanating from political blogs like Daily Kos and many others. In short, most Democratic political bloggers detest Hilary. Daou’s going to try to undo that or at least mitigate it. All I can say is good luck. I think he’s running a fool’s errand.

But what I personally find even more troubling is that Daou will continue to be affiliated with Salon & the Daou Report while he works for Hilary Clinton. To me this raises too many possibilities of conflict of interest between his allegiance to Clinton’s campaign and the interests of his Salon readers.

While I generally decried the attacks on Kos by David Brooks & Chris Suellentrop, one thing I thought valid was the latter’s contention that when you’re a political blogger who also consults you have two masters. Can you serve each one well and not do a disservice to either? Perhaps. But perhaps not.

I think it’s too much of a crapshoot for Salon not to disaffiliate with Peter for the duration of his involvement with Clinton. When he writes about politics in ways that even remotely intersect with Clinton how will we know which hat he has on? How can we see him as a fully disinterested observer of the political scene? In short, how can we fully trust what he’s saying to us?

My views on this subject are influenced by the post I just wrote about Kos’ troubles with the conservative and moderate media types who’ve just tried to roast him for various alleged ethical misdeeds. In that post, I called for a political blogging code of conduct which, among other things, would insist that political bloggers enumerate precisely their consulting relationships: how much they’re making, who they work for, etc. But the issue for Daou and Salon is even more complicated since Salon is not his site. That’s why I think it would be far better for the two to part ways at least temporarily.

It’s similar to what happens when a media/news personality declares themselves a candidate for political office. It’s customary for the customary for the candidate to take a leave of absence so that the radio or TV station’s credibility and non-partisanship will not be questioned. I don’t think the Daou-Salon situation is much different.

As for Salon, what will it do with Daou’s material? Will it publish a disclosure each time he publishes which notes his involvement with Clinton. And if not, why not? How will it enforce a separation between Daou’s work for the site and his political affiliation? How will it guarantee that his professional prejudices will not inform his writing for Salon? I have written to Salon asking them to clarify what their policy is regarding their politics writers who consult for political candidates; and what Daou’s relationship with Salon will be while he works for Clinton. No answer yet.

tags peter-daou, political-blogging-and-political-consulting-conflict-of, salon.com

We are in an eerie phase of Israel’s Gaza invasion. Operations have begun and Israeli forces have entered the territory. Some offensive operations have begun but mostly from the air or artillery. The major expected ground assault has not materialized. Palestinians are poised for the worst, but they know they’ve only seen the tip of the iceberg.

Reading today’s Haaretz, it seems there may be disagreement among Olmert, Peretz, chief of staff Halutz and his own senior commanders on what the proper order of battle should be:

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert on Thursday rejected a proposal by Defense Minister Amir Peretz and the Israel Defense Forces for a ground operation in the northern Gaza Strip against the ongoing Qassam rocket fire.

According to government sources, the operation, which will target Beit Hanun, will take place, but Olmert wants the operation to be “prolonged and exhausting,” and did not believe that the plan he was shown fit the bill…

The sources added that while IDF Chief of Staff Dan Halutz approved the plan, other IDF officers opposed it, and Olmert was informed of their objections.

The operation was aimed at halting Qassam rockets from being fired at southern Israel. Meanwhile, six of the homemade rockets struck the western Negev and Sderot on Thursday evening.

As best I can tell, Peretz (possibly along with Halutz) seems to have prepared a short range plan that would attempt to knock out Qassam sites, but would not involve a thorough “cleansing” or wholesale or long-term eradication of such capability. Olmert, after hearing of displeasure expressed by Halutz’s commanders has ordered Peretz’s plan thoroughly revised so that it will be a longer and more comprehensive operation.

One can only wonder what more Israel can do than it already has done to stop the rocket launches. And certainly no plan, whether it be Peretz’s or Olmert’s will stop a determined enemy from attacking Israel in whatever way and by whatever means are available to it.

Another consideration may be causing a delay in the full-scale assault: an Egyptian request to give its mediators several more days to broker an agreement. Notably, Khaled Meshal was due in Egypt today to speak with Egypt’s intelligence chief presumably to find a way to reach a compromise that might satisfy both Israel and the militants. Peretz appears in favor of the delay while his presumably more hot-headed field commanders may be tearing at the bit to attack. At any rate, there seems little love lost between the Defense Minister and whoever the unnamed “defense officials” may be who are referred to here:

Defense officials were furious at Peretz Thursday night, accusing him both of revealing that the planned military offensive in northern Gaza had been postponed and of denying initial reports that the postponement had been at Egypt’s request.

Part of the IDF’s plan in supposedly rooting out the Qassam menace appears to involve a forced exodus of the Palestinian civilian population from northern Gaza:

Meanwhile, in Gaza…leaflets were flung from helicopters last night over Beit Lahiye and Beit Hanoun, the two northeast corner towns of Gaza used by Qassam rocket launching crews to set up their attacks on the Israeli hamlets and towns around Gaza. The leaflets warned residents ‘to stay away’ as the IDF prepared to shell the residential areas and move in. Not since Operation Grapes of Wrath in southern Lebanon, when Israel warned civilians to leave south Lebanon and then proceeded to shell the region to drive out Hizbollah forces, has Israel taken a step so clearly aimed at forcing people out of their homes…Operation Grapes of Wrath ended with an accidental Israeli shelling of a UN encampment set up to provide refuge for fleeing Lebanese, killing some 120 people. As of noon…there were reports of hundreds of Beit Lahiye and Beit Hanoun families moving out of the area.

Robert adds the reference to the grave shelling error during Operation Grapes of Wrath which forced its demise. This of course reminds us of just how capable the IDF is of royally messing up its operations through the wholesale killings of Palestinian civilians. Would anyone care to doubt that this outcome is certain if all-out hostilities commence in Gaza?

Presumably, elimination of northern Gaza’s civilian population would give Israel freer reign to extirpate both the Qassams and the militants who fire them. But to me this strategy is little better than the U.S. strategy in retaking Fallujah last year. You have a “cesspool of violence” (their view not mine) and so decide to root out the evildoers. First you uproot civilians, then you go in and get the bad guys. Problem is, the bad guys have long gone by the time you get even remotely close to where you could catch them. Eventually, you have to leave as you cannot occupy the town forever. So what happens? The bad guys reinfiltrate Fallujah and you’re back where you started. Except for the casualties and dead on our side and theirs.

And even should you “cleanse” Fallujah (or northern Gaza) of bad guys, they just move elsewhere finding a weak point in our defenses to exploit. In the case of Fallujah, the insurgents moved to other towns in Anbar province.

One only wonders how this would work out in Gaza. But it’s entirely possible that once the IDF leaves the bad guys will simply move back into northern Gaza and take up where they left off. Unless, that is, the IDF plans on entirely and permanently uprooting Beit Lahiya and Beit Hanun, the two towns nearest to the launching sites. This of course would be a violation of the Geneva Conventions as would be a semi-forced expulsion/exodus of civilians from the area in order to promote the IDF’s ease in uprooting the militants.

In this hour of darkness, it is some small comfort to find brothers and sisters in arms who share my mistrust of the IDF’s plan and motives; and who hold out some hope that somehow common sense, cooler heads, call it what you will, can prevail and avoid the utter horror and bloodshed that appear to be in store should the IDF let loose with a full scale assault. Robert Rosenberg has been that “brother” over the past few days. His Ariga report today echoes many of the thoughts I wrote in yesterday’s report on the Gaza horror (given the time difference between the west coast and Israel, we may’ve even been writing at almost the same time).

Israel Using Hamas Political Echelon As Bargaining Chips?

Rosenberg expands upon the Shin Bet’s strange plan to arrest virtually the entire Hamas political echelon (at least those who weren’t smart enough to go underground to evade capture) and investigate them for their supposed complicity in terrorist crimes:

…Israel…put into motion a secret plan approved weeks ago by Attorney General Menachem Mazuz — the arrest of dozens of Hamas officials, including ministers and parliamentarians in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The 87 Hamas officials, including 64 elected officials, from Palestinian parliamentarians to at least two major city mayors (Jenin and Qalqiliya), are not being held as counter-hostages, as part of Israel’s efforts to win the release of captured soldier Gilad Shalit, Israeli officials insisted. They are all going to be questioned as suspects in specific terror cases and charged if evidence is found against them. Among those arrested are at least two Palestinians suspected of direct involvement in the murder of Asheri.

A separate Haaretz article quotes the IDF’s denial that the detainees (or should we call them ‘kidnap victims??’) are ‘bargaining chips’:

An IDF spokeswoman said the arrests were part of an operation against suspected terrorists, and were not “bargaining chips” for the release of abducted IDF soldier Corporal Gilad Shalit.

“They are not bargaining chips for the return of the soldier. It was simply an operation against a terrorist organization,” she said. “They will be investigated, brought before a judge to extend their detention and charge sheets will be prepared.”

You can see how much credence Haaretz gives to the army’s denial in the following sentence which directly contradicts the IDF:

The arrests are part of several moves designed to increase pressure on the militant group to free a captive soldier. Israel blames Hamas for the abduction of Shalit, kidnapped Sunday by militants who attacked an IDF post near the border with Gaza.

Army Radio speculated that the lawmakers might be used to trade for the captured soldier, but the IDF refused to comment on the matter.

Those who follow official Israeli government pronouncements as I do will know how to read these tea leaves: whenever an official denies that Israel’s tactics are intended to achieve thus-and-such a goal, you pretty much know that the denied motivation is precisely the actual one that motivates the Israelis. So of course the Hamas operatives ARE being held as counter-hostages despite what Israel’s Kabuki spokespeople say. But the very idea that such a stupid plan can have its desired impact of threatening or cowing or even dismantling Hamas and the PA is ludicrous as Robert notes:

The more pressure on the population, the more the Hamas government wins popular support;

Arresting Hamas Legislators As Attempt to Derail National Unity Government

Today’s NY Times adds another interesting and convincing dimension to the Israeli sweep against Hamas’ elected officials:

Ali Jarbawi, a professor and dean at Birzeit University here, said he thought the real goal was to remove the Hamas government from power.

Israel wants to continue with its unilateral policies based on the idea that there is no “Palestinian partner,” said Mr. Jarbawi, who turned down an offer from Hamas to join the government as an independent. “If you build up your strategy on having no partner, then you have to ensure you don’t have one. So when Palestinians tell you that there is about to be a political agreement among the factions, putting their house in order at last, you intervene.“

So, according to this thinking the coming together of Hamas and Fatah in a national unity government severely threatened Olmert who would rather have a divided and severely weakened PA.

Rosenberg views dubiously Israel’s entire rationale for the Gaza operation:

Operation Summer Rains is thus gradually transforming from an operation…meant to put pressure on the Palestinian population to put pressure on the Hamas government to put pressure on the Hamas militants who are holding Shalit, into an operation with three goals: freeing the soldier, ending the Qassam fire, and bringing down the Hamas government.

But it is not at all clear if it can accomplish any of those three goals. The more pressure on the population, the more the Hamas government wins popular support; even as Israel was issuing dire warnings about the Qassam fire coming from the northern Gaza area, Qassams were being fired into the Western Negev; and even if Israel were to arrest all the Hamas parliamentarians and all its ministers, the Fateh leadership would not be able to step in lest it appeared as if they were merely Israeli collaborators.

Finally, he raises this chilling possibility should Israel actually fully eradicate Hamas and the PA:

Indeed, if Israel is not careful…it could bring down the PA itself. And that would mean Israel is once again responsible not only for security, but for the health, education and welfare of the Palestinians, to the tune of billions of shekels. Furthermore, it would likely mean a new eruption of intifada-style warfare in the territories, which would once again damper the Israeli economy, driving away tourists, harming international investment, and curtailing the impressive 5-6 percent economic growth rate Israel has enjoyed for the last year.

But of course it is not in Israel’s interests to entirely eradicate the PA. Just to cause enough disintegration to prevent anyone from being able to govern effectively. Israel for many reasons vastly prefers a fragmented, ungovernable Palestinian entity to one that is stable and coherent. For while a stable, coherent Palestinian government might rein in militants and end terror; it would also command the respect of the international community and possibly force Israel to negotiate with it in good faith. While some may see this view as cynical, I ask how in heaven’s name can Israel believe what it is doing now can ever lead to any coherent Palestinian governing authority? Sure they can try to destroy Hamas (and fail), but what is their alternative? Fatah? They think Fatah is going to be more moderate or amenable after this mass-hooliganism on Israel’s part? All I can say is “Hah.”

Mubarak Announces Hamas Agrees to Terms for Kidnapped IDF Soldier’s Release

I can’t believe I read the entire Haaretz article referenced above and almost missed the most hopeful part of it (at least potentially hopeful). Hosni Mubarak says that Hamas has agreed to terms for Corp. Shalit’s release:

Palestinian militants have agreed to a conditional release of Shalit, but Israel has not yet accepted their terms, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak said in remarks published Friday.

In an interview with Egypt’s leading pro-government newspaper, Al-Ahram, Mubarak said “Egyptian contacts with several Hamas leaders resulted in preliminary, positive results in the shape of a conditional agreement to hand over the soldier as soon as possible to avoid an escalation.

“But agreement on this has not yet been reached with the Israeli side,” Mubarak said.

The president said he had asked Olmert “not to hurry” the military offensive in Gaza, but to “give additional time to find a peaceful solution to the problem of the kidnapped soldier.”

A Foreign Ministry official said Israel did not know of such an offer.

“In general Israel’s stance is, as the prime minister said earlier, that the soldier will only be released unconditionally and there will be no negotiations with a gang of terrorists and criminals who abducted a soldier from Israeli territory,” the official said.

Mubarak’s remark implied he was claiming a role in Israel’s decision.

“Israeli leaders promised, and I hope they will stick to it, not to shed the blood of innocent Palestinian civilians in any hurried military operation,” Mubarak said.

“At the same time, Egypt warned Hamas leaders of the dire consequences of adopting of tough positions and urged them to shoulder their responsibilities in view of the dangers and difficulties faced by the Palestinian people at the present time,” Mubarak said.

It is hard to know what all this means. Is Mubarak exagerrating the possibility of a solid agreement in order to burnish his own credentials as Mideast peace negotiator? In the event that Hamas is willing to engage in a prisoner swap for Shalit will Israel go along or will it truculently try to force the issue and go it alone in attempting to secure the soldier’s release? I have said many times here that both sides in this conflict “never miss an opportunity to miss an opportunity. Cleary, Mubarak is warning both sides in this particular contretemps not to make the same mistake they’ve made in the past and botch an opportunity to potentially resolve the crisis short of a bloodbath.

And I’d like to know where the Hell is the Bush Administration on this? Why aren’t they restraining both sides with forceful statements instead of milquetoast pronouncements forgotten as soon as they’re uttered? We’re AWOL as usual when push comes to shove in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Israel’s conduct is becoming so outrageous, so beyond the pale of accpeted international norms, that some cooler heads outside the immediate zone of conflict must prevail.

tags ariga.com, beit-hanun, beit-lahiya, fallujah, forced-population-expulsions, gaza-invasion, idf, olmert, peretz, qassams, robert-rosenberg

Right off the bat, let me say that I’m not about the argue that Israel’s invasion of Gaza is precisely like its 1982 invasion of Lebanon (known then as Operation Peace for Galilee). But there are important and interesting similarities. Today’s Haaretz already notes that Ariel Sharon used the attempted assassination of Shlomo Argov, Israel’s ambassador to England as a pretext to launch the attack. The kidnapping of Gilad Shalit serves the same purpose today.

Military strategists note that the most important guarantee of success on the battlefield is having a carefully considered and precise plan. Knowing what you do not want to do is as important as knowing what you do. If you try to do too many things then you are almost guaranteed to fail. Likewise, in some cases (as with our invasion of Iraq) if you try to do too little then you will fail.

Today’s developments in Gaza show that Israel has fallen prey to precisely the same mistake as afflicted its long-term occupation of southern Lebanon. It seems to have allowed its politicians and military strategists to create a wish list of things it would like to accomplish regarding Gaza (this from Ariga.com):

Operation Summer Rains…includes an incursion…into southern Gaza as the first stage of a ‘big operation’ meant to apply military pressure on the Palestinians not only to release captured soldier Gilad Shalit, believed to be held somewhere in southern Gaza, but to end Qassam rocket fire on the Western Negev, ‘rehabilitate’ Israel’s deterrence against the Palestinians, and, say some, to bring down the Hamas government. The next stage began this evening as Israeli TV military reporters said planes would drop thousands of leaflets into the two northeast Gazan towns of Beit Lahiye and Beit Hanoun, warning residents to stay away from the army, which implied it was planning to roll into the area to try stopping the Qassam rockets.

It wants to do too many things and risks failing at all or most of them.

Another point on Israel’s Gaza invasion “wish list” that reared its ugly head today was the desire to decapitate the Hamas-led PA. Hence, the announcement that it has detained 87 (as of this writing) Hamas legislators, government ministers and ‘military operatives.’ The idea that a nation may invade another and imprison the latter’s entire political echelon is quite novel and preposterous. One wonders not only at what Olmert hopes to accomplish by doing so, but also what the actual result will be. If he stopped to think for a mere second he’d realize that every single one of the pols he’s jailed has become an instant hero to the average Palestinian. In fact, this so guarantees Hamas’ continued popularity that one almost wonders whether Olmert has some latent wish for Hamas to continue in power for the indefinite future. If he wishes to drive a wedge between Hamas and the Palestinian people he’s picked precisely the wrong way to do it.

Those old enough to remember the 1982 invasion will recall Sharon’s repeated assurances that the operation was meant as a short-term tactic to end rocket fire from southern Lebanon on Israel’s northern cities (shades of today’s Qassams!). His assurances turned out to mean nothing as Israel occupied southern Lebanon for years, hundreds of young Israelis died, Barak was forced to withdraw in defeat while Hezbollah crowed with victory and made its reputation as an Israeli dragon-slayer. Through last year’s unilateral disengagement from Gaza, Sharon handed Hamas precisely the same victory which in part led to its election victory in parliamentary elections. Olmert, unintentionally perhaps but foolishly nevertheless, seems hellbent on sealing Hamas’ popularity in perpetuity. Does this rhetoric give you deja vu all over again?

‘We have no intention of reoccupying Gaza, or to remain there. We have one main purpose, to bring Gilad home,’ he said. But the press reads the operation differently, with much talk about how the army has plans for going house to house, searching not only for the soldier but for the ‘terrorist infrastructure,’ a euphemism for suspected terrorists, their weapons, and their munitions factories, such as the workshops where the Qasam rockets are made. Israel has conducted many such operations in the past, with mixed results that don’t last very long. Proof? Last night, even as the tanks were rolling into southern Gaza, four Qassams were fired from northern Gaza.

Olmert has made a fool of Condoleeza Rice and her advice yesterday that Israel should “cool it” and give diplomacy a chance. Perhaps she was a fool to think that such advice would register at all with an Israeli political leader faced with a crisis. In such situations historically Israel knows but one language: absolute force. Not that this policy succeeds, much of the time it doesn’t and sometimes it fails miserably, but the force is projected as much to mollify an impotent public as to solve the crisis. Indeed, while such force is meant to convey a message of control and even dominance of the enemy it often betrays an absolute inability to influence events. This, I sadly predict is what must happen in Gaza. One wonders whether George Bush or Condi Rice could muster even an ounce of moxie to call Israel back from the precipice onto which it has crawled by demanding that it exercise restraint and release the Hamas leaders.

It is telling and sad to read Robert Rosenberg’s report that:

The kidnapped soldier’s father meanwhile was saying that the only way Israeli soldiers are ever returned is through negotiations.

Tell it to the PM.

Yet another point Olmert neglects to understand is that those who perpetrated the guerrilla operation that resulted in the kidnapping–Khaled Meshal with the approval of his Syrian protectors–expects precisely the bellicose response which the PM has provided. Israeli overreaction serves the Palestinian rejectionists perfectly. It ratchets up the heat and hatred against Israel AND against the Hamas ‘moderates’ led by Ismail Haniye. It precludes any possible rapprochement between Israeli and the Palestinians. It maintains the bloody status quo.

Shlomo ben Ami made another good point against the Gaza invasion. It bodes terribly ill for Olmert’s proposed West Bank withdrawal. When Israel withdrew unilaterally from Gaza last year it hoped it would be done with Gaza for good. Now, this ‘chicken’ of a delusion has come home to roost:

I think it was wrong to do that [invade Gaza], because — if only for the reasons that affect the stability of the government itself. You see, the government is engaged now in this idea of disengagement from the West Bank. If the they invade the Gaza Strip, what they are going to show to the Israeli opinion and to public opinion, as a whole, is that disengagement, unilateral disengagement, doesn’t work. If you do not coordinate things, either with the Palestinians or through a third party — the Quartet, for example — disengagement creates a frontline in a state of war, in a permanent state of war. And therefore, you’ll have to reoccupy the territory, so what’s the point in disengaging in such a manner? I think the government is exposing the fallacies of its own policy by occupying or reoccupying the Gaza Strip.

As another Haaretz commentator wrote last night, the territorial withdrawals only change the battle lines. Wherever Israel places its Separation Wall will be where the new Qassam battles will be fought.

Finally, 18 year-old Eliyahu Osheri’s body was found buried in a Ramallah field today. He was kidnapped and murdered by the Popular Resistance Committees shortly after his kidnapping on Sunday. To some Palestinians, there might be some modicum of sense in this killing since Osheri hailed from one of the more ideologically hardline West Bank settlements. But to everyone else this crime must be added to all the other horrible ones perpetrated by both sides in the name of national honor and vengeance. In reality, such acts bring no honor to their cause and only promote further rounds of revenge from the enemy camp. So the cycle continues.

The chance of Operation Summer Rains bringing any rain or relief to the Israeli people are about as nonexistent as the chance, way back in 1982, that Operation Peace for Galilee would bring the Galilee, or Israel any peace.

tags ariga.com, ehud-olmert, eliyahu-osheri, gaza-west-bank-withdrawal, gilad-shalit, hamas, israel-gaza-invasion, lebanon-invasion, operation-summer-rains, qassam-rockets

Things just became a whole lot more complicated for the Israeli government as the Popular Resistance Committee, involved in the attack which captured IDF officer Gilad Shalit, also kidnapped a young settler near Ramallah possibly on Sunday. There are unconfirmed reports that the boy may already be dead; though if this is so, it hasn’t stopped the PRC from trying to use the victim as leverage to stop the IDF incursion into Gaza.

Though Ehud Olmert issued an especially harsh, ‘dogs of war’ statement yesterday promising vengeance on anyone involved in the IDF kidnapping (and also on the Hamas political echelon which appears to have had nothing to do with the guerrilla operation), his latest statements appear to have softened ever so slightly. Perhaps this may have something to do with Condi Rice’s direct appeal to Olmert to give diplomacy a chance (which, in the form of the IDF invasion he has clearly rejected):

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on Tuesday called on Israel to give diplomacy more time. “There really needs to be an effort now to try and calm the situation, not to let the situation escalate, and to give diplomacy a chance to work to try to get this release,” Ms. Rice told reporters during a refueling stop in Scotland en route to Pakistan.

Israel and the IDF finds itself in an awkward situation. It has massed troops, tanks and equipment for a massive incursion. It knows Shalit is in the Khan Yunis refugee camp. But it also knows that if it enters that camp it runs a very high risk of causing Shalit’s death. This is indeed what happened to the last IDF soldier kidnapped by Palestinian militants, Nachshon Waxman. Then PM Rabin refused to negotiate with the kidnappers and sent in a rescue force. In the course of the operation both the kidnapped soldier and the mission leader were both killed. One hopes that Olmert will bear this in mind as he proceeds with his plans for this operation.

The IDF supposedly has a plan to ratchet up the pressure on the kidnappers if they refuse to release Shalit. The IDF has a history of talking as if it is capable of fine gradations of tactical response to various situations and then goes in guns blazing with often disastrous results. Let us hope that someone’s listening to the three government ministers including Shimon Peres who urged Olmert not to invade precisely because it might ensure Shalit’s death.

I wonder who chose the name “Operation Summer Rain” for the Gaza incursion, since there isn’t any in Israel or Gaza. They wouldn’t by chance be saying the chance that this operation will bring peace, stability or the release of Gilad Shalit are about as high as the chance of summer rain??

Hamas-Fatah National Unity Government Agreed

Another important development that looms large in the background (or at least SHOULD loom large) is the report that Hamas and Fatah have finally agreed to jointly sign the Prisoner’s Document and create a national unity government within two weeks. I have little hope that Olmert realizes that if such a government IS created precisely the type of political moderation which Israel has been demanding from the PA might be in the offing. That is, if Israel doesn’t roil the waters so savagely in its incursion that the entire Prisoner’s Document/national unity government project becomes a casualty of war.

For a typically obtuse Israeli government response to these Palestinian political developments, read this from the NY Times:

“We are at the edge of the cliff, and everyone is asking the Palestinian leadership to help avert this crisis and release our serviceman,” said Mark Regev, the spokesman for the Foreign Ministry. “Yet energy and time is being put into this prisoners document, and it’s in many ways tragic.”

What IS tragic is Regev’s obtuseness rather than the time and energy spent on the Prisoner’s Document.

Haaretz describes the agreement thusly:

Hamas acceded to Fatah during the negotiations on the contentious points of limiting armed resistance to territories occupied by Israel in 1967 and creating a unity government. The agreement also secures the Palestine Liberation Organization as the single legitimate representative body of Palestinians. According to the agreement, changes will be made to the PLO to integrate within it Islamist organizations.

The agreement also authorizes the PA Chairman to negotiate with Israel on a permanent agreement - sidestepping Israel’s embargo on talks with Hamas - and paves the way for a national Palestinian referendum.

There is disagreement among them as to whether Hamas, in signing the document, has tacitly recognized Israel. Some in Hamas say they haven’t. But Haaretz quotes a representative:

Hamas accepted it only after amendments it insisted would allow it to…reject any suggestion the deal could imply it now accepts Israel’s existence.

“The document included a clear clause referring to the non-recognition of the legitimacy of the occupation,” said Hamas spokesman Sami Abu Zuhri.

The NY Times article helpfully clarifies the ‘occupation’ reference:

By the last phrase, Hamas normally means the occupation of historic Palestine by an Israeli state of any kind; the Hamas charter explicitly says that Palestine is Islamic waqf — land given by God to Muslims, who cannot cede it or sell it.

I suppose the proof of the pudding regarding recognition is in the implementation. If the coming national unity government takes steps indicating that it does accept Israel then we will know where Hamas stands; and if the Hamas members of this government refuse to participate in such steps then we will also know where it stands.

tags fatah, gilad-shalit, haaretz, hamas, idf-gaza-incursion, new-york-times, olmert, palestinian-national-unity-government, popular-resistance-committee, settler-kidnapping

Ori Nir reports in The Forward that pro-Israel neocon, Malcolm Hoenlein and his Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations “umbrella” group have entered the fray against the Palestinian Prisoner’s Document which seeks Hamas’ acceptance of a two-state solution and an end to terror attacks outside of the Green Line (among other things). Many Palestinians, Israelis and Mideast analysts have welcomed this initiative as a possible breakthrough that might eventually lead to Israeli-Palestinian final status peace negotiations. In this blog, I have attempted to address the Prisoner’s Document cautiously but optimistically as have a number of stories in the Israeli press. I don’t think any of us is oblivious to the difficult road ahead if the Document is to be turned into a long-range plan leading to peace negotiations. There is oh so much that can go wrong. Just look at the events of the last two days as a perfect example of an attempt to derail the Document.

But Hoenlein, apparently fearing that the Document might take on a life of its own in world opinion has taken to the ramparts to do battle against it:

American Jewish organizations are strongly criticizing the document guiding national unity talks between Hamas and Fatah officials…

For Palestinians, observers said, the purpose of hammering out a unified platform is not to trigger talks with Israel. Instead, the negotiations surrounding the document appear aimed at preventing an internal civil war and breaking the financial siege that the international community has imposed on the Palestinian Authority…

“This is not a platform for negotiations with Israel, but for negotiations between Palestinians,” Haim Malka said. Malka is a Middle East expert with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a Washington think tank…

Several Jewish groups — including the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, the 52-member umbrella group widely seen as the Jewish community’s main united voice on Middle Eastern affairs — are complaining that the Palestinian document driving the Hamas-Fatah talks has wrongly been described in the media as a “peace plan.”

“Not only is this not a peace plan, but it expresses positions that are much more hard line than the ones believed to be Fatah’s position on issues such as the right of return [of Palestinian refugees] and what they call the right of resistance” to Israel, said Malcolm Hoenlein, executive vice chairman of the Presidents Conference.

The document, Hoenlein told the Forward, could only hinder future negotiations with Palestinian moderates, because it would blur distinctions between them and militants tied to Hamas and to other terrorist groups. “What this would say is that Hamas and Fatah of Abbas have now become the same thing,” Hoenlein said.

Any reasonable observer will note the inanity of much of this poppycock which passes for “analysis.” First, the Prisoner’s Document is clearly meant to lead eventually to “triggering talks with Israel.” Merely stating that the Document is not intended to lead to negotiation is what passes for well-reasoned political argument in the pro-Israel community. Those who suggest there is no intent to lead to negotiation are little more than propagandists and utter fools to boot.

This doesn’t mean that the Document isn’t also meant to break the PA’s international isolation as the above passage indicates. Those two objectives are by no means in conflict nor does one preclude the other. Second, the Document clearly IS a peace plan. Yes, it does contain different provisions than ones previously endorsed by Fatah. But the problem with the Hoenlein view is that it neglects to take into account that Fatah is no longer in power. Hamas for now holds the reins and until now Hamas has not endorsed any of the provisions in the Document.

Further, Hoenlein conveniently neglects to mention a key provision of the Document calling on Hamas to accept previously negotiated agreements (like Oslo) adopted by the PLO. If Hamas signs on to this provision then it will in effect be endorsing precisely those positions which Fatah has endorsed (recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence, etc.). There goes Hoenlein’s argument out the window!

In other words, the Prisoner’s Document is a complex one which must not be reduced to a few propaganda sound bytes. Those who do, like Hoenlein, will convince no one but their own acolytes of the rightness of their analysis.

One small piece of carping about Nir’s coverage. Certainly, Malcolm Hoenlein and CPMJO’s views on the Prisoner’s Document are important and worth covering. But could he not find any other commentator to provide an alternate view? By not doing so, Nir in effect cedes the field to the mainstream pro-Israel groups allowing readers to believe that the Jewish community speaks with one voice on this issue. Nothing could be farther from the truth. In fact, I’m willing to bet that if you polled American Jews providing them with the basic provisions of the Prisoner’s Document and asked whether it was a worthwhile proposal which deserved consideration by Israel–that a majority of us Jews would agree with the proposition. The fact that a majority of the American Jewish fatcat pro-Israel leadership does not, merely indicates how much they exist in their own isolation chamber, a place that is divorced not only from the majority of American Jewry but from Israeli interests as well.

There are Israeli commentators and this blog as well which espouse an alternate view of the Document. Could one of us have not been cited by Nir so as to provide some balance to the article? I’ve written to Nir about this–we’ll see what, if anything, is his response.

tags conference-of-presidents-of-major-jewish-organizations, fatah, hamas, malcolm-hoenlein, opposition-to-palestinian-prisoners-document, ori-nir, the-forward

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